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As towns and cities grow, pressure on infrastructure increases, from 
schools and hospitals to utilities and transport. As always, resources 
available to governments are limited. Prudent choices are therefore 
essential.
Interviews with government officials and surveys of members of the 
New Zealand Government Economics Network and the Economic 
Society of Australia revealed some not inconsiderable disquiet about 
the use — and non-use — of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in government 
decision-making.
Like any analytical tool, CBA can be misused, but it remains the most 
rigorous method available to assist decision-makers. It is the central 
tenet of this monograph — supported by survey results — that one 
practical means of improving quality is to harmonise the framework 
that is used for CBA in the various Australian and New Zealand 
jurisdictions. Greater transparency — through publication of all CBA 
studies commissioned by governments — is an important complement 
to harmonisation, albeit one requiring a degree of political courage.
Discount rates are typically the focus of those promoting analytical 
consistency in CBA. But results can also be sensitive to input variables 
such as travel time, the depressive effect of taxes or loans used to fund 
infrastructure, and the application of risk analysis. Recognising this, 
the following pages argue for a comprehensive systematisation of the 
framework used for CBA.
Dr Leo Dobes (Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian 
National University) is the primary author of the publication. Dr George 
Argyrous (Australia and New Zealand School of Government and 
University of New South Wales) was the principal author of Chapter 2 
(with econometric analysis contributed by Dr Patrick Doupe, Crawford 
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Economics is about choice. The resources available to society — from 
people, machines and materials to environment goods — are limited. 
Scarcity means that using a specific resource for one project or policy 
will preclude its availability for alternative uses.
Project funding should thus be considered against the context of 
missed opportunities. At the most confronting level, a decision-maker 
may need to ask how many people will die because the government 
spent money to reduce bushfire hazards (e.g. Ashe et al., 2012), 
for example, rather than providing more diagnostic equipment in 
hospitals. As Gittins (2015) observes, ‘the moral of opportunity cost 
is: since you can’t have everything, choose carefully’.
It is a primary role of governments to direct social resources to where 
they will most benefit the community as a whole. Cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) can be used to assist governments in making relevant decisions. 
While it should not be seen as replacing common sense, or political 
judgement, it is an important tool in ensuring that government 
is informed of the costs and benefits to society of proposed actions.
Although it is difficult to formulate a concise, non-technical definition 
of CBA, however, its objective can be summarised as the assessment of 
proposed public projects, policies or regulations to determine whether 
their social benefits exceed their social costs. Chapter 4 describes the 
technique of CBA as a series of sequential steps. 
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The basic decision rule in CBA is that the additional social benefits 
should exceed the additional social costs, even if some members of 
society may be adversely affected by a project. Social cost-benefit 
analysis is the most systematic and rigorous tool for informing decision-
makers of the likely net benefits of a policy, program or project.
In principle, CBA can be applied to virtually any project or 
policy. Examples include reducing blood alcohol limits for drivers 
(Leung,  2013), addressing gambling addiction (Productivity 
Commission, 1999), including health warnings on tobacco 
products (Abelson, 2003a), phasing out lightweight plastic bags 
(Allen Consulting, 2006), pursuing water fluoridation (Doessel, 1979), 
climate change mitigation (Garnaut, 2008), and preservation of river 
red gum forests through improved environmental water flows (Bennett, 
2008). In practice, it is generally easier to estimate the costs and 
benefits of infrastructure projects, such as a dam (Saddler et al., 1980) 
or a transport improvement (Tsolakis et al., 1991), than less tangible 
elements, such as the effect on national pride or esprit de corps of a 
country that proposes to host the Olympic or Commonwealth games 
(Moore et al., 2010). It is for this reason that pedagogic presentations 
of CBA tend to use infrastructure projects as examples.
The terms ‘economic analysis’, ‘economic appraisal’ and ‘economic 
evaluation’ are sometimes used as substitutes for ‘cost-benefit 
analysis’. The term cost-benefit analysis itself is a shortened form of 
the more descriptive ‘social cost-benefit analysis’, which indicates 
that conventional CBA automatically includes all social elements of a 
proposal — financial, environmental and social — from the perspective 
of all the actors in a society. While these alternative terms may have 
specialised meanings in some bureaucracies or disciplines, they 
are generally used interchangeably in the literature, and have been 
treated as being equivalent in this monograph. A slight difference in 
the United States is usage of the term ‘benefit-cost analysis’ (BCA) or 
‘social benefit-cost analysis’.
North American textbooks typically ascribe the emergence of the 
official use of CBA to the 1936 US Flood Control Act, although it has 
been argued that the antecedents of CBA in America extend back 
further in time (e.g. Reuss, 1992). The 1936 legislation contained the 
now-famous phrase that flood-control projects should proceed ‘if the 
benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated 
3
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cost, and if the lives and social security of people are otherwise 
adversely affected’. Several presidential executive orders in the last 
three decades have extended and strengthened requirements for 
Federal US agencies to undertake economic appraisals for projects and 
regulatory proposals. 
1.1 Economic evaluation in Australia 
Economic appraisal of projects has firm roots in Australia. In evidence to 
a committee of the Victorian Parliament discussing railways legislation 
in 1871, the responsible engineer provided a detailed exposition of 
the application of discounted cash flow methodology (Evidence Taken 
at the Bar of the Legislative Council …, 1871, appendices K & L). 
His example demonstrated that it would be cheaper to build a wooden 
viaduct that would last for only 10 years and rebuild it every decade 
thereafter, than to build a stone structure with steel girders that would 
last for 100 years.
In examining proposals for gauge unification prior to Federation, 
the colonial railways commissioners drew on rudimentary economic 
appraisals (Dobes, 2008). Studies were published by academics 
(e.g. Webb & McMaster, 1975) and on behalf of government (see Sinden 
& Thampapillai, 1995, app. 1) intermittently during the latter part 
of the 20th century (mainly for a couple of decades from the 1960s), 
which was the heyday of CBA in Australia.
Australian governments, including at the federal level, however, have 
been diffident at best in requiring economic appraisals of projects and 
regulatory measures. There is no statutory equivalent in Australia to 
the 1936 US Flood Control Act to require analysis of social costs and 
benefits of policy or project proposals. The Commonwealth Treasury 
(1966) published an information bulletin supplement that outlined 
the essentials of CBA and, in 1988, New South Wales became the 
first government in Australia to require all proposals by all agencies 
for new capital projects to be supported by an economic appraisal 
(pers. comm. NSW Treasury, 20 August 2015). 
Upon taking office, new governments have on occasion announced 
that Cabinet would only consider expenditure proposals supported 
by an economic appraisal. These good intentions have been wont 
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to fall into abeyance, particularly as senior or politically influential 
ministers have often been able to gain prime ministerial approval to 
have their submissions considered ‘under the table’ in Cabinet, thus 
circumventing any prescribed evaluation processes. 
Further, projects are necessarily submitted by ministers to Cabinet 
at different times during the life of a government. They cannot, 
therefore, be compared at the same time, with only the best ones 
being chosen. Clearly, standards of some sort are required to ensure 
a degree of intertemporal comparability. One commonplace standard 
is that net present value (NPV) exceed zero, or the benefit-cost ratio 
(BCR) should exceed one. In the absence of a harmonised approach, 
however, the calculation of the components of NPVs and BCRs can be 
manipulated in different ways, limiting their utility as decision rules 
(see also Chapter 5). It is therefore something of a mystery how the 
Cabinets of state and national governments can validly compare the 
relative merits of different proposals.
A potential source of public cynicism about government appraisal 
of major projects is the avoidance of CBA entirely, even for major 
projects that generate negative externalities. One means of avoiding 
undertaking a CBA that captures the effect of a project on the whole 
affected community is to establish so-called community consultation 
groups. 
In 2011, for example, the Australian Government established such 
groups (Department of Infrastructure and Transport, 2011) to 
ostensibly allow ‘Australians to have a bigger say in the planning and 
operation of … airports’. Australian airports are able to seek approval 
for major changes of use through the development of 20-year master 
plans, without CBA. The private sector lessees of Canberra Airport, for 
example, obtained approval (Truss, 2015) to introduce international 
flights in a curfew-free situation. Given the obvious potential for large 
aircraft to increase noise disturbance for residents of Canberra and 
Queanbeyan, it is disconcerting that, in this case, social costs have 
been ignored in policy formulation.
5
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1.2 Regulatory impact statements
Australian Government processes that are intended to ensure rigorous 
evaluation of proposals for regulatory measures have fared little better 
than general economic appraisal. The Office of Regulation Review 
was established in 1986 and succeeded by the Office of Best Practice 
Regulation (OBPR), which issued detailed guidelines on conducting 
a  CBA. Harrison (2009, pp. 44–45) pinpointed the reasons for the 
flawed nature of the processes involved:
Many regulations (such as delegated legislation) do not go to Cabinet, 
and can be passed without OBPR approval. Whether a Department that 
does so is declared non-compliant depends on OBPR staff detecting 
regulations that should have been subject to an RIA [regulatory 
impact assessment] process. There is not much incentive to declare 
regulations that have already been passed as non-compliant, as this 
could upset the Department and Minister, and potentially embarrass 
the government. Not only is it easier (and less work) to declare 
a  regulation compliant with (or exempt from) the RIA process, it is 
difficult for the conscientious to see any positive results from declaring 
a passed regulation non-compliant. The only sanction is an increased 
non-compliant proportion of the Department’s regulations in the 
OBPR Annual Report (a fact which may even be seen to reflect badly 
on the OBPR and the RIA process if it is in fact noticed by anyone) … 
Likewise, life is more difficult for an OBPR officer if an RIS [regulatory 
impact statement] is declared inadequate. Rejections are scrutinised 
closely; acceptances are not. Pressure on the junior staff can include 
irate telephone calls to their supervisor from a Departmental Secretary 
or Minister. The result is the so-called tick-and-flick mentality.
Detailed CBA guidelines were removed from the OBPR website soon 
after the transfer of the OBPR from the Department of Finance to the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet following the September 
2013 election. The guidelines were replaced by the Australian 
Government Guide to Regulation (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014), 
which is focused specifically on the regulatory impact statement 
(RIS) process.
The current Guide to Regulation presents a general framework template 
for appraising proposed regulations. Although it requires an evaluation 
of the net benefit of the proposed regulation, it adopts triple bottom 
line language and an approach that recommends assessing impacts 
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such as ‘lower prices … improved productivity or the creation of new 
jobs’ to ‘achieve some form of desirable social outcome’. Quantification 
of benefits and costs is specified in terms of ‘business, community 
organisations and individuals to a level of detail commensurate with 
the impact of the policy proposal’. It therefore bears little relationship 
to a rigorous, conventional CBA.
The scope for CBA to be used in decision-making has recently been 
expanded by a number of jurisdictions. Queensland Government (2014), 
New South Wales Government (2013) and the Western Australian 
Program Evaluation Unit (2015) are examples of whole of government 
evaluation frameworks that refer explicitly to both cost-effectiveness 
and CBA as relevant types of summative evaluation approaches. 
These frameworks tie funding for a program to the adoption of explicit 
plans for how the program will be assessed in terms of effectiveness 
and efficiency. Such evaluation plans are increasingly including CBAs 
to address the issue of allocative efficiency. 
1.3 Economic evaluation in New Zealand
Like Australia, New Zealand has a long history of economic 
appraisal of projects, and all regulatory and legislative proposals 
require completion and publication of a RIS. Initially used for major 
highway improvements, the use of CBA was extended in the 1980s 
to all road projects. The New Zealand Transport Agency (2013) 
Economic Evaluation Manual (EEM) provides a set of detailed input 
variable values for use in transport analysis, with update factors 
published regularly.
The New Zealand Treasury has developed expertise in CBA over the 
years. It provides evaluation and assessment guidelines to government 
departments on how to complete CBAs and regulation impact 
statements. It updated its 2005 Guide to Social Cost Benefit Analysis 
(the Guide) in July 2015 (New Zealand Treasury, 2015). The Guide 
(pp. 48–49) covers the principal aspects of CBA, specifies values for 
discount rates and the value of statistical life, as well as specifying a 
factor of 20 per cent of project costs to allow for the deadweight loss 
of taxes where a project is funded by general taxation. 
7
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However, the Guide (p. 45) also outlines a living standards framework 
that is intended to complement a CBA, if not already taken into 
account in the CBA. The living standards framework promoted by the 
Treasury has the following five elements:
• economic growth (intended as a proxy for increases in overall 
economic welfare, which is what CBA tries to measure)
• sustainability for the future (usually taken to refer to impacts on 
climate change, biodiversity and loss of natural habitat, but can 
also refer to fiscal sustainability)
• increasing equity (usually taken to refer to ensuring there is a safety 
net, to reducing income inequality and to achieving procedural 
fairness)
• social infrastructure (refers to institutional structures and customs 
that underpin the way society works. They reduce the transaction 
costs of doing business, of securing one’s income and property, and 
of social interactions)
• managing risks.
It is not clear from the Guide, however, how these principles are 
practically implemented during Cabinet consideration of project 
proposals, or why the underlying principles would not have already 
been taken into account in a social cost-benefit analysis.
1.4 Confusion and opaqueness in the area 
of economic evaluation
An instructive comment made by an agency in one Australian 
jurisdiction during background research for this volume was that 
politicians often call for a CBA, but few, if any, actually understand 
what a CBA is. The same appears to be true of many public servants. 
This raises the broader question of whether politicians can rely on the 
advice of public servants, or even on their advice regarding studies 
commissioned from specialist consultants. At the extreme, it raises 
the fundamental question of whether a minister who presents what is 
purported to be a CBA in support of legislation is guilty of misleading 
parliament if the analysis is not based firmly on established economic 
principles.
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Clarke’s (1995) examination of the abortive introduction of the Australia 
Card scheme illustrates the lack of even basic levels of expertise in the 
Australian Public Service. An excerpt is worth quoting at length: 
The over-enthusiasm of the Department [of Social Security] for the 
program is of historical interest. Of ongoing concern, however, was 
the Department’s failure to apply conventional cost/benefit analysis 
principles to the exercise. Indeed, there was evidence of failure to 
even understand the concepts involved. In the 1992 [Annual] Report, 
for example, net present value techniques were not applied, hardware 
and maintenance costs were overlooked, no costs were imputed for the 
efforts of other agencies and clients (which in the case of a program 
of such wide scope is essential), and the bases on which savings were 
projected into the future were not stated. The most glaring error 
was the complete omission of the staff costs involved in 137,000 
manual examinations of files, 18,000 actual reviews, 10,000 actions 
against clients, 1,300 queries by clients, 150 formal appeals, 1,500 
debt recovery actions (of which 700 involved negotiations with the 
debtor), and 100 briefings of the Director of Public Prosecutions. This 
omission was despite statements that ‘the real cost has been in the 
time and effort of staff administering the program’ and ‘the reporting 
requirements are stringent and a lot of time and effort is needed to 
comply with them’ … 
The Privacy Commissioner expressed similar concerns, albeit more 
gently … An external audit [by the Australian National Audit Office] of 
the Parallel Data Matching Program also criticised the quality of cost/
benefit analysis undertaken, and pointed out that the Act ‘requires 
the tabling of a comprehensive report in both House of Parliament 
… Sufficiently comprehensive cost/benefit information had not been 
included in either Report … ’ 
Clarke’s example highlights the importance of requiring a 
rigorous and  comprehensive analysis of social costs and benefits. 
More importantly, it demonstrates that mandating the use of rigorous 
cost-benefit (or other) analysis will not be effective unless the 
bureaucracy understands the underlying principles, and applies them 
of its own volition. Cultural factors are more important, therefore, 
than formal guidelines and rules.
In recent years, the term cost-benefit analysis has been appropriated 
by the financial sector, where it is now frequently used to refer to 
additional costs and revenues — in terms of cash flows alone — that 
are generated by a private sector (i.e. commercial) project. Such studies 
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are based on financial, rather than economic values. Compounding the 
problem is the fact that media commentators rarely, if ever, explain 
their terminology. Confusion about the meaning of CBA is, therefore, 
understandable.
A further source of potential confusion is the fact that public projects 
and programs can validly be analysed from a number of different 
perspectives: government budgets, social CBA, a ‘business case’, off-
budget financial analysis of a public–private partnership, or impact 
analysis. Any or all of these approaches may constitute valid analytical 
or presentational perspectives, depending on the purpose at hand. It is 
not always clear to non-technical audiences, however, which is being 
presented or why. The lack of technical understanding, compounded 
by a lack of clarity in usage, can spark debate that flows at cross-
purposes because protagonists do not make sufficiently clear which 
perspective or technique is being discussed. 
Possibly due to the complexity of social CBA, or simply in reaction 
to its perceived focus on economic efficiency alone, policymakers 
in many countries, including Australia, began to use multi-criteria 
analysis (MCA) from about the 1980s. Appendix 2 uses a road-
widening example to illustrate why ‘composite index’ approaches like 
MCA are subjective and arbitrary (see also, Ergas, 2009; and Dobes & 
Bennett, 2009). Nevertheless, some government agencies present MCA 
as an alternative to CBA when it is felt that not all costs or benefits 
can be quantified (e.g. Government of Victoria, 2014, p. 14), or as a 
complementary approach that supplements perceived gaps in CBA. 
It is therefore not surprising that some public servants and politicians 
may be confused about the appropriateness of different methods of 
undertaking a project or policy appraisal.
1.5 What can be done to improve the use 
of economic evaluation?
Handbooks of CBA have been produced by a number of state 
agencies, as well as by the Commonwealth (Department of Finance and 
Administration, 2006). While these handbooks are useful, and help 
raise general awareness about the technique, they can provide only 
a summary of the theory and techniques available in more detailed 
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textbooks and journal articles. Moreover, they generally tend to 
outline what should be done, but often neglect to address the issue of 
what should not be done. 
Despite the existence of government manuals and handbooks that 
provide the basics of CBA, all does not seem to be well in terms of 
the application of CBA in the various jurisdictions. Chapter 2 reports 
the results of a survey of academics, public servants, non-government 
organisations and private sector (including consultants) individuals in 
Australia and New Zealand. Their responses indicate that CBA is not 
conducted independently and objectively, is used to ‘justify rather 
than inform’ and is not always undertaken on important decisions. 
Almost two-thirds of survey respondents supported, with qualification, 
greater harmonisation of variable values and methodologies in CBA as 
a means of increasing consistency in analysis. A third or so supported 
the approach without qualification. Interviews with government 
officials in the various jurisdictions confirmed that there was some 
degree of underlying support for increased harmonisation, either to 
achieve better quality or to facilitate the use of CBA by agencies with 
limited expertise. Chapter 3, therefore, examines different possible 
approaches to harmonisation, but concludes that harmonising variable 
and parameter values or methodologies at a national or state level 
would require a level of effort that would be impracticable.
Chapter 4 proposes harmonisation of only the framework to be used 
for CBA. While such frameworks already exist in textbooks and many 
government manuals and handbooks, Chapter 4 proposes a framework 
that requires an increased level of consistency and transparency. 
For example, in the first step of specifying the objective of a project, 
a  list of alternative means of achieving the objective is required, 
as  well  as the reasons for not including any of them in the CBA 
analysis. Similarly, where standard features like risk analysis are not 
used, an explicit explanation for the omission is required. 
A ‘belts and braces’ approach is advocated in Chapter 5. Government 
handbooks are invariably authored by an official or consultant who 
is familiar with CBA and the emphasis tends to be on what ought to 
be done in carrying out an economic evaluation. True, warnings and 
caveats are typically included about issues like double counting or 
the limitations of benefit-cost ratios, but it is rare, for example, to see 
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a comprehensive discussion on why the number of jobs created by a 
project should not be included in the CBA. At best, a handbook will 
indicate that issues such as job creation should be discussed separately 
to the CBA. While such advice is not incorrect, a non-expert may not 
fully appreciate the reason for it. To reduce the scope for potential 
error, an explicit explanation of erroneous approaches would assist in 
harmonising the quality of CBA studies.
Finally, a number of appendices have been included to assist readers 





Professional perspectives on 
harmonisation and cost‑benefit 
analysis in Australia and 
New Zealand 
Following interviews with government agencies in the various 
jurisdictions over the period October to December 2014, it was 
apparent that there was only patchy use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
in Australia and New Zealand. 
At one extreme, transport agencies were generally well equipped with 
expert analysts and modelling capability to carry out conventional 
CBA studies of proposed projects. Some, but not all, central agencies 
possessed in-house expertise in CBA but were generally engaged only 
in reviewing studies prepared by line agencies or their consultants as 
part of budgetary processes. Health and environment agencies, which 
generally lacked CBA expertise, tended to favour the introduction 
of  harmonised values to facilitate utilisation of CBA in their 
portfolio areas.
Available resources did not permit more extensive face-to-face 
canvassing of views with portfolios other than the central agencies: 
transport, health and environment. In order to access a wider range of 
views among those familiar with CBA, a survey of professionals was 
conducted under the auspices of the Economic Society of Australia 
(ESA) and the Government Economics Network in New Zealand. 
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The objective of the survey was to identify the views of respondents 
about the use of CBA in public sector decision-making and the 
potential for greater harmonisation of parameters and variable values.
2.1 General survey responses
The web-based survey questionnaire (see Annex to this chapter) was 
distributed to 1,068 members of the ESA and the participants in a CBA 
Forum hosted by the NSW Branch of the ESA and NSW Trade and 
Investment in Sydney on 18 July 2014. An identical questionnaire was 
distributed to 774 members of the Government Economics Network 
in New Zealand. In total, 360 responses out of 1842 were received, 
although not all questions were answered by all respondents.
Table 2.1: Responses by area of employment and education
Respondent characteristics Per cent
Employment sector (n=229)
Australian Public Service 22%




Highest level of education (n = 357)
undergraduate degree — economics 29%
Postgraduate degree — economics 36%
Postgraduate degree — business, finance, or public administration 11%
undergraduate degree — other discipline 15%
Postgraduate degree — other discipline 10%
Source: George Argyrous with Sara rahman
Table 2.1 indicates that respondents were spread across the public, 
private, and academic sectors, with 55 per cent of respondents 
having worked in their current position for 10 years or more. Fewer 
than 14 per cent had held their current position for less than two 
years. Further, respondents came from a wide range of policy fields, 
including transport, environment, health, and urban planning, with 
only 14 per cent listing their work field as ‘economics’. Respondents 
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were also highly qualified, with over half having a postgraduate 
degree, and high economic literacy, with over two-thirds having 
a degree in economics. 
In terms of experience with CBAs, respondents showed a reasonable 
level of familiarity with various aspects of the use of CBAs in decision-
making, as shown in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: Responses by degree of experience with CBA 
Level of experience Per cent
Preparing CBAs (n = 310)
Not at all experienced 22%
Some experience 44%
high level of experience 34%
Arranging for CBAs to be prepared (n = 299)
Not at all experienced 34%
Some experience 41%
high level of experience 25%
Reviewing CBAs (n = 309)
Not at all experienced 17%
Some experience 46%
high level of experience 37%
Using the results of CBAs (n = 307)
Not at all experienced 12%
Some experience 48%
high level of experience 39%
Source: George Argyrous with Sara rahman
Prior to seeking the views of respondents on the specific issue of 
harmonisation of CBA values and methodologies, information was 
sought on their views regarding some of the broader issues faced 
by those using CBA in policy formulation and decision-making. 
Respondents were asked to rate and rank the importance of a range of 
issues relevant to CBA on a five-point Likert scale with a range from 
0 to 4. Table 2.3 presents the main results.
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Table 2.3: Importance of issues associated with the use of CBAs
CBA issue Mean rating 
score
Per cent rating this as 
the most important issue
CBAs are undertaken at the wrong time 2 .2 2 .0%
The wrong options for CBAs are being 
considered
2 .6 4 .3%
The results of CBAs are not effectively 
communicated
2 .8 5 .5%
variables used in CBAs (e.g. discount rates, 
value of time) are not consistent
2 .7 5 .9%
CBAs are not generally published 2 .8 6 .7%
Policies and programs are not evaluated 
using ex post CBA
3 .2 7 .1%
CBAs are ignored in decision‑making 2 .8 11 .1%
CBAs are not being conducted 
independently and objectively
2 .9 12 .3%
CBAs are being used to justify rather 
than inform
3 .1 22 .1%
CBAs are not undertaken on important 
decisions
3 .1 22 .9%
Source: George Argyrous with Sara rahman
There was variation among different groups of respondents regarding 
the relative importance of the issues listed in Table 2.3. In general, 
respondents from outside of the public sectors in Australia and New 
Zealand were less concerned about the issues listed in Table 2.3. Most 
notably, public sector respondents did not feel as strongly that CBAs 
are not undertaken for important decisions, or that they are not being 
conducted independently or objectively, or ignored in decision-
making. A smaller proportion of New Zealand public sector respondents 
indicated that the fact that CBAs are not generally published was an 
important issue compared with their Australian counterparts, which 
possibly reflects a different culture of transparency. Table 2.5 below 
provides more detail.
As might be expected, there were differences between groups of 
respondents regarding the issue that was considered to be the most 
important. One quarter of Australian respondents placed emphasis on 
the issue that ‘CBAs are not undertaken on important decisions’, but 
other groups rated as most important the view that ‘CBAs are used to 
justify rather than inform’. No group considered that ‘variables used 
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in CBAs (e.g. discount rates, value of time) are not consistent’ as a 
major issue, with less than 10 per cent rating this issue as the most 
important across any cross-classification of respondents.
Support for harmonisation predominated, although Table 2.4 indicates 
that it was not unqualified. Support for trans-Tasman harmonisation 
of CBA, however, was not as effusive as support for within-country 
and within-jurisdiction harmonisation.




















Do not support 5 .3% 4 .8% 7 .6% 25 .8%
Support with 
qualifications
63 .0% 62 .0% 66 .1% 63 .6%
Support without 
qualifications
31 .7% 33 .2% 26 .3% 10 .6%
Source: George Argyrous with Sara rahman
More respondents from the public sector supported harmonisation, 
mainly for consistency purposes and cross-departmental comparisons 
to be made possible. A significant group, however, also supported 
the alternative of greater transparency through publication. This 
was largely based on the need to accommodate and justify different 
variables for sector-specific areas. 
Private sector respondents were evenly split between harmonisation 
and transparency — with support for harmonisation based on much 
the same reasons as those given by public sector counterparts. 
Transparency was considered to be the best way to improve the overall 
quality of CBAs.
Academics also tended to favour harmonisation, but most had 
reservations regarding how values were to be set; they were sceptical 
about the ability of a centralised body to set good standards for 
variables.
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2.2 Quantitative analysis of survey results
To investigate the strength of the survey results in greater detail, the 
data were interrogated econometrically to check for insights about 
relationships between the characteristics of respondents and the 
answers that they provided to survey questions. The key details of the 
survey are reproduced below as an annex to this chapter.
The survey questions were grouped around four broad themes:
• application and usage of CBA studies 
• support for greater harmonisation in CBA across agencies 
and jurisdictions 
• principles and preferences for increased harmonisation 
• potential areas for greater harmonisation in CBAs. 
Results in tables 2.5 to 2.8 are presented in blocks based on these four 
themes. Various questions were asked within each theme and overall 
there were 30 questions posed in questions 2, 4, 5 and 7 of the survey 
(which were used as dependent variables) and, therefore, 30 (ordinal 
logistic) regressions. Due to the large number of regressions and 
covariates involved, only those relationships that were statistically 
significant at the 10 per cent level are presented in the tables, but with 
actual p-values shown in brackets. The tables provide information 
about which sectors, jurisdictions or experience levels favoured 
survey question propositions more (or less) than others.
The survey questions were posed on 3- or 5-point Likert scales, so that 
numerical values from 0 to 2 or 0 to 4 were assigned to them in order 
to estimate relationships. A higher value means the respondent agrees 
more with, or assigns a higher importance to, the survey question. 
Although a ranking of 2 is ‘higher’ than a ranking of 1, it is not ‘twice 
as large’. There is no numerical measure of distance between the 
scores. The numerical values represent an ordinal scale rather than a 
cardinal measure.
An important assumption in the model is, therefore, that the 
relationship between each pair of outcome rankings is homogenous; 
for example, the estimate of moving from, ‘do not support’ to ‘support 
with qualifications’ is the same distance as moving from ‘support with 
qualifications’ to ‘support without qualifications’. 
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Because the survey questions have an ordinal structure, ordinal 
logistic regression was used to analyse the data. Estimated regression 
coefficients were converted to proportional odds ratios. A proportional 
odds ratio of 2 can be interpreted as a characteristic having twice 
the odds (twice as likely) of being associated with a higher ranking 
response to the survey question. A proportional odds ratio of 0.5 
means that those with the characteristics are half as likely to rate a 
given issue as being important.
Based on questions 1, 8, 9 and 10 of the survey, four broad classes of 
characteristics were used — CBA experience, education, employment 
sector and job experience — and their component categories formed 
the independent variables in the 30 logistic regressions. 
‘CBA experience’ refers to four sub-categories in descending order 
of extent of experience:
• preparing CBAs
• arranging for CBAs to be prepared
• reviewing CBAs
• using CBA results
Survey question 1 asked respondents to indicate their level of 
experience against each of these four sub-categories on a 5-point scale. 
Responses stating ‘Not applicable’ or ‘Can’t say’ were eliminated, 
leaving only three levels of experience for each of the four categories:
• high level of experience (assigned value of 2)
• some experience (assigned value of 1)
• not at all experienced (assigned value of 0).
Response values were averaged across the four sub-categories. 
The  independent variable ‘CBA experience’ was then defined by 
combining those with a high level and some level of experience, 
relative to the base case of ‘not at all experienced’.
Sub-categories for education included the following variables:
• undergraduate: economics 
• undergraduate: other discipline
• postgraduate: economics
• postgraduate: business, finance, public administration
• postgraduate: other.
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In tables 2.5 to 2.7, ‘Economics qualification’ includes both 
undergraduate and postgraduate economics qualifications 
(i.e. excluding business, finance, or associated disciplines). Results for 
the economics qualification dummy variable (value 1) are expressed 
relative to the base case (value 0) of undergraduate and postgraduate 
qualifications in all other disciplines. 
A dummy variable of value 1 was used for ‘Postgraduate qualification’, 
which included all postgraduate qualifications, irrespective 
of  discipline. The base case was therefore ‘no postgraduate 
qualification’, irrespective of discipline.
The following sectoral employment variables were used on the basis 
of survey information collected: 
• academic
• public sector: Australian state government
• public sector: Australian (Commonwealth) Government 
• public sector: New Zealand
• ‘other’ sector: student, retiree, non-government organisation
• private sector: the base case dummy variable; all other sector 
results are expressed relative to the private sector.
‘Job experience’ refers to the number of years of experience in the area 
of current employment. Possible responses ranged from 0 (less than 
one year) to 10, as well as a category for ‘more than 10’. The number of 
years in the job was compared to a base case of 0 (less than one year). 
Regression coefficients in the tables are interpreted as the increase in 
the odds for a one-year increase in experience.
Survey respondents’ views were sought regarding the importance of 
issues to do with the way that CBAs are used or not used. Table 2.5 
presents results that were significant at least at the 10 per cent 
level, with p-levels shown in brackets below the logit coefficients. 
Respondents with economics qualifications were roughly twice as 
likely as non-economists to consider that ‘CBAs not being published’, 
or ‘CBAs being undertaken at the wrong time’, were important issues. 
Respondents classified as part of ‘other’ sector (students, retirees, 
NGOs) were between 2.8 and 7.6 times more likely than those in the 
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private sector to rate the following issues as more important: CBAs 
used as justification for projects; CBAs not being consistent, evaluated, 
published, or the results being ignored. 
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CBAs are undertaken 







Note: p‑values are shown in brackets below the logit values (logarithms of the odds ratios) 
recorded in the body of the table. See text for interpretation of logit values.
Source: Patrick Doupe
Respondents from the NZ public sector were two to three times less 
likely to find some issues more important relative to the private 
sector. These issues were that CBAs are being used to justify rather 
than inform; not being undertaken; or, when undertaken, being 
undertaken at the wrong time. Respondents with more experience 
in CBAs, however, were less likely than their less experienced peers 
to think that CBAs ‘being used to justify rather than inform’ is an 
important issue.
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Note: p‑values are shown in brackets below the logit values (logarithms of the odds ratios) 
recorded in the body of the table. See text for interpretation of logit values.
Source: Patrick Doupe
Survey question 4 asked respondents about the desired degree of 
harmonisation of input variables used in CBAs. Opinions differed 
across the Tasman (Table 2.6). Amongst public sector employees, 
those from New Zealand were two times more likely than their private 
sector counterparts to believe that harmonisation across agencies was 
important. State-level public sector employees from Australia were 
two times less likely than private sector respondents to hold such 
a view. Australian Commonwealth public sector employees did not 
differ significantly from private sector respondents in their views.
Those with an economics qualification were 2.2 times more likely 
than non-economists to be associated with a higher preference for 
CBA harmonisation across similar agencies in a country. Postgraduates 
(all disciplines) were 2.6 times more likely than those without a 
higher degree to be associated with a preference for harmonisation 
between Australia and New Zealand. Those with more job experience 
were less likely to be associated with a preference for trans-Tasman 
harmonisation.
Table 2.7 analyses responses to survey question 5, which asked 
respondents for their preferences surrounding harmonisation based 
on different approaches and principles. 
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Note: p‑values are shown in brackets below the logit values (logarithms of the odds ratios) 
recorded in the body of the table. See text for interpretation of logit values.
Source: Patrick Doupe
NGO workers, students and retirees (‘Sector other’) exhibited a higher 
propensity relative to the private sector to designate disclosure of 
estimation methods as more important in fostering harmonisation. 
This includes making the results and probability distributions or 
variable values publicly available. Academic economists were three 
times more likely than the private sector to believe that full disclosure 
of the estimation method was more important. On the other hand, 
Australian state public employees were two times less likely than the 
private sector to consider disclosure to be important. 
Surprisingly, those with an economics qualification were only 
half as likely as non-economists to consider the clear definition of 
variables used in CBA to be important. Respondents with greater 
CBA experience were more likely than those without CBA experience 
to think that agreement about how variables will be updated in the 
future is important.
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flora and fauna values 1 .763
(0 .027)
Period of the analysis 0 .893
(0 .017)
Social discount rate 1 .696
(0 .02)






Note: p‑values are shown in brackets below the logit values (logarithms of the odds ratios) 
recorded in the body of the table. See text for interpretation of logit values.
Source: Patrick Doupe
Question seven asked survey respondents about potential areas of 
harmonisation of values in CBA (results shown in Table 2.8). Greater 
CBA experience was associated with a higher weight on the importance 
of harmonisation for flora and fauna values, the social discount rate and 
the value of a statistical life. Greater job experience had an opposing 
relationship with harmonisation of deadweight loss and specification 
of the period under analysis. Relative to the private sector, academic 
respondents were less likely to consider that harmonisation of the 
value of a statistical life was important.
2.3 General qualitative feedback
Some qualitative feedback reinforced points already made above, but 
other, more nuanced points were also made. Some of the more notable 
issues raised were as follows:
• When ex ante CBA is employed to support a particular policy instead 
of informing decision-making, ex post CBA is not undertaken.
• CBAs do not necessarily mean that a project is rejected or approved 
solely based on the CBA, rather CBA is used as a tool for decision-
makers to make informed decisions, especially since some factors 
cannot be easily monetised or there are mandatory restrictions on 
programs and their outcomes (e.g. targets/standards).
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• Where only an ex post CBA is undertaken, viable options that 
should have been considered in an ex ante CBA are not examined 
at all.
• Due to the subjective nature of CBAs, a wide range of calibrations 
to the analysis can be justified. Monetary considerations, coupled 
with the view of CBAs as subjective, leads to pressure on 
practitioners to manipulate variables to support a client’s position, 
effectively resulting in an ‘opinion for hire’ market for CBAs. 
• Discount rates were a specific concern, with several respondents 
citing instances of discount rates being manipulated to 
‘spectacularly high’ levels in order to dismiss a particular policy. 
Non-market values were also cited to be commonly and easily 
manipulated to achieve ‘desirable’ results.
• Although some respondents thought that publication would be 
enough to solve the problems faced by CBA, a smaller group was 
concerned that, without proper communication and explanation 
of CBAs, the general public would remain uninformed about their 
content and how to assess their validity. If the public is to influence 
debate using the CBAs, then they must be able to access the full 
assumptions, model and calculations involved in CBAs as well as 
have enough knowledge to understand how to interpret them.
• Having clear definitions would make a big difference to how CBAs 
are understood and applied in decision-making and would ease 
comparisons and external validation of different CBAs.
• Harmonisation was thought to be best implemented as default 
values or ranges and included for comparison purposes 
across different analyses, with alternative values allowed with 
justifications for scenario-testing purposes. This approach was 
thought to reconcile the need for reducing manipulation while 
allowing for practitioners to use their expertise in employing 
different approaches. Significant disagreement persists, however, 
over how harmonisation should be carried out and whether it is a 
superior solution to greater transparency in the CBA process.
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2.4 Qualitative responses reflecting 
concerns about harmonisation
Qualitative responses reflecting concerns about the concept 
of harmonisation were equally illuminating and instructive. 
The following is a paraphrased selection of comments made: 
• The most common concern that respondents expressed regarding 
harmonisation related to differences in parameters and situations 
across different jurisdictions, countries, and agencies, which would 
make harmonisation difficult. 
• Additionally, some were concerned that standardisation across 
sectors could result in certain types of projects being favoured 
more than others. Examples given of possible difficulties in 
harmonisation were interest rates across different countries, laws 
in different jurisdictions and different non-market valuations 
across different sectors. 
• Another concern regarding possible harmonisation of CBA 
standards is the degree to which standards can be ignored. 
Harmonisation and rules must prevent tinkering for political 
purposes, but allow enough flexibility to allow practitioners to 
conduct accurate or more robust analyses for their projects and to 
account for difficulties in collecting data.
• Harmonisation was also thought to possibly restrict debate 
and prevent innovation in how CBAs are conducted, with some 
respondents saying that CBAs should be a ‘brain on’ and not a 
‘brain off’ process. The innovation and debate process was thought 
to be important, especially with some doubting the ability of a 
centralised body to create good standards. 
• Creativity can be encouraged, because, over time, external scrutiny 
of transparent CBA processes may lead to a convergence around 
key variable values, without that having to be a formal process.
• Disagreement was also widespread over which variables should be 
standardised. One way that respondents approached this was to 
harmonise variables that they classified as stable across jurisdictions 
and areas. There was no real agreement, however, on what these 
variables were, with disagreements even over key variables, such 
as the period of analysis and discount rates.
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• Some respondents supported harmonisation of variables which the 
average practitioner could not estimate better than standardised 
values — basically those that may be difficult to estimate.
• There was more agreement about variables that should not be 
standardised than those that should — travel time, flora and fauna, 
and analysis periods were the major variables that were thought 
to not be suitable for harmonisation whereas harmonisation of the 
value of statistical life and the cost of emissions was supported.
Annex to Chapter 2: Survey questionnaire1
1. How would you rate your experience with each of the 
following CBA activities?




















2. In your view, how important are each of the following issues 
in the use of CBAs as part of public sector decision-making? 
 0 — Not at 
all an issue 






CBAs are ignored in 
decision‑making 
CBAs are not generally 
published 
1  The survey questionnaire was compiled by Leo Dobes, George Argyrous and Joanne Leung 
with input by Richard Tooth. The questionnaire was administered by Diane Litherland on behalf 
of the Economic Society of Australia which sponsored the survey. Initial results were compiled 
by Sara Rahman and George Argyrous. Econometric analysis was carried out by Patrick Doupe.
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 0 — Not at 
all an issue 






The wrong options 
for CBAs are being 
considered 
CBAs are undertaken 
at the wrong time 
The results of CBAs 
are not effectively 
communicated 




Policies and programs 
are not evaluated 
using ex post CBA 
CBAs are being used 
to justify rather than 
inform 
CBAs are not 
undertaken on 
important decisions 
variables used in 
CBAs (e.g. discount 
rates, value of time) 
are not consistent 
3. Which of these issues do you consider to be the MOST 
IMPORTANT in the use of CBAs as part of public sector 
decision-making?
CBAs are not undertaken on important decisions
The wrong options for CBAs are being considered
CBAs are undertaken at the wrong time
CBAs are being used to justify rather than inform
CBAs are not being conducted independently and objectively
CBAs are ignored in decision-making
CBAs are not effectively communicated
CBAs are not generally published
Variables used in CBAs (e.g. discount rates, value of time) are not 
consistent
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The following questions relate to the degree of harmonisation that 
public sector agencies across Australia and New Zealand should 
adopt. In this case harmonisation means the extent to which agencies 
should use agreed values, or ranges of values, for major elements 
of public sector CBAs, including consistency in the approaches to 
determining those values. Harmonisation does not mean uniformity 
or standardisation. It refers to guideline values that can be ignored if 
specific, local estimates can be justified as being better.
4. To what extent do you support greater harmonisation 
of input variables used in CBA undertaken by government 
agencies, or consultants commissioned by these agencies?








within each jurisdiction 
Across similar agencies 
within a country 
Across jurisdictions 
within a country 
Between Australia and 
New Zealand 
Can you provide the reasons for your opinion? 
5. If a policy of harmonisation were to be adopted for public 
sector CBAs, please rate each of the following principles in 
terms of their importance to help guide the specification of 
input variables. 
 0 — Not at 
all important 






variable capable of 
clear definition 
Ease of collection of 
data required 
variable value and 
underlying data to 
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 0 — Not at 
all important 
















variables that have 
significant influence 
on net present 
values 
Agreement on how 
values are to be 
updated in future 
6. Which of these principles do you regard as the 
MOST IMPORTANT? 
Variable capable of clear definition 
Ease of collection of data required 
Variable value and underlying data to be made publicly available 
Probability distribution of variable values made available 
Full disclosure of estimation method used 
Harmonised variable values used as default only
Harmonise only variables that have significant influence on net 
present values 
Agreement on how values are to be updated in future
7. Do you generally support, within each jurisdiction, 
harmonisation of the values, or range of values or consistency 
in the approaches to determining those values, for each of the 
following CBA input variables? 










Period of the analysis 
(by type of project or 
regulation) 
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Noise (by source 
of noise; e .g . cars, 
aircraft) 
Travel time 
Social discount rate 
Damage cost of 
greenhouse gas 
emissions 
value of statistical life 
flora and fauna 
values 
Deadweight loss due 
to tax‑funded project 
Can you provide the reasons for your opinion? 
These final questions will provide some background to our survey 
respondents. Your responses will remain confidential and anonymous
8. Which of the following best describes your current or more 
recent position?
Public sector — Australian Commonwealth
Public sector — NSW
Public sector — Victoria
Public sector — Queensland
Public sector — South Australia
Public sector — Western Australia
Public sector — Tasmania
Public sector — Territories
Public sector — New Zealand
Private sector — Consultant
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10. What are your qualifications (select all that apply)?
Undergraduate degree — economics
Undergraduate degree — other discipline
Postgraduate degree — economics
Postgraduate degree — business, finance, or public 
administration





Pressure for structural change in the Australian economy increased 
during the 1970s (e.g. Treasury, 1978; Rattigan, 1986), with significant 
micro-economic reform taking place over the following two decades in 
areas ranging from floating the exchange rate, reducing import tariffs 
and liberalising financial markets, as well as corporatising government 
business enterprises, particularly in transport and telecommunications, 
and exposing them to competition (Willis, 1989; Banks, 2014). Much of 
the policy debate was underpinned by economic analyses undertaken 
by the Productivity Commission and its predecessor institutions.
Almost from its historical beginnings, economic thought has been 
subjected to a variety of criticisms (Pearce & Nash, 1981; Coleman & 
Hagger, 2001; Coleman, 2002). Perhaps due to ‘reform fatigue’, and 
growing attacks by anti-economists on cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
(e.g. Self, 1975) and its ‘econocrat’ proponents, the 1990s presaged a 
reduced political appetite for economic reform and economic appraisal 
of policy proposals. Attacks on so called ‘economic rationalism’ 
(e.g.  Pusey, 1991) and derogatory references to ‘econorats’ by 
opponents to continued reform coincided with the reduced influence 
of economic analysis, in Canberra at least. 
Notwithstanding the publication by the Department of Finance 
(1991; revised 2006) of a Handbook of Cost-Benefit Analysis, subsequent 
decades saw a concomitant increase within the Australian Public 
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Service of managerialist methodologies like triple bottom line reporting 
(e.g. Department of the Environment and Heritage, 2003), and multi-
criteria analysis (MCA) (e.g. Resource Assessment Commission, 1992). 
MCA is examined in Appendix 2.
Despite the projections of the then Federal Department of 
Employment, Education and Training, which considered at the time 
that economists were the third-ranking growth profession, Millmow 
(1995) drew attention to the decline in availability of academic 
positions for economists. Riley (1994) detected a corresponding fall 
in the number of secondary students studying economics. Despite the 
optimism of Maxwell (2003) of a possible renaissance over the next 
50 years in numbers taking tertiary-level economics degrees, Lewis 
et al. (2004) noted a continued decline in numbers. Reviewing an 
Economic Society of Australia (ESA) survey of heads of economics 
departments, Abelson (2005) concluded that student standards had 
also declined, due to lower entry standards, high student–staff ratios, 
and a declining culture of study. A decade later, Lodewijks & Stokes 
(2014) reported on the inevitable consequence, noting the closure of 
economics departments across Australia, with many being subsumed 
within business schools and other faculties.
A desktop survey of 39 Australian university websites in February 
2015 revealed that only five offered undergraduate or postgraduate 
courses devoted to CBA, with a further four offering courses that 
partially covered CBA. This may be an underestimate because details 
were not always fully available of the specific content of postgraduate 
programs and because online search facilities did not always provide 
comprehensive information. Although seven out of eight New 
Zealand universities appear to offer CBA in their undergraduate or 
postgraduate courses, it is uncertain what proportion of students take 
up those courses. 
On the other hand, the Government Economics Network in New 
Zealand has found a high level of demand for CBA courses by 
members, indicating a general lack of sufficient training in this area. 
In Australia, executive courses presented by the Australia and New 
Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG) in various cities in Australia 
and New Zealand, and by the Crawford School of Public Policy at 
The Australian National University in Canberra, continue to attract 
healthy numbers of participants. CBA forums organised in 2014 and 
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2015 by the NSW branch of the ESA and NSW Trade & Investment 
attracted in the order of 200 participants from a range of government 
departments, universities and the private sector. 
Although direct evidence is not available, it is likely that the fall in the 
number of economics graduates and the relatively low number of CBA 
courses offered at universities is reflected in the ostensibly diminished 
extent of CBA expertise in government agencies across Australia. 
A NSW central agency pointed out that the paucity of economic 
positions within the NSW public service that are focused specifically 
on economic evaluation is an important factor in the loss of expertise. 
Any expertise that existed was not harnessed appropriately. A Centre 
for Program Evaluation has recently been established in the NSW 
Treasury in order to concentrate evaluation expertise. 
During face-to-face interviews with staff from government agencies 
from October to December 2014, those responsible for portfolios such 
as health and environment reported that they tended, out of necessity, 
to resort to assistance from their colleagues in other specialised agencies 
when they were required to produce or commission an economic 
appraisal. Transport agencies were seen as repositories of expertise 
and one interviewee related that a contact in the (since abolished) 
Queensland Office of Best Practice Regulation was considered to be 
especially helpful to agencies in that state. 
A number of those interviewed indicated that their strong preference 
to use CBA was stymied by the lack of resources and expertise. 
Interlocutors regularly stated that the provision of harmonised 
‘plug-in’ values endorsed by a central agency or recognised authority 
such as the Productivity Commission would encourage their use 
of CBA.
3.1 Harmonisation versus standardisation
Standardisation implies the inflexible, procrustean imposition of 
pre-specified variable values or methodologies. In other words, 
standardisation would insist on strict uniformity in an economic 
appraisal, with little or no scope for variation, irrespective 
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of circumstances. The less rigid approach of harmonisation is based 
primarily on the use of default values or ‘yardsticks’, or even ranges 
of recommended values. 
In the case of recommended default ‘plug-in’ values, the onus would 
be on the consultant or the government agency concerned to justify 
use of a different value. Justification might be offered on the basis 
of differences in local conditions and greater relevance, or use, for 
example, of more up-to-date information or estimates. To ensure 
transparency, results of CBA studies that use harmonised values could 
be presented in two separate analyses: one using the set ‘plug-in’ 
value and one using values preferred by the analyst. 
Inter- or intra-jurisdictional harmonisation would necessarily require 
agreement not only about the values of the variables themselves, but 
also about the underlying methodology. For example, values used 
for the value of statistical life (VOSL) are generally estimated using 
either the human capital approach or some form of stated preference 
that reflects a change in risk of mortality or morbidity. At present, 
jurisdictions differ in the methodological approach that is used to 
derive a value for this variable, so there can be significant differences 
in values. 
Lack of harmonisation is not a new issue. An example regarding 
its effect was provided several decades ago by McKnight (1982), 
who concluded from a survey of travel time values in Australia that:
the results of the survey indicate a reluctance on the part of most 
agencies to make independent estimates of value of time for use in 
analysis. In general, they lack the appropriate resources or technical 
skills. Consequently these agencies seek some standard, ‘off the shelf’ 
set of values. Most agencies are willing to carry out simple analysis to 
update such standard values to current price levels, but there was no 
uniformity among respondents in the method of update adopted, with 
both consumer price and average wage rate indices being popular.
Nevertheless, harmonisation would also require care to ensure 
internal analytical consistency. Suppose an agency is using the 
value of a life year (VLY) based on a 40-year annuity of an estimate 
of the VOSL, using a specific discount rate. Disregarding the reason 
and appropriateness of choosing between VLY and VOSL, to ensure 
consistency it is necessary to make sure that the overall discount rate 
used for the CBA and for the annuity is the same. 
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The Australian Bureau of Transport Economics (BTE, 2000, p. 29) 
used a central 4 per cent per annum (consumption) discount rate 
to obtain the value of labour lost to society’s production levels due 
to road crashes, while an updated report (Bureau of Infrastructure, 
Transport and Regional Economics, 2009, p. 90) uses a 3 per cent 
rate. However, Austroads (Rockliffe et al., 2012, p. 7) recommends an 
annual discount rate of 7 per cent for public transport infrastructure 
projects, which is the same rate that is used by a number of Australian 
jurisdictions. A  search for any discussion of the potential effects of 
such inconsistencies proved fruitless.
3.2 Potential approaches to developing 
harmonised values
Various methods for estimating economic costs and benefits are 
presented in standard texts such as Boardman et al. (2011), Perkins 
(1994), Mishan & Quah (2007), Campbell & Brown (2003), Pearce & 
Nash (1981) and Pearce et al. (2006). They include revealed preference 
methods, such as direct econometric estimation, hedonic pricing, 
damage costs avoided, travel cost methods and market analogies, 
as well as two stated preference methods: the contingent valuation 
method (CVM) and choice modelling (CM). 
Each of the standard estimation methods has advantages and 
weaknesses, depending on the context, data availability and 
rigour of application. Although not explored specifically here, it is 
important to be aware that the choice and application of a particular 
estimation method will affect downstream development of ‘plug-in’ 
values. For example, a meta-analysis or expert elicitation of values 
for noise externalities may be influenced by a hedonic comparison of 
differences in house prices near an airport and further away that may 
not have taken into account other factors, such as the size of houses or 
the quality of their construction. An alternative estimation method, 
such as CVM, may have been better in such circumstances, but it too 
is likely to suffer from particular weaknesses.
The objective of developing harmonised values is to allow their use 
as ‘off-the-shelf’ variables. That is, readily available ‘plug-in’ values 
that can be used without the need for separate estimation on each 
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occasion that a CBA is carried out. This approach comes within the 
broad rubric of ‘benefit transfer’, which is itself subject to a range of 
qualifications (see below).
3.2.1 Publication of CBA guidelines and manuals
Publication of CBA guidelines and manuals is a common practice 
worldwide, particularly in the transport sector, but central agencies 
also issue such publications from time to time. For the transport sector, 
publications usually also include unit values for benefit variables 
or parameters, as well as the method for updating such values to 
current dollars. One limitation, however, is that many benefit values, 
for example in the NZ context, are based on outdated studies and 
may, therefore, not be accurate reflections of the current values of 
the benefits. 
3.2.2 Access to completed CBA studies
Access to CBA studies undertaken by others can assist public servants, 
academics and the general public through an educative process. 
Information about methodological approaches used can be particularly 
helpful in assisting those tackling analogous issues. Over time, the 
availability of completed studies can also assist in setting standards 
or establishing canonical values for variables and parameters that are 
included in the analysis.
The New South Wales Government Department of Premier and Cabinet 
(2013) has instructed government agencies to make ‘Evaluation 
findings … publicly available, unless there is an overriding public 
interest against disclosure, in line with the Government Information 
(Public  Access) Act 2009’: arp.nsw.gov.au/c2013-08-program-
evaluation-and-review. Although a welcome development, this 
policy does not guarantee the use of CBA or evidence-based methods. 
An example, albeit one that predates the 2013 instruction, is a review 
of the use of tablet and iPad technology in school classrooms which 
appears to have been based primarily on opinions expressed by 
teachers and parents as well as the researcher’s personal observations 
(Goodwin, 2012).
The Commonwealth Government, on the other hand, has restricted 
public access to economic analyses under the Freedom of Information 
Act 1982. The Act generally exempts from release any material 
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developed as part of a ‘deliberative process’ which ‘involves the 
exercise of judgement in developing and making a selection from 
different options’, although section 47C(3)(a) excludes reports 
of scientific or technical experts. 
Somewhat incongruously, the social sciences, including economics, 
are not considered to be scientific or technical for the purposes of 
section 47 (Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 2014, 
ss  6.74–6.76). As it is inherently the task of a CBA to ‘deliberate’ 
among a set of options, a CBA can evidently be precluded from release 
to the public. At the Commonwealth level, therefore, the scope for 
sharing information and improving the standards of CBAs through 
greater transparency is severely constrained.
3.2.3 Establishment of databases of variables 
and parameters
In 1995, the NSW Environment Protection Authority released 
its  Envalue online database of environmental valuation studies 
(www.environment.nsw.gov.au/envalueapp/). The database was 
intended to facilitate the incorporation of environmental values into 
CBA studies and environment impact statements. 
Due to the cost of maintaining the Envalue database, it was later 
subsumed into the Environmental Valuation Reference Inventory 
(EVRI) online database (www.evri.ca/Global/Splash.aspx), which is 
sponsored jointly by Australian (NSW), Canadian, French, British and 
American environmental agencies. Access to EVRI is free to nationals of 
the sponsoring countries. Environmental databases are also maintained 
separately by other countries, including the NZ Non-Market Valuation 
Database, which is maintained by Lincoln University (www2.lincoln.
ac.nz/nonmarketvaluation/QuerySearch.asp). 
An advantage of compilations of valuation studies, especially those 
with free access like Envalue and EVRI, is that they reduce search costs 
for analysts. Nevertheless, as the number of studies accumulated in a 
database grows, search costs may no longer be negligible. Specialist 
skills — not generally available within government agencies — may 
also be required to apply database information that has been based on 
sophisticated choice modelling techniques. It may also not be clear 
how values extracted from older studies should be updated over time.
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In sum, databases are useful for specialist practitioners of CBA, but 
their utility to generalist public servants, who are often subject to 
time pressure to provide advice to government, is probably limited 
(Pearce et al., 2006, ch. 17). It is instructive that none of the officials 
interviewed in 2014 in the various jurisdictions proposed greater use 
of databases, but a number did raise the desirability of provision of 
officially sanctioned ‘plug-in’, ‘off-the-shelf’ values. While databases 
themselves are not necessarily useful in practice, they do provide the 
necessary basis for more specific approaches, like benefit transfer.
3.2.4 Canonical values 
Inertia, lack of information, or reluctance to break with tradition may 
lead over time to the de facto establishment of canonical ‘plug-in’ 
values. An example is the use of different discount rates for road 
projects. In the past, it has invariably been recommended by Austroads 
that road projects be discounted at an annual real rate of 7 per cent 
(e.g. Austroads, 1996; Rockliffe et al., 2012, part 2), and this rate is 
generally used by road transport agencies. 
Appraisal of rail projects, on the other hand, is less definitive in its use 
of specific discount rates. The Bureau of Transport Economics (1976) 
used a 7 per cent real per annum rate for an analysis of a Victorian rail 
line, and real annual rates of 4 per cent, 7 per cent, and 10 per cent 
for an evaluation of standard gauge links to selected ports (Starr et al., 
1984), but applied three annual rates of 7 per cent, 10 per cent and 
15 per cent in a study of the Tasmanian rail system (Tsolakis et al., 
1991). Luskin et al. (1996) used an annual 11 per cent real rate in an 
analysis by the bureau of the proposed Melbourne–Brisbane inland 
rail route, but a later bureau analysis of the same route by Reynolds 
et al. (2000) applied a real discount rate of only 4 per cent per annum. 
Referring to a recommendation by Luskin & Dobes (1999) for the use 
of risk-free discount rates based on the long-term government bond 
rate, the Australian Transport Council (ATC, 2006, vol. 5) endorsed 
the approach for transport projects. 
Another example of a canonical value in Australian transport practice 
is the designation of the value of travel time. McKnight (1982) 
presents separate tables of travel time values that are used by various 
Australian state road authorities, urban transport agencies and 
planning agencies, showing a wide range of values due to differences 
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in updating methods and treatment of modes and passenger types. 
Unfortunately, McKnight’s tables do not reveal the precise method of 
calculation of the values by the various agencies, or their identities. 
In recent years, travel time values have been based on wage rates in 
Australia, presumably because they are officially recorded by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and hence easily discovered.
Austroads has invariably recommended (e.g. Tan et al., 2012) that 
the value of travel time should be based on average weekly earnings 
(AWE), as estimated by the ABS. Travel time values for private car 
travel to and from work, travel time for pensioners, tourists, bicycle 
travel, public transit passengers, pedestrians and waiting time, for 
example, for public transport, are set at 40 per cent of seasonally 
adjusted full-time AWE by Tan et al. (2012). It is not clear why a 
production-oriented approach should be used, rather than a stated 
preference valuation from the perspective of both employers and/or 
those travelling, but the Austroads methodology has gained general 
acceptance among analysts. 
The Australian Transport Council (ATC, 2006) guidelines specify 
default values for a range of environmental effects, and they emphasise 
the desirability of maintaining consistency of values used in analysing 
transport projects:
If a growth rate for the VTTS [Value of Travel Time Savings] is assumed 
over the life of an initiative, index all labour costs throughout the BCA 
… In Australian BCAs, it is more usual not to increase the VTTS, the 
costs of labour, crashes and externalities in line with forecast growth 
in real income. Yet increasing these attributes is the correct approach. 
The difficulty is that if proponents choose their own growth rates for 
parameters, there could be a loss of comparability between appraisal 
results, and proponents may use over-optimistic growth forecasts to 
achieve more favourable BCA results … If Austroads specifies growth 
rates for road initiatives, jurisdictions should develop a consistent set 
of growth rates for rail initiatives. (vol. 5, p. 51)
As of early 2015, the Australian Transport Council and Austroads 
are in the process of combining their transport system evaluation 
methodologies and parameters. 
Canonical values may also develop organically if the producer of the 
data is well respected. For example, forecasts of Australian population 
levels published by the ABS are used by most researchers because of 
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the reputation of the ABS for quality statistical research. Although 
population forecasts depend heavily on contestable assumptions about 
parameters such as longevity, net immigration and reproduction ratios, 
the ABS projections are generally accepted in both the commercial and 
the public sectors.
3.2.5 Meta-analysis
Meta-analysis summarises findings from previous studies. Its objective 
is to identify representative values, or an associated range, that can be 
used as a ‘plug-in’ to a current study. Apart from saving resources, 
the technique is sometimes justified on the basis that a value derived 
from a combination of different studies, and hence more observations, 
offers greater statistical power-efficiency than one derived from a 
single study. Values can be obtained either qualitatively or by using 
statistical techniques, typically regression analysis.
On occasion, lack of local data necessitates use of data from other 
countries. Abelson (2003b) found that there was no general VOSL in 
Australia based on willingness to pay. He therefore reviewed European 
estimates of VOSL on the basis of the broad similarity of European 
and Australian incomes. Based on European values, he recommended 
a VOSL of about $A2.5 million for a healthy prime-age individual for 
Australian policy purposes. Australian road agencies at that time were 
using a VOSL of about $1.3 million that was based on the human capital 
approach and which did not, therefore, reflect willingness to pay. 
An essential first step in a credible meta-analysis is a systematic review 
of the available literature. Ideally, the review should be ‘reproducible 
for others to prevent author-induced selective bias in the inclusion of 
studies’ (van Wely, 2014). Nevertheless, the technique can suffer from 
a number of problems: 
• so-called ‘publication bias’ — sometimes called ‘the file drawer 
problem’ — is a major potential problem. Studies that report 
definitive results, or surprising ones, are more likely to be published 
in learned journals than ones that offer an equivocal result or a less 
dramatic narrative. Rothstein et al. (2005) note that suppression 
of studies may also occur due to language bias (e.g. preference for 
studies published in English), or familiarity bias (e.g. inclusion 
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only of studies from a familiar discipline). There are no obvious 
ways of overcoming such fundamental data problems
• the analysis can only be as good as the quality of the underlying 
studies. But any attempt to weed out poor quality studies itself 
runs the risk of selectivity bias
• two separate studies may yield similar results indicating a particular 
effect. When combined, however, they may indicate the opposite 
effect, sometimes termed ‘Simpson’s paradox’. This is illustrated 
in Figure 3.1 below, which shows regression lines for two separate 
data sets having a positive slope, but the combined data set 
showing a negative slope. Similarly, Bickel et al. (1975) present 
an intriguing study of apparent sex discrimination in university 
admissions when analysed at an aggregated level, but no apparent 
discrimination when data are pooled into disaggregated sets.









Figure 3.1: Simpson’s paradox
Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simpson%27s_paradox 
It would be difficult to unreservedly recommend the use of meta-
analysis for determining ‘plug-in’ values. The principal reason 
is that cost-benefit studies suffer from the invariable reluctance 
of governments to publish them. Estimates of costs and benefits 
used in such studies, therefore, seldom see the light of day either. 
The extent of the publication bias is not known, but is likely to be not 
inconsiderable. 
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3.2.6 Expert elicitation
In a paper on ‘rapid cost-benefit evaluation’ of measures to manage 
effects of climate change, such as floods, Oldfield (2012) advocates 
the use of ‘subjective judgement obtained using expert elicitation 
techniques’ in a ‘structured workshop environment’. Experts’ 
opinions about costs and benefits are garnered using a unitary rating 
scale from 1 to 7 and then translated to monetary units using ‘an 
equivalent monetary scale’. Oldfield gives as an example a rating of 2 
being valued at $100 and a rating of 3 at $1,000. The term ‘evaluation’ 
is used rather than ‘analysis’ in order to recognise the associated loss 
of accuracy. 
Whether the use of expert elicitation is a credible method of developing 
harmonised ‘plug-in’ values is an open question. Defining, identifying 
and selecting experts poses a key problem in methodological 
approach. Definitional issues aside, the identification and recruitment 
of knowledgeable persons is potentially subject to subjectivity and 
the sort of biases that afflict meta-analysis. 
For example, The Economist (3 January 2015) published a table 
ranking economists by their publication record, compared to their 
ranking according to media prominence. Some, like Paul Krugman, 
scored well on both measures, but a large proportion of the socially 
more prominent economists did not score well in terms of academic 
performance, and vice versa. Choosing an expert panel on the basis of 
prominence may thus fail to satisfy the criterion of academic expertise 
or specialist knowledge.
In a review of the literature on biosecurity risk assessment, Burgman 
et al. (2006) found that experts tend to be overconfident compared to 
the accuracy of their estimates, are subject to value-induced biases, 
and influenced by the framing of issues. Elicitation techniques range 
from general opinion surveys to numerical (e.g. ‘standard gamble’) 
and language-based (e.g. expressed as ‘highly likely’, to avoid the 
‘false precision’ of numerical probabilities) tools, but few of them have 
been tested for accuracy or reliability in the area of biosecurity. 
Arnell et al. (2005) sought unsuccessfully to garner expert views on 
the likelihood of rapid climate change due to the collapse of the North 
Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation. They concluded that a problem 
with expert elicitation is ‘that it does not factor in the process of 
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judgment making; it focuses simply on the outcome of the judgment 
process’, and therefore prefer not to aggregate the significantly 
divergent results. To ensure consensus, a commonly used approach is 
the structured Delphi method where a facilitator provides feedback 
iteratively on the responses of all expert participants until they arrive 
at a consistent view. A key risk of deliberately seeking consensus is 
agenda-driven bias, as is the risk of papering over differences that 
reflect genuine uncertainty, ambiguity or bimodalism.
It is at least arguable that expert elicitation is likely to be more reliable 
in issues relevant to the physical sciences than for social sciences like 
economics. Physical effects or dose-response relationships are often 
governed by the laws of physics or chemistry, and so provide some 
bounds to likely outcomes. 
Economics and other social sciences tend to involve multiple possible 
interrelationships, which are often influenced by unpredictable human 
behaviour and ‘unknown unknowns’. Benefits, in particular, should 
preferably be based on the community’s willingness to pay, rather than 
an estimate of physical damage avoided and its financial cost. Reliance 
on expert elicitation of economic costs and benefits therefore does not 
seem to be a particularly sound approach to establishing harmonised 
values.
3.2.7 Benefit transfer using stated preference 
methods
A low-cost, back-of-the-envelope estimate of benefit values is often 
feasible where even only limited amounts of market data are available. 
For example, where few or no resources have been made available, 
it might be possible to carry out hedonic pricing of noise costs by 
asking a sample of real estate agents about differences of prices of 
houses near an airport and further away. 
When no market data are available, revealed preference methods 
like hedonic pricing cannot be used and stated preference methods 
like Contingent Valuation Methods (CVM) or Choice Modelling (CM) 
need to be used instead. Both methods, however, are expensive and 
time-consuming because of the need to undertake detailed surveys. 
Analysts, therefore, welcome opportunities to use results from stated 
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preference studies that have been carried out by others, so that they 
can transfer them to their own work. The process of extrapolating 
results from one study to another is termed ‘benefit transfer’. 
CVM studies yield unique values for a specific good or service 
because of the way that questions about willingness to pay (WTP) 
or willingness to accept (WTA) are put to survey respondents. For 
example, a CVM study by Imber et al. (1991) sought to estimate the 
value of the Kakadu Conservation Zone by asking: ‘Would you be 
willing to have your income reduced by $X for the next ten years 
to add [a particular] area to Kakadu National Park, rather than use 
it for mining?’. Because responses specifically addressed a particular 
area in Kakadu, the resulting valuation cannot realistically be applied 
elsewhere. 
CM, on the other hand, establishes separate values for the constituent 
characteristics of a good or service, rather than a single holistic value. 
Had a CM study been conducted of Kakadu, it might have defined its 
characteristics by the number of bird species, the quality of rivers, 
and the range of native food types. By presenting survey respondents 
with different combinations of the number of bird species and native 
food types, varying river water quality, and the (different) cost to the 
respondent of preserving each combination, it is possible to estimate 
the relative value of each characteristic. For example, it is possible to 
estimate how much more value is placed by respondents on bird species, 
compared to river water quality. More importantly, it is possible to 
estimate the value placed on an increase or decrease of each separate 
characteristic (called a ‘part worth’), so that the values can be applied 
to a larger area of Kakadu, or a similar ecological area. By capturing 
the socio-economic characteristics and site characteristics, benefit 
transfer can be extended to sites with different characteristics.
Because stated preference studies are expensive and time-consuming, 
they are not always an option for CBA studies commissioned by 
government. Even if funds are available, agencies often fail to budget 
for such studies. Ministers often require advice at short notice, thus 
precluding a time-consuming survey. Although databases such as 
Envalue and EVRI do contain a range of studies to draw on, they may 
not always be relevant, and specialist expertise in stated preference 
techniques is necessary to make proper use of them. 
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Table 3.1: Types of ‘benefit transfer’ methods for stated 
preference techniques
Transfer method Example Valuation technique
Single point value transfer A rainforest protection value 
of $50 per person per year 
is transferred from Case 
Study A to Site B
Generally CvM
Marginal point value 
transfer
A rainforest protection value 
of $2 per hectare/person 
per year is transferred from 
Case Study A to Site B. The 
values are adjusted for the 
size of the area protected
Part‑worths of CM. CvM 
can also be used, but 
values may not be rigorous 
unless multiple CvM 
studies are available.
Benefit function transfer A rainforest valuation 
function that involves 
several attributes 
(i .e . characteristics) is 
transferred from Case 
Study A to Site B.
Model from CM study. 
Allows automatic 
adjustment for variations 
in attribute levels.
Meta value analysis results from studies A, X, y, 
Z are pooled to estimate a 
value for Site B.
either CvM or CM
Source: adapted from rolfe (2006, Table 2.2)
Given that this problem faces all Australian and New Zealand 
jurisdictions, one solution might be to carry out large-scale CM studies 
of commonly appraised projects (e.g. protection of wetlands) in a 
manner designed to maximise the potential for benefit transfer across 
jurisdictions, including ease of deriving ‘plug-in’ values. The  cost 
could be shared between jurisdictions in some agreed proportion, 
with provision for regular updating of values, perhaps through readily 
available price indexes. 
3.3 Points in favour of making available 
harmonised variable values
A feature of CBA that is not shared by techniques like cost-effectiveness 
analysis (CEA) or Multicriteria Analysis (MCA) is that results can be 
expressed fully in a common numeraire of money values. Use of a 
monetary metric allows valid comparisons of projects as different as 
a road upgrade and the construction of a hospital. From a conceptual 
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perspective, commensurate estimates allow decision-makers to 
compare and choose between demands on limited resources in a way 
that best enhances the community’s overall well-being. 
3.3.1 Consistency in decision-making
Implicit in the literature is the perspective that the purpose of CBA is 
to provide decision-makers with adequate information to determine 
whether social costs are exceeded by social benefits, or vice versa. 
If  the present value of the social benefits exceeds the present value 
of the social costs, then net present value (NPV) is positive, and the 
project or policy is typically deemed to be worthwhile and should 
proceed. 
Subject to some of the qualifications canvassed in Chapter 5, if more 
than one project or policy is available for implementation, it is 
generally presumed that decision-makers should give precedence to 
the one with the highest NPV. Projects or policies that have positive 
but lower NPVs should also proceed progressively to the extent of 
available (budgetary) resources. 
In order to be able to make judgements about the allocation of scarce 
community resources, however, decision-makers need to be confident 
that the NPV for each project or policy has been calculated in a 
comparable manner. Inappropriate methodology, or the use of different 
values for key input variables will preclude valid comparisons between 
the relative merits of potential projects and policies. Harmonisation 
of key variables and associated methodologies would help engender 
a degree of consistency that does not exist today.
3.3.2 Reduction in transaction and search costs
CBA is expensive when estimates of social benefits or costs are not 
readily available, especially so in the case of non-marketed goods and 
services, because collection of appropriate data, administration of 
surveys and recording and analysis of findings requires considerable 
financial resources. Arriving at estimates dedicated to a specific project 
or proposal may also not be possible within a tight timeframe set by 
decision-makers if a stated preference survey is required. In  those 
situations, the benefit of conducting a dedicated analysis may be 
outweighed by the costs.
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The availability of harmonised ‘plug-in’ values based on techniques 
such as CM offers a workable solution because ‘part-worth’ values can 
be applied in different contexts. Their disadvantage is the expense of 
establishing a database that provides values for a comprehensive range 
of different situations and variables. On the other hand, a CBA may 
not be carried out at all in the absence of ‘plug-in’ values, resulting in 
a less than socially optimal selection of projects. 
3.3.3 Procurement practice and commissioning 
of CBA studies
Harmonised values are likely to be beneficial to both consultants and 
to the government agencies that commission CBA studies. 
Preparation of request for tender (RFT) documentation can be time-
consuming. It is also a difficult process from the perspective of a 
government agency because lack of uniformity can make assessment of 
bids more difficult. One consultant may nominate a higher fee because 
they intend to estimate the value of travel time using an expensive 
survey, while a competitor may propose the use of a ‘plug-in’ value 
that is not entirely accurate but is sufficiently ‘fit for purpose’. The 
difference between the technical responses of the two tenders requires 
a degree of expertise to interpret the proposals and this is not always 
available within government agencies. The use of ad hoc survey 
results for different CBAs also raises issues around consistency and 
comparability between projects, interventions and decisions.
A list of harmonised values specified in an RFT would allow consultants 
to quote rates on a common basis, enabling better comparisons 
between competitors. This would not preclude consultants from 
providing separate estimates for more resource-intensive work, 
such as estimation of local travel time values, where more specific 
estimates are considered to be justified. Lower resource costs incurred 
by consultants would be likely to be reflected in lower costs to 
government, and hence taxpayers. 
3.3.4 Use of ‘rapid CBA’ (back of the envelope)
Government agencies faced with the task of evaluating projects at 
short notice at the request of a minister would find it easier to perform 
the analysis using readily available, harmonised values. As ministers 
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and their office staff became more familiar with the use of harmonised 
values, the likelihood of their acceptance of ‘back of the envelope’ 
analyses would increase and hence assist in fostering more rigorous 
decision-making processes. 
3.3.5 Reduced public confusion about the nature 
of cost-benefit analysis
Public understanding of CBA is limited and there appears to be a 
widespread misconception that the process only estimates financial 
costs and revenues. This may be because of the increasing commercial 
use of the same term to mean a financial analysis. Because money is 
used as the standard numeraire in social CBA, any confusion in the 
public mind is understandable.
Harmonisation cannot in itself dispel misconceptions about CBA, 
but it may assist in clarifying its nature by publishing values, and 
methodologies for determining non-market goods and services such 
as congestion or the value of statistical life. Public presentation of the 
various non-market values would help reassure the public that non-
financial impacts are also taken into account in an economic appraisal. 
In particular, it would help counter inappropriate use of MCA or triple 
bottom line approaches.
3.3.6 Pliant consultants may bring government 
projects into disrepute
Exaggerated CBA studies or those that use unrealistic values will 
ultimately lead to a loss of confidence in such analyses on the part of 
the public, and even by decision-makers. In some circumstances, even 
socially desirable projects may be derailed for the wrong reason.
Lack of harmonisation provides ample scope for massaging results to 
suit a client government agency. Discussion of draft reports between 
consultants and clients, for example, can afford an opportunity to 
signal a desired outcome. Even if an agency does not explicitly or 
implicitly indicate what result is desired, consultants, who rely on 
continuing business, may prefer to provide a result that will not 
displease a client. 
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Peer review and publication of CBA studies are important tools for 
ensuring credible analysis, but even credible analyses can differ 
considerably if values of key variables, such as the value of travel time 
can be chosen without constraint by a consultant. The proliferation 
of values generated in various studies, whether based on appropriate 
methodologies or not, leaves open the possibility of a consultant being 
able to ‘justify’ the use of any preferred value simply on the basis that 
it has been used by others. 
3.3.7 Common evidence base
Apart from the valuation of benefits, CBA also requires realistic 
projections of future impacts. Projections generally rely on a range of 
inputs and assumptions (e.g. about population growth or economic 
outlook). Whether or not input values and assumptions are modified 
to deliberately influence results, experience has shown that optimism 
bias (below) is an ever-present risk. Even in the absence of optimism 
bias, inappropriate use of input values or assumptions can result in 
misguided intervention decisions. Greater collaboration between 
agencies to share common evidence bases and key assumptions 
would help to reduce search costs as well as improving consistency in 
assessments across projects. 
3.3.8 Reduction of optimism bias
Optimism bias is a problem worldwide, particularly with regard to 
transport infrastructure projects (Flyvbjerg, 2009). In some cases, the 
reason may be innocent, but bias is more likely to occur in cases where 
a project proponent carries out the CBA, or where special interest 
groups are able to influence the way in which a study is carried out.
Optimism bias typically arises in projects where projected demand 
for infrastructure or services is overestimated compared to the final 
outcome. The Productivity Commission (2014, p. 685) suggests that 
optimism bias can be countered through:
• the use of sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of outcomes 
to changes in variables or assumptions
• ensuring a clear statement of the assumptions underpinning the 
analysis to ensure transparency
• identification of the results of comparable projects carried out 
elsewhere. 
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The latter approach, called ‘reference class forecasting’ (Flyvbjerg, 
2009), involves the identification of a relevant reference class of 
comparable past projects, establishing a probability distribution of 
a parameter being forecasted for the reference class, and comparing 
the current project proposal with the reference class distribution. It is 
therefore not much different in concept — except that it is focused on 
outcomes — from a quantitative meta-analysis that might be used to 
establish harmonised variable values.
Harmonisation can further assist in ameliorating optimism bias. 
For example, projected road traffic may primarily be a function of 
population growth projections. Specification of estimated population 
growth, or at least that of a credible source of estimates of population 
growth, can help limit any overestimate of future traffic. Similarly, any 
associated estimate of the social cost of car crashes can be constrained 
by specifying default values for the value of statistical life.
3.4 Drawbacks of using harmonised 
variables 
It is at least arguable that harmonisation of input variable values 
would impose inappropriate constraints, and potential bias in terms 
of specific or localised analyses. Analysts and consultants, however, 
would be free to use their own values, so long as they were able to 
justify them. Ways of ensuring credible justifications might include 
some or all of the following:
• the results of the CBA pass a ‘commonsense’, ‘pub’, or ‘sniff’ test 
• the study and underlying analysis and data are published 
• the study is subjected to independent expert peer review
• if variable values other than those recommended in a harmonised 
system are to be used, the justification for their use should be 
published before the analysis is started.
3.4.1 Cost considerations
Considerable cost in resources would be incurred in selecting and 
harmonising values of variables to be used, as well as ensuring 
updating in the future. On the other hand, this cost would be partly 
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offset through resources saved in search costs for ‘plug-in’ values. 
But it is not immediately apparent that the social benefits of doing so 
would exceed the social costs. 
3.4.2 Inappropriate application and use of plug-in 
values
Use of harmonised ‘plug-in’ values runs the risk of their inappropriate 
use, particularly where a CBA envisages large changes in the use of 
resources or production of goods and services.
Take as an example the construction of a public housing estate. 
A CBA of a relatively small project could validly use a ‘plug-in’ value 
for the cost of concrete because the national price of concrete would 
not change much, if at all, due to the construction of several houses. 
A large project, by contrast, would be likely to see an increase in the 
price of concrete, making the use of the recommended ‘plug-in’ value 
unrealistic. Boardman et al. (2011, ch. 4) illustrate the effect of price 
changes of resources on both existing users of those resources (who lose 
consumer surplus due to higher costs) and on the project itself. 
Automatic application of fixed harmonised values cannot be a 
substitute for rigorous economic analysis. Estimation of harmonised 
values covering all potential situations of supply and demand is, 
however, unlikely to be a realistic proposition.
3.4.3 Potential ossification
Harmonisation risks ossification in the absence of an institutional 
mechanism that ensures regular updating of methodologies and 
variable values. Federal systems with several stakeholders would 
be particularly prone to this problem in the absence of a collegiate 
approach. Arrow’s impossibility theorem reinforces the likelihood of 
difficulty in reaching agreement on all issues. In Australia, the Council 
of Australian Governments (COAG) is an existing institution that could 
be used to establish at least an umbrella framework. 
Harmonising a variable may not be practicable if different agencies 
or jurisdictions require the variable for significantly different 
purposes and cannot agree on a common definition. An alternative 
to harmonisation is to link related databases, perhaps with input of 
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additional information, to allow interrogation of different combinations 
of data. For example, police data on road crashes involving location 
and vehicle types could be integrated with hospital clinical data 
on type and severity of injury or period of treatment. But linking 
databases may raise sensitive privacy issues. 
In New Zealand, for example, matching of police, hospital admissions 
data and the NZ Accident Compensation Corporation’s new claims data 
is carried out periodically to assist estimation of the total social cost 
of road crashes and injuries. For privacy and commercial sensitivity 
reasons, however, such linkages have not been extended to include 
private insurance claims data.
3.4.4 Incomplete harmonisation
In cases like climate change analyses, a national perspective may not 
be sufficient for adequate harmonisation. Unless harmonisation of 
values, such as the national externality cost of carbon emissions, is 
also consistent with values used in other countries, national projects 
or policies may result in less than optimal results.
On the other hand, reliance on foreign databases can also be 
problematic. Austroads research underpinning its standardised 
environmental externalities unit values, for example, draws heavily 
on European methodology and data, including the calculation of air 
pollution costs due to exhaust emissions. Austroads issued a review 
notice on 7 October 2015 foreshadowing an examination of whether 
Volkswagen’s reported emissions violations would affect standardised 
unit values.
3.5 Alternatives to harmonisation
If consensus cannot be achieved, the Commonwealth could develop 
a set of protocols and recommended values, perhaps in cooperation 
with only some of the states. Other states would be able to accede to 
the agreement or memorandum of understanding in the future, or to 
make use of the values without any formal commitment. Despite the 
potential for some free-riding, the long-term national efficiency gains 
elicited from better project selection may outweigh the costs.
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Other, longer term approaches might include:
• publication of results of all CBAs, so that others can copy key 
variables, with some values ultimately becoming dominant in usage. 
The US Government in 2013 reportedly required federal agencies 
that spend more than US$100 million per annum on research to 
publish the results in locations where they can be accessed for free 
(The Economist, 2014, p. 80). A similar requirement in Australia — 
provided it passed a cost-benefit test — could increase transparency 
in government, as well as reducing the transaction costs of carrying 
out economic appraisals
• establishment of government research or evaluation units to 
provide leadership and expertise in analysis. Examples include the 
Centre for Program Evaluation in the NSW Treasury, the Program 
Evaluation Unit in the WA Treasury, and Superu in New Zealand. 
In a budget-constrained environment, peak workloads could be 
covered by seconding commercial analysts temporarily to a bureau, 
both to carry out work and to pass on skills 
• establishment of a Government Economics Network on the NZ 
model (www.gen.org.nz/tiki-index.php), so that economists and 
other policy officers can exchange views and information on a 
regular basis
• establishment of a Government Economic Service on the UK model 
(www.gov.uk/government/organisations/civil-service-government-
economic-service/about), with specialist economists outsourced to 
line agencies to transfer analytical skills. 
3.6 The Pew-MacArthur Results First 
Initiative in the United States 
Although its antecedents go back much further, the US ‘federal 
government first mandated the general use of cost-benefit analysis in 
Executive Order 12291 in early 1981’ (Boardman et al., 2011, ch. 1), 
requiring a regulatory impact statement (RIA) for all proposed federal 
regulations. Similar executive orders have been issued by presidents 
William Clinton (no. 12866) in 1993 and Barak Obama (no. 13563) in 
2011. However, Shapiro (2013) considers that studies of RIAs have 
concluded that their quality ‘has been uneven at best’. 
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A ‘first-of-its-kind’ survey by Pew-MacArthur Results First Initiative 
(2013), sponsored by The Pew Charitable Trusts and the John D. and 
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, from 2008 to 2011 of the 50 US 
states and the District of Columbia found that 10 states systematically 
evaluated costs and benefits of program alternatives and used them 
to inform policy and budget decisions. Practice in other states varied, 
but use of CBAs increased significantly over the study period, spurred 
on by budgetary pressures. 
The Pew-MacArthur study found that key constraints on the use 
of CBA were: 
• resource limitations in terms of cost and available expertise
• data limitations because ‘state accounting systems often do not 
track expenditures by program or activity, making it difficult to 
compute the marginal and total costs. States also frequently lack 
robust systems to monitor program outcomes …’
• tension between the length of time required to produce a CBA 
and shorter legislative timeframes and hence the need to inform 
decision-makers at short notice.
Distrust of CBA studies by policymakers and ineffective communication 
of results by analysts also constrained its acceptance. The study also 
found that 252 statutes mandated CBA in 48 states and the District 
of Columbia, but a July 2011 California law directed that ‘the state 
oil-spill-response administrator “shall not use a cost-benefit or 
cost-effectiveness analysis or any particular method of analysis in 
determining which measures provide the best achievable protection”’. 
Washington state was considered to be the national leader in the 
use of CBA. Established in 1983, the Washington State Institute for 
Public Policy (WSIPP) has developed a high-quality cost-benefit 
model. WSIPP is often called upon to provide advice to the legislature, 
partly because of the trust engendered by the rigour of its work, 
and its development of working relationships with various agencies 
over time. 
The peer-reviewed WSIPP (2014) model is based on a rigorous and 
selective meta-analysis of available data and research literature to 
establish the costs and benefits of public policy initiatives in the 
following areas:
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• criminal and juvenile justice
• K–12 and early education
• child welfare
• substance abuse
• mental and public health 
• public assistance 
• employment and workforce development
• health care.
A particular advantage of the model is considered to be the ready 
availability of cost and benefit data. Consistency and replicability are 
complemented by the ability to provide a relatively quick analysis of 
proposed programs. 
Costs include any externalities and the deadweight loss of taxation, 
and are available in both average and marginal form, as well as 
equivalent annual values. Although data, such as earnings, are taken 
from the US Census Bureau, state-specific adjustments are made where 
considered appropriate. 
Benefits, however, are generally estimated in the form of a ‘costs 
avoided’ approach (see also s. 5.6 for issues associated with this 
method). For example, crime-reduction programs are assessed on 
the basis of costs avoided by both the state and the victims of seven 
major types of crime. Costs to the state are primarily budgetary, while 
tangible costs to victims include property damage, medical and mental 
health care, and intangible costs such as pain and suffering are based 
on jury awards. 
The Results First Initiative has extended the use of the WSIPP model 
to 14 other states in the United States. The initiative hosts annual 
meetings with the states involved in the program and provides 
technical expertise to assist users of the model. Pew-MacArthur 
representatives at a workshop connected to the March 2015 Society for 
Benefit-Cost Analysis conference in Washington DC reported that an 
important aspect of assistance to the states has been the identification 
and categorisation of relevant program costs.
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3.7 Views and practice in the various 
jurisdictions regarding harmonisation in 
the period October to December 2014
Research for this volume involved the holding of semi-structured 
face-to-face interviews in all the Australian (except for the Northern 
Territory) and New Zealand jurisdictions over the period October 
to December 2014. Resource constraints dictated the selection 
of agencies consulted and, where possible, transport, health and 
environment departments, as well as central agencies, were included. 
In several jurisdictions, requests for interviews were declined by some 
departments (Appendix 1). 
Because interviews were held in late 2014, some of the information and 
views garnered then may now be outdated. For example, line agencies 
in Queensland drew attention to the fact that all policy was aligned 
with the then government’s ‘four pillars’ policies (www.thepremier.
qld.gov.au/plans-and-progress/plans/6-months-july-dec-12/four-





The then Queensland Government’s policy focus was on streamlining 
and reforming legislation to meet business needs, including cutting red 
tape. Policy proposals were not examined in terms of social benefit, but 
rather how they would contribute to economic growth. Conventional 
CBA was not relevant in this context. An election in January 2015, 
however, saw a change in government, and the ‘four pillars’ webpage 
cited above was no longer available in July 2015. In  April 2015, 
the Queensland Productivity Commission was established, subsuming 
the Queensland Office of Best Practice Regulation. Victoria also saw 
a not entirely expected change of government following the election 
on 29 November 2014, although interviews had been held there a 
month earlier. Despite significant changes such as these, the reported 
perspectives of jurisdictions on harmonisation issues are necessarily 
those recorded over the October to December 2014 period.
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A significant constraint on reporting the outcomes of the interviews 
is the request for anonymity that was made by a number of officials. 
The problem was partially overcome by drawing on handbooks and 
appraisal guidelines issued in some of the jurisdictions. It should also 
be borne in mind that, in many instances, the views expressed were 
those of a single official speaking informally. In some circumstances 
a group of officials participated, but views recorded may have been 
those of a dominant discussant.
The New Zealand Treasury was in the process of revising its previous 
CBA guidelines in November 2014, and revised guidelines were 
published in July 2015 (New Zealand Treasury, 2015). Support among 
line agencies for harmonisation of CBA variables was less effusive than 
in some of the Australian jurisdictions, possibly because of a non-
federated political structure and greater use of consultants to carry 
out CBAs. However, the transport portfolio collaborates closely with 
Austroads and, like its Australian counterparts, maintains in-house 
analytical expertise. 
This section and relevant parts of Chapter 4 should, therefore, be 
taken as indicative, rather than as fully considered positions of the 
government agencies that were consulted.
3.7.1 New Zealand 
New Zealand has a long history of economic appraisal of projects, 
particularly in the transport sector. In July 2015, New Zealand 
Treasury released its Guide to Social Cost Benefit Analysis to replace the 
previous version that had been in circulation since 2005. It reduced 
the recommended annual discount rate from 8 per cent to 7 per cent 
for infrastructure and special purpose buildings, with default annual 
discount rates unchanged at 8 per cent for projects that are difficult to 
categorise, including regulatory proposals. 
The New Zealand Treasury (2015, pp. 43–44) Guide notes that there 
are a range of common criticisms of CBA that might have contributed 
to its low level of usage.
• ‘CBAs produce false accuracy’: It is not unusual to see CBAs that 
state that the benefit cost ratio is ‘1.17’. This is most likely to be 
spurious accuracy. The problem of false accuracy is overcome with 
the use of ranges.
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• ‘CBAs can’t measure everything’: We acknowledge that there are 
some intangible benefits that the analyst won’t be aware of or that 
are too hard to measure. As this guide explains, there are more 
benefits that can be measured than people think. As for those 
that can genuinely not be measured, this guide recommends that 
they should be drawn to decision-makers’ attention along-side the 
results of the CBA of those benefits and costs that can be measured.
• ‘CBA can be misused to produce self-serving analysis’: CBA is a 
tool, and like all tools it can be misused. This is not a reason to 
dismiss CBA in favour of some other tool. 
• ‘CBA is too complex’: … [it is] not recommended that inexperienced 
policy analysts should carry out CBAs of complex or large projects 
themselves. Either a ‘rough’ CBA can be carried out, or the job 
should be contracted out to specialists. However, it is important for 
those carrying out CBAs to produce an accessible report that heeds 
the recommendations of this guide. 
• ‘Information requirements are often too onerous’: CBAs can 
be carried out with whatever information is available. If the 
information is poor, then the confidence intervals will be larger. 
There are no other project evaluation methodologies that can 
produce better results from the same information base.
• ‘CBAs overlook equity considerations’: It is recommended that 
equity implications of a project be discussed and drawn to decision-
makers’ attention along-side the results of the CBA.
• ‘The CBA is not likely to support our Minister’s objectives’: This 
comment ignores the fact that public servants have two distinct 
roles. The first is to give ministers free and frank advice on what 
the likely consequences of their decisions are. A CBA is necessary 
for this role. The second is to implement the Minister’s decisions, 
whether or not those decisions are consistent with the advice given.
Economic appraisal for transport projects has evolved over the last 
35 years. In the early 1980s, CBA was compulsory only for major 
state highway improvements. Around the mid-1980s, an economic 
appraisal procedure for road improvement projects was developed. 
This was later updated and expanded to form the Project Evaluation 
Manual. Due to the demand for guidance on approaches to assessing 
alternatives to road construction (e.g. public transport investment), a 
separate guide was developed in the mid-1990s. The value of non-work 
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travel time was later updated as a result. In the mid-2000s, the 
Project Evaluation Manual was combined with other new guidelines 
(including health benefits from walking and cycling) to form the 
Economic Evaluation Manual (EEM). Since its initial release in 2005, 
the EEM has been updated and improved annually with uplift factors 
for updating benefit parameter values published at the same time to 
ensure road controlling authorities use the same unit valuations in 
their assessments.
3.7.2 Victoria
As with other jurisdictions, Victorian transport agencies were well 
advanced in harmonising a range of variable values, in cooperation 
with Austroads and the Australian Transport Council. Nevertheless 
transport, like other portfolios, was subject to overarching Department 
of Treasury and Finance Guidelines on economic appraisals. 
General line agency comments included:
• the desirability of consultants providing transparent lists of 
assumptions made, even if harmonisation of variables were 
instituted 
• harmonisation would require a consensual top-down approach, 
with the Commonwealth ‘putting money on the table’
• publication of CBAs should be avoided because of their commercial-
in-confidence nature as part of tendering processes.
3.7.3 New South Wales
It was pointed out by several interlocutors that New South Wales, 
together with Victoria, was an early developer and adopter of 
guidelines for undertaking economic appraisal. Material developed 
by the former Roads and Traffic Authority, for example, provided a 
basis for the 2006 National Transport Council guidelines. There was a 
relative preference in some agencies for consistency in approach, rather 
than harmonisation of variable values, although it was also recognised 
that default values might be useful in the case of agencies that lack 
CBA expertise. However, the NSW Treasury (2007, p. 2) states that ‘in 
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order to ensure that a consistent approach is used by all public sector 
agencies, Treasury sets certain key parameters to be used in appraisals, 
such as the discount rate and the rate of real earnings growth’.
3.7.4 Queensland
Several interlocutor agencies in Queensland commented on the 
lack of CBA expertise in the state, with the provision of detailed 
guidelines and harmonised default values being seen as a desirable 
initiative. It is likely that these views reflected the rather minimalist 
and non-prescriptive nature of the project analysis guidelines issued 
by the Queensland Treasury at the time. One suggestion was that the 
Commonwealth’s Productivity Commission could issue guidelines that 
incorporate a list of ‘best practice’ variable values in the same way 
that the Australian Government Office of Best Practice Regulation 
does. Transport was again the standout portfolio, drawing on its own 
modelling capabilities and Austroads parameters.
3.7.5 South Australia
Like the NZ Treasury, the SA Department of Treasury and Finance 
was in the process of revising its evaluation guidelines (Department 
of Treasury and Finance, 2014) in late 2014. In the past it has not 
recommended ‘plug-in’ values to agencies, but has considered that 
ensuring the accuracy of underlying data used in analysis was an 
issue of particular importance. One line agency considered that a set of 
‘plug-in values’ that could be adjusted for different circumstances and 
situations would be a good start to encouraging more CBA. It would 
be important, however, to have transparency in the derivation of such 
values, including the assumptions made. 
3.7.6 Western Australia
Discussion at central agency level in Western Australia indicated some 
predilection for the use of authoritative harmonised values. Unsolicited 
reference was made to the usefulness of the Environmental Value 
Reference Inventory (EVRI) database as a source for environmental 
variable values. One line agency, however, cautioned against the 
unqualified application of nationally harmonised variable values, 
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especially because there were obvious differences in conditions 
and circumstances in Western Australia compared to other parts 
of Australia.
3.7.7 Tasmania
Analytical CBA expertise in Tasmania resides primarily in the 
Department of Treasury and Finance, although one agency referred to 
a proposal to establish an Infrastructure Tasmania organisation (in fact 
established mid-2015) to improve coordination of infrastructure 
appraisals. Specialist consultants are relied on to perform CBA. 
Austroads material was used in the absence of an internal manual for 
economic evaluation. The principle of harmonisation was regarded 
positively in principle, subject to the caveat of addressing local 
conditions and needs. 
3.7.8 Australian Capital Territory
As in Tasmania, analytical expertise in the Australian Capital Territory 
resides primarily in the Treasury, but internal evaluation manuals are 
also provided to line agencies for the preparation of project proposals. 
Informal discussion indicated support in principle for a greater 
degree of harmonisation in terms of both default variable values and 
methodology. One view was that the benefit of harmonisation within 
the ACT government would probably be even more beneficial than 
inter-jurisdictional harmonisation. 
3.7.9 Commonwealth Government
The leadership role exhibited in the past by the Department of 
Finance (1991) with its publication of the Handbook of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, and the revised version in 2006, has not been maintained. 
While some officials have expertise in the area of CBA, Finance’s 
previous role has dissipated. Further, its administrative responsibility 
for the Commonwealth’s Office of Best Practice Regulation (OBPR) 
was transferred to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
in September 2013. The Commonwealth Treasury Department has 
internal expertise in CBA, but its role is simply that of a ‘consumer’ of 
studies produced or commissioned by line departments when briefing 
the Treasurer on new proposals. 
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The Productivity Commission and Infrastructure Australia possess 
significant analytical capabilities. The Productivity Commission 
undertakes inquiries on topics referred to it by the Australian 
Government. It also undertakes internal research on productivity and 
regulatory issues, but does not have a coordination role with respect 
to inter-jurisdictional evaluation practices. 
On 6 November 2014, the Minister for Infrastructure and Regional 
Development issued a statement of expectations (Truss, 2014) to the 
board of Infrastructure Australia, requiring it, inter alia, to produce 
a rolling 15-year plan of infrastructure priorities at the national and 
state levels on the basis of rigorous cost-benefit analysis. Infrastructure 
proposals to be considered include transport, water, communications, 
energy, and social infrastructure in the education and health areas. 
Given the broad range of areas to be covered, it is unsurprising that 
Infrastructure Australia officials informally favour a greater degree of 
harmonisation in the evaluation of projects.
3.8 Conclusion
With the exception of the transport sector, there is a surprising 
dearth of economic appraisal expertise in the line agencies of most 
jurisdictions. Whether due to deliberate outsourcing or not, relevant 
expertise is now primarily the domain of commercial consultants. 
In principle, it should not matter whether appropriate expertise 
is held within the public service or outside it, because it is always 
possible to commission external experts to undertake any required 
studies. In practice, however, the current situation is less than ideal, 
partly because of the operational characteristics of the public service. 
To the extent that new policy proposals are not predictable at the time 
of setting budgets, public service agencies generally do not set aside 
budgeted funds to undertake CBA studies. Even where funds may be 
available, procurement principles and processes mean that there may 
be insufficient time to commission an external CBA if a new policy 
proposal requires a quick response from a minister or the government. 
Where outside experts are commissioned, the paucity of internal 
expertise can mean that a request for tender may not be expressed 
with sufficient clarity. If the quality of the final product cannot be 
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adequately assessed internally, even peer review processes may not 
obviate issues such as the optimism bias that afflicted some recent 
Australian urban tunnel projects. Given that ministers typically seek 
policy advice from their portfolios rather than external consultants, 
a general lack of expertise in CBA may also affect the quality of policy 
advice provided.
Harmonisation of variable values and methodologies offers some 
solutions in principle, but it is likely to require Sisyphean effort in 
practice. There are too many jurisdictions and competing interests 
within each one to establish a workable arrangement. The lack of in-
house expertise itself would complicate any negotiations.
An alternative might be for an agency to adopt a de facto leadership 
role. Perhaps building on existing databases, like that provided by 
Austroads and Infrastructure Australia requirements, additional roles 
could be added over time. A central agency in one of the jurisdictions, 
a university, or a body like the (Australian) Productivity Commission 
or the Office of Best Practice Regulation could undertake this task, 
given an appropriate level of resources and collaboration with other 
jurisdictions.
A more practicable approach may be to begin a step further back, 
by harmonising the processes involved in economic appraisal. 
Harmonising the framework adopted for CBA studies would not 
only increase the transparency of results, it would also make them 
more accessible to readers. It could also accommodate the future 





A framework approach 
to harmonisation
It is clear from discussions with government agencies in the Australian 
and New Zealand jurisdictions (except the Northern Territory) that all 
is not well in the area of economic evaluation. A survey of members of 
the Economic Society of Australia and the New Zealand Government 
Economics Network (Chapter 2) confirmed this impression. It is equally 
clear (Chapter 3) that any attempt to harmonise variable or parameter 
values to promote consistency and credibility in cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) studies would be fraught with methodological and perhaps 
political difficulties.
Most academic texts implicitly also recognise that uniformity in 
approach is neither desirable nor practicable. They proceed instead 
on the basis of a general step-wise framework for conducting a CBA 
study. The 10 steps presented below are a typical presentational 
approach, although the number of steps, names and descriptions 
differ between texts. 
1. specify the objective of the analysis
2. define ‘standing’ and scope
3. establish the base case: establishing a reference point
4. predict the effects of the policy or project over its life cycle
5. estimate the economic value of the costs and benefits
6. adjust costs and benefits for risk
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7. calculate the net present value (NPV) of the costs and benefits
8. conduct sensitivity analysis
9. determine distributional consequences and distributional 
weighting of costs and benefits
10. arrive at a conclusion or recommendations for the CBA.
The framework is composed of a series of sequential processes. 
For example, clear specification of the objective of the proposed policy 
or project as the first step ensures that subsequent steps are executed 
with reference to it, so that the study remains internally consistent. 
The second step establishes the perspective from which costs and 
benefits are estimated. It ensures that a local government study, for 
example, does not include costs or benefits that are incurred or reaped 
only at a national level. The final steps are contingent on the results 
determined in the intervening analysis and provide the information 
that is typically required by decision-makers.
One advantage of systematising a CBA study in this way is that it 
helps clarify where different parts of the analysis fit within the overall 
picture. Complex studies may include detailed, and hence lengthy, 
sections that estimate components of variables, so it may not always 
be clear why or how a particular part relates to other sections of the 
study, or to the final result. 
Because consultants and other analysts tend to approach CBA studies 
from unique perspectives — depending on the key estimation issues 
involved — reports can be idiosyncratic, following no particular 
order, and perhaps devoting considerable space to esoteric issues 
of particular interest to the problem at hand. Reading such reports, 
even if they are technically rigorous, is time-consuming, even for 
experienced users of CBA analyses, because it is necessary to identify 
the key components and to check for internal consistency. 
Preparation, presentation and comprehension of CBA studies could 
be facilitated if a harmonised framework such as the one above were 
adopted by the various jurisdictions. Consistency in the order of the 
presentation of the steps would need to be maintained in order to 
maximise transparency for readers searching for specific information 
about a study.
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Implementation of a harmonised framework need not require a formal 
agreement between all of the jurisdictions. Adoption of a framework 
— along the lines of that outlined in this chapter — by a central 
agency in one of the larger jurisdictions, the Office of Best Practice 
Regulation, or the Productivity Commission, would encourage others 
to follow over time. 
Improved access to completed CBA studies undertaken by the 
Commonwealth Government would also assist in fostering increased 
harmonisation of approach. In this regard, amendment of section 
47C(3)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 to specifically include 
the social sciences would be an important first step.
Recommendations 
• A common approach be adopted by the various jurisdictions 
in presenting the results of CBA studies, using a harmonised 
framework, such as proposed in the 10 steps outlined above. 
• In the absence of a formal inter-jurisdictional agreement, 
consideration should be given by one of the central agencies to an 
informal leadership role by adopting a framework along the lines 
outlined in this chapter.
• Section 47C(3)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 should be 
amended to specifically include the social sciences.
4.1 Specify the objective of the analysis
Clarity of objective is self-evidently essential in ensuring that each 
step in a CBA study is consistent with preceding and successive steps. 
In particular, it is important that alternative approaches or projects 
are formulated in a way that is consistent with the desired outcomes 
of decision-makers. An example might be the implementation of 
preventative health programs as an alternative to constructing a new 
hospital in order to address the policy objective of reducing the effect 
of some debilitating medical condition on the community. 
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4.1.1 Constraints
An informed approach to identifying realistic alternatives also requires 
an elicitation of legal, physical, geographic, informational, political 
and other constraints that could limit achievement of the policy 
objective. A key feature of the CBA should, therefore, be a specific 
enumeration and examination of the constraints that may influence 
achievement of the desired outcome. 
4.1.2 Cataloguing alternative projects
All potential alternative projects should be listed at the outset so as to 
avoid ‘first selection’ bias. In the words of NSW Treasury (2007, p. 3), 
‘the economic appraisal should not be a “business case” which simply 
promotes a preferred approach’.1 The list should not be limited to a 
single approach, such as construction of infrastructure or regulation 
of an activity. Market- or price-based solutions, delayed or staged 
implementation, and use of a real options approach, should also be 
considered. For example, a program to encourage people to increase 
their level of active exercise may be an effective alternative to a 
proposal to build a dedicated facility to treat obesity or diabetes.
For practical reasons, the full list of alternative projects will need 
pruning if the CBA is to be conducted within time and resource 
constraints. In doing so, however, transparency requires that reasons 
should be given for the rejection of projects that are not shortlisted. 
In some circumstances, it may also be possible to conduct a ‘back of 
the envelope’ or ‘rapid CBA’ appraisal of the major benefits and costs 
to assist in the filtering process with the detailed CBA conducted for 
the key proposals. For complex decisions, each proposal may deserve 
a standalone CBA to detail the process and results. In those situations, 
it  is necessary to ensure different CBAs use consistent assumptions 
and unit value in the assessment and an overall CBA report is prepared 
to summarise all individual analyses.
1  If a decision has already been taken by government that a specific project should be 
undertaken, then a cost-effectiveness analysis may be more appropriate than proceeding 
with a CBA. A government decision to proceed is presumably based on its perceived benefits. 
Implementation is then largely a matter of lowest cost, or value for money.
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4.1.3 The role of the analyst in choosing 
alternatives for appraisal
Rather surprisingly, CBA textbooks rarely discuss the issue of 
selecting alternative projects to include in an appraisal. In practice, an 
analyst may be asked to evaluate only one project against a base case, 
but may also be aware of other potentially viable alternatives. If the 
commissioning agency rules out comparisons of the proposed project 
with potential alternatives, the analyst may face a moral dilemma. 
Sugden & Williams (1978, p. 231) examine some of the issues involved, 
but are unequivocal about the stance to be taken by the analyst:
The analyst has a dual role to play in relation to the set of alternatives 
to be compared. He may offer advice at this initial stage, seeking to 
ensure that important and practicable policy options are not ignored. 
Here the roles of decision-maker and analyst overlap a good deal. 
And at the end of the analysis, the analyst should do his best to ensure 
that his findings are not misinterpreted, or read as implying more than 
they really do. If important alternatives have not been considered in 
the study, intellectual honesty requires that the analyst points this 
out. It is possible that the decision-maker may suppress these, and 
perhaps other significant qualifications when presenting the analyst’s 
work in support of his decision. This puts the analyst in a difficult 
position but we believe that the analyst has the professional duty to 
set the record straight, for otherwise analysis in general is brought 
into disrepute. If in the special circumstances this is impossible, 
then it becomes a matter of conscience for the analyst whether he 
can continue working for that client, and whether he should dissuade 
other analysts from so doing. 
Table 2.4 reveals that more than half the respondents considered that 
CBAs are not conducted independently and objectively, are used to 
justify rather than inform, and are not undertaken for important 
decisions. Requiring CBAs to record explicitly why apparently feasible 
alternative projects have not been included in an analysis is desirable 
in maintaining credibility, even if decision-makers do not release this 
information.
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4.1.4 Strategic merit tests
Transport agency guidelines in the various jurisdictions generally 
specify the conduct of a ‘strategic merit test’ in an early stage of a 
project. For example, Transport for NSW (previously the Road 
Transport Authority) (2013, p. 72) states that:
Strategic merit testing is a technique used to check if the proposed 
project aligns with the economic, environmental and social objectives, 
policies and strategies of the government. This qualitative project 
appraisal tool used during the strategic planning phase includes a series 
of questions which try to identify the contribution of the proposed 
project to the government’s objectives, policies and strategies.
On one reading, this advice is not much different to the point made 
above that constraints, including those of a political nature, should be 
taken into account in identifying a realistic set of alternative projects. 
On the other hand, a less sympathetic interpretation might lead one 
to conclude that there is a considerable risk of bias posed by such 
‘strategic merit testing’, with analysts second-guessing ministers 
as to what alternative projects might in fact be acceptable to the 
government. Government policy is not always set in stone, and may 
change during the course of an electoral cycle, especially if changeable 
budget constraints dictate a reconsideration of earlier priorities. From 
this perspective, a full listing of projects that satisfy the government’s 
primary objective is a desirable element of all CBA studies.
A broader, more informative approach to the use of a ‘strategic 
merit test’ might be to compare government priorities in all sectors 
of society — perhaps by applying a rapid CBA assessment — to 
gauge the relative merit of using scarce resources in the transport 
sector compared to expenditure on health or education or defence. 
This may not be practical, however, and may pre-empt government 
consideration of the merits of broader alternatives. In some cases, 
governments may have decided formally or informally that they will 
proceed with a project or program long before a CBA is commissioned. 
The national guidelines issued by the Australian Transport Council 
(2006, Part 3, p. 16) are rather circumspect, acknowledging the 
subjective nature of decisions made by government. Nevertheless, the 
risk remains that an unsophisticated approach that considers ‘strategic 
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merit’ can result in a biased selection of project alternatives. This may 
especially be the case for inexperienced officials who commission 
a tendentious CBA study by a commercial consultant. 
4.1.5 Peer review
Studies of complex projects can involve difficult issues of a 
methodological or conceptual nature. In order to ensure a defensible 
result, it is sometimes the practice to engage a peer body or analyst 
to review the study to reassure decision-makers or the public of its 
fidelity. The concept is analogous to the gateway process employed in 
large government procurement programs. 
In general, CBA studies are time-consuming, and may be expensive. 
There is, therefore, merit in engaging a peer reviewer early in the 
process, to provide critique and feedback throughout the study, 
rather than at the end when there may be a reluctance to redress any 
apparent shortcomings. In doing so, however, it would be prudent 
to maintain a degree of independence for the reviewer, perhaps with 
greater use of academics who are not reliant on government agencies 
for continued work. 
4.1.6 Recommendations 
A CBA should record explicitly:
• the objective of the proposed project or policy
• a full list of alternative projects and policy initiatives that could be 
used to achieve the objective, including market-based alternatives 
to construction of infrastructure or its expansion 
• reasons for not including any of the feasible alternative projects in 
the CBA analysis
• a process of objective and independent peer review be instituted 
at an early stage of the analysis for all government-funded studies.
4.2  Define ‘standing’ and scope
Many CBA studies fail to define explicitly the perspective from which 
costs and benefits are to be included or excluded. 
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Specification at the outset of the perspective or ‘standing’ to be taken 
in an analysis is a key determinant of subsequent steps, especially 
the inclusion or exclusion of particular benefits or costs. For example, 
if the analyst or decision-maker decides to conduct the analysis from 
the standpoint of the city of Auckland, then benefits accruing to 
residents of Wellington or Dunedin, or costs imposed on them, should 
not be counted. 
The Capital Metro Agency (2014) business case for Canberra’s proposed 
light rail system does not explicitly define standing. It implies in 
several parts (e.g. p. 69) that a key objective is ‘facilitating economic 
growth for the ACT [Australian Capital Territory]’, including job 
creation. It is therefore unsurprising that the study wrongly includes 
as a benefit additional tax revenue from an assumed larger workforce 
(Table 28, p. 102), even though income tax is levied and largely 
retained by the federal government rather than the ACT. Further, the 
study does not reveal how much of the additional employed labour 
is likely to be sourced from residents of the ACT, rather than from 
neighbouring commuter towns like Queanbeyan, Goulburn or Yass, 
which are located in New South Wales. 
Omission of the critical step of defining standing in a CBA is difficult 
to condone. However, Whittington and MacRae (1986) argue that:
The practice of equating standing with citizenship worked reasonably 
well in most early applications of cost-benefit analysis. For instance, 
in the appraisal of water resources development projects, it served 
to broaden the focus of the analysis from the immediate beneficiaries 
for a project (often limited to a small district or region) to include 
other citizens who would have to pay the cost of what typically 
turned out to be porkbarrel projects. Neither the costs nor the benefits 
commonly spilled over national boundaries. Though the techniques 
of cost-benefit analysis were often misused, the thrust of the analysis 
should theoretically have detected narrowly conceived projects that 
were designed to serve only a few who would gain something at the 
expense of the majority, who would lose more. The issue of standing 
may also have been neglected in the literature because economists 
felt they had little expertise that could be brought to bear on the 
question. Thus,  following Mishan, they attempted to calculate the 
willingness to pay for ‘each person in the defined community’, leaving 
the determination of the ‘defined community’ to the political process.
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The issue of standing was the subject of debate in the early 1990s, 
primarily by Trumbull (1990), Whittington and MacRae (1990) and 
Zerbe (1991) in response to an article by Whittington and MacRae 
(1986). Despite some unresolved contentious issues, Boardman et al. 
(2011, ch. 2) reflect contemporary thinking in suggesting that standing 
in CBA should be from a national perspective as a default position, and 
be based on prevailing social norms and preferences, and legal rights. 
Ethical conundrums can bedevil attempts at satisfactory approaches 
to defining standing. Some examples include the interests of 
aborted foetuses, the rights of prisoners incarcerated near a noisy 
airport, treatment of non-human hominids, local pollution that 
affects neighbouring countries, or non-participation of children in 
vaccination programs if their parents object. 
4.2.1 Standing and the value of statistical life
The human capital approach essentially posits that society values a 
(statistical) life on the basis of the value of the wages that the deceased 
could have been expected to earn in their remaining lifetime as 
measured by their life expectancy at a particular age. 
Most Australian road and rail agencies — New South Wales being an 
exception — have for many years used the human capital approach to 
value statistical life, or the hybrid approach employed by the Australian 
Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics (2009). 
In New Zealand, the Ministry for Transport specifies the value of 
statistical life (VOSL), and the same value is used by New Zealand 
Treasury and other departments and agencies. The New Zealand VOSL 
has been based on the willingness to pay (WTP) approach since 1990, 
when it replaced the human capital approach.
One well-known disadvantage of the human capital approach is that 
the lives of pensioners who no longer earn a wage should theoretically 
be valued at zero, or worse. If a life is lost, it could be argued that 
society loses the value of that person’s production (as measured by 
their wage), but that society will also save the resources that would 
have been consumed by the individual in their remaining lifetime. 
However, Prest and Turvey (1965, p. 722–23) point out that this issue 
of consumption forgone poses a conundrum for the analyst:
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Ignoring non-materialistic considerations like the grief of family 
and friends, the loss to society of a decedent is typically taken to be 
the wealth that the person would have accumulated, plus taxes that 
would have been paid, minus any transfer payments that he or she 
would have received. An adjustment sometimes made to this ‘value 
of life’ approach is to subtract the value of the resources that would 
have been consumed by the individual because they can be used by 
society for other purposes, and are therefore a social ‘gain’. But this 
presupposes that society is defined as it exists after the person’s death. 
That is, standing is defined implicitly to exclude the statistically 
deceased individual.
Prest and Turvey (1965) argue that an alternative perspective might 
be to consider society as including all current residents or citizens, 
including those who will die in the future. Imagine these residents 
considering a proposed safety project and discussing the cost to 
society of future deaths of residents. Members of this discussion group 
would still see themselves as part of society into the future. For them 
individually, the loss due to death would include the consumption 
that they would forgo. Since they are still part of society, the disbenefit 
of their loss of consumption into the future would conceptually also 
represent a loss to society. From this perspective, the private loss of 
consumption by a prospective decedent should be counted as a social 
loss, rather than an offsetting ‘gain’.
4.2.2 Standing and wider economic impacts 
in transport analysis
The 1980s saw the beginnings of a debate about the broader effects of 
transport infrastructure improvements on the economy, in addition 
to the conventional CBA methods employed by transport economists. 
Analysts and agencies in the United Kingdom began to characterise 
such effects as ‘wider economic benefits’, an inappropriate term given 
that they relate mainly to changes in gross domestic product due to 
public investment in infrastructure. Appendix 3 examines the issues 
in more detail.
Recent work, reviewed by Laird and Mackie (2010), has revealed 
a failing by earlier studies to take into account the standing or ‘prism’ 
from which the analysis was conducted. Increased productivity due to 
infrastructure investment was found to be mainly due to the relocation 
of the most productive people to larger cities. At a national level, the 
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additional productivity effect due to people relocating would simply 
be redistributive, with a particular area gaining what another loses, 
and therefore with no net increase. Local government, on the other 
hand, could be expected to include any increased productivity in its 
assessment of an infrastructure project. 
The wider economic impacts (WEI) estimated in various sub-national 
studies were in general comparatively large compared to conventional 
estimates of net social benefits of transport and other infrastructure 
projects (Laird & Mackie, 2010). Failure to consider the implications 
of choice of ‘standing’ therefore risks significant bias in decision-
making about the effect of infrastructure investment on the economy 
as a whole.
4.2.3 Practice in the jurisdictions
Despite its obvious importance in the aggregation of costs and benefits, 
the treatment of standing is largely absent from Australian Government 
manuals for CBA. Even the Australian Government Department of 
Finance and Administration (2006) handbook on CBA does not deal 
explicitly with the concept of standing.
Evaluation guidelines issued by the SA Department of Treasury and 
Finance (2014, p. 31) refer in passing to the need to assess costs and 
benefits that impact upon the ‘state economy and broader community’. 
A NSW Government Department of Infrastructure & Planning (2012) 
guideline for the use of CBA in mining and coal seam gas proposals 
states that costs and benefits should be aggregated ‘over the whole 
community’, but without specifying the extent of the community. 
The Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance (Government of 
Victoria, 2014) guide to CBA in regulation indicates that impacts on 
different groups and governments should be identified, but does not 
deal explicitly with the issue of standing.
In contrast, a European Commission (2008) guide to CBA devotes 
about half a page to the need to establish standing as part of the socio-
economic context and scope of the analysis. A draft CBA guide issued 
by the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (1998), also devoted space 
to the issue of standing, but the oft-cited HM Treasury (2003) Green 
Book does not cover the topic. New Zealand Treasury (2005, p. 11) 
stated its expectation that a CBA would be undertaken from a national 
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perspective, but the revised guide that was issued in July 2015 
(New  Zealand Treasury, 2015) is more equivocal, citing only some 
examples of the difficulties involved in defining standing.
Officials interviewed in the various Australian states invariably 
responded that standing was based on a purely state perspective. 
Somewhat incongruously, no distinction is made between state 
residents and visitors from other states or abroad, for example, in 
estimating the benefits of a faster transport link between a capital city 
airport and the central business district. The reason generally given 
was that no data are available to distinguish between different users 
of infrastructure. 
Practice in the various Australian jurisdictions is thus consistent 
with the Austroads (Rockliffe et al., 2012, Part 2, p. 8) suggestion that 
standing should include ‘all affected persons’, including foreigners, 
because ‘few data sources distinguish the residency of affected 
persons’. One rationale given for not addressing this contradiction 
is that governments generally wish to promote tourism, so that the 
practice of including non-residents is not inconsistent with the overall 
strategic objectives of the government.2 It is difficult to believe, 
however, that no adjustment is possible on the basis of available 
statistics produced by the Australian Government agency Tourism 
Research Australia. 
Counting benefits to non-residents of a particular state when standing 
is taken as being confined to the residents of that state means that 
the benefits of the project will be overstated. In the health sector, 
however, interstate agreements about mutual hospital treatment may 
make it difficult to justify excluding consideration of project benefits 
to non-residents, even if ‘standing’ has been specified as being limited 
to one state alone. 
On the face of it, there appears to be little justification for persisting 
with a narrow state-based approach to standing when benefits to non-
residents are being counted. However, several jurisdictions intimated 
2  This argument is redolent of the use of apologetics to defend a position that may otherwise 
be logically flawed. If the government wishes to promote tourism, it should do so directly with 
a specific project or program, subject to justification through a CBA. Inclusion of benefits to 
tourists in an infrastructure project is a blunt instrument that may have no significant causal 
relationships to the number of tourists in the country. 
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in interviews that their governments would not be keen to take into 
account any externalities that local projects might impose on another 
state. For example differences in waste disposal fees between states has 
seen at least one state accepting a neighbouring state’s waste, but any 
externalities that might be imposed were not taken into account in an 
evaluation by the sending state. While not presented by interlocutors 
as a justification for taking a state-only perspective, political reality is 
that the issue of potential externalities would seem to be a pertinent 
disincentive to changing the current practice of  purely state-based 
standing. 
4.2.4 Recommendations
The need to clearly define standing at the outset of an analysis 
is important, but it would be inappropriate to offer prescriptive 
guidelines for areas that involve ethical issues. 
Nevertheless, a degree harmonisation of approaches is desirable to 
promote greater consistency and transparency in economic evaluation. 
In particular: 
• Explicit specification of ‘standing’ should be provided in all 
CBA  studies. Where more than one perspective is adopted 
(e.g.  to  provide additional information requested by decision-
makers), results should be shown separately for each specification.
• Adoption of a national perspective for all CBA studies should be 
the default position. Studies should clearly identify the parties 
whose benefits and costs are included, as well as those who are 
specifically excluded from the analysis.
• Consideration should be given to adopting a convention that all 
residents of Australia, not just citizens, be granted standing in a 
CBA study.
4.3 Establish the base case: Establishing 
a reference point
Calculation of additional benefits and additional costs requires an 
initial or reference case from which to measure the changes induced 
by implementation of a project or policy. This reference case is 
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often termed the ‘base case’ in CBA studies, but is also variously 
depicted as the ‘before project situation’, ‘status quo option’, ‘do 
nothing’ option, ‘business as usual’ and ‘do the minimum’ option. 
The latter two terms probably best express the underlying concept 
of a counterfactual situation that would exist if the project or policy 
were not implemented. In general, all alternative projects specified in 
Section 4.2 above should be evaluated against the same base case. 
A realistic base case does not assume that past behaviour will be 
replicated infinitely into the future. It recognises that life goes on, 
even if a particular project or policy is not implemented. Populations 
may grow or diminish and age profiles will shift, traffic densities 
may increase, land-use patterns will change, and similar but smaller 
projects may be implemented. 
Nevertheless, political constraints sometimes require use of a base 
case different to the ‘business as usual’ or ‘do the minimum’ scenarios. 
For example an analysis of the National Broadband Network (NBN) 
by the Australian Department of Communications (2014, Vol. II, p. 9) 
eschewed the use of continued rollout of the NBN as being ‘clearly not 
realistic’, because the incoming government had explicitly decided 
not to continue it. The base case adopted was continued rollout, but 
without any further government subsidy of the operation. 
4.3.1 The period of the base case
Establishing the period of the base case — the time of its beginning 
and the time of its end — determines which, and how many, costs and 
benefits are counted. Where only one project is analysed, the base 
case and project periods may coincide naturally, although long-lived 
projects may require the inclusion of residual or ‘horizon’ values in 
order to justify choice of matching periods. If more than one alternative 
project is analysed and the project life cycles do not coincide, resort 
to equivalent annual values (s.  5.2), or similar techniques, may be 
required.
4.3.2 Recommendations
The importance of the base case as a reference point for estimating 
additional costs and benefits suggests that there would be merit in 
harmonising the following procedural principles:
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• listing and explanation of all assumptions made in choosing or 
developing the base case scenario
• as a default option, use official sources for key variables employed 
in projections
• justification for use of estimates that are not based on official 
sources
• specification and justification of the time period selected for the 
base case
• where relevant, ensuring consistency of base case assumptions 
with those used in projections of impacts of the project or policy.
4.4 Predict the effects of the policy 
or project over its life cycle
The additional benefits and costs of a project are measured in terms 
of the difference of the effects induced by the implementation of a 
project, compared to the counterfactual of a base case. In simple terms, 
the project that generates the highest level of net benefit relative to 
the common base case is to be preferred.
Even if an analyst is experienced and knowledgeable, there is some 
likelihood that they may not fully identify all the impacts of a project, 
particularly if there is novelty in the case being examined. Prudence 
suggests a wide-ranging consultative process by the analyst, including 
particularly with operators (the people with the spanners) and those 
directly affected by the project, in order to avoid bias due to omitted 
impacts. 
Unless the analyst provides readers of the study with information 
about who has been consulted, however, it is difficult for a decision-
maker to form a judgement about the rigour of the results. Overcoming 
this asymmetry of information is relatively straightforward if the 
analyst provides a list of those consulted. The same is true of published 
sources that may have been relied on. A ‘belts and braces’ approach 
also requires the analyst to provide reasons for not consulting relevant 
people or sources of information.
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Transparency and accountability also require that the identified 
impacts are presented by the analyst to allow peer reviewers and 
decision-makers to identify omissions from the analysis. In short-
listing the impacts for which economic values are to be estimated, the 
analyst should provide cogent reasons for all exclusions. 
4.4.1 The period of analysis of the project(s)
The period of time chosen for analysis of a project and its alternatives 
determines the types and number of costs and benefits that are 
aggregated over time, just as for the base case. Transparency is 
therefore critical, but is rarely observed in practice. Textbooks are also 
silent in this area, despite the fact that manipulation of results can be 
more easily achieved than fiddling with the more obvious aspects of a 
CBA, such as the discount rate.
The Canberra light rail project is a case in point. Economic analysis 
conducted by Capital Metro Agency (2014, Table 19) used a 30-year 
period beginning in 2016, despite positing an ‘operating term of 
20 years’. Because the analysis begins from construction in 2016, 
it excludes significant set-up costs.3 It has been argued informally 
by Capital Metro that exclusion of preliminary costs accords with 
accounting standards because the formal Cabinet decision to proceed 
with the light rail project was not made until after contracts were let for 
preliminary engineering work and the agency had been established. 
In effect, the project period has been broken up into separate stages in 
a way that excludes preliminary project costs. 
Where government procurement guidelines set limits to expenditure 
in the absence of a formal request for tender process, there may be a 
temptation to break procurement projects up into separate stages that 
all fall below the limit. To preclude this, guidelines typically require 
bundling of staged costs to ensure a full accounting of the total costs 
involved. The Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines (2005, s. 8.10), 
for example, contain the following safeguard clause:
Where a procurement is to be conducted in multiple parts with 
contracts awarded either at the same time or over a period of time, 
3  Specific figures are not readily available, but Canberra Times (6 August 2014, p. 2) reported 
that $30 million had been budgeted over two years from July 2013, including $9.8 million for 
consultancies and $2.3 million for staff and administration costs.
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with one or more suppliers, the estimated value of the property or 
services being procured must include the estimated total maximum 
value of all of the contracts.
Employment of a similar approach in harmonising the analytical 
framework for CBA should be considered to ensure a ‘true and fair’ 
view of proposals as a whole. By the same token, all costs relevant to 
implementation of a government decision to proceed with a project 
or program should also be included: these may include items such 
as post-implementation reviews, in media res and ex post reviews, 
auditor investigations, and reports to ministers or parliament.
4.4.2 Transfer payments
Pensions, subsidies to businesses, taxes and unemployment benefits 
are examples of transfer payments. They redistribute resources or 
wealth without affecting the overall well-being of society (assuming, 
for example, that the marginal utility of income is constant). The person 
providing the payment does not directly receive any goods or services 
in return for the payment. 
Because transfer payments are not considered to affect the overall 
well-being of society, they are typically treated as being neither a 
cost nor a benefit. For this reason, it is not uncommon for transfer 
payments to be ignored in a CBA. Nevertheless, it is useful to identify 
such transfers at an early stage of the analysis because they are relevant 
to any discussion of distributional consequences at a later stage of 
the CBA. 
4.4.3 Duality in costs and benefits
There is often an element of duality in CBA. Duck hunters, for example, 
may welcome the construction of a dam, but campers may regret the 
loss of trees and land.
An increase in house rents (a change in price) that does not reflect a 
change in costs involves greater expenditure by the person renting 
the house. But the tenant’s increased expenditure is exactly offset by 
the additional revenue to the landlord. Such pecuniary effects cancel 
each other out, so their inclusion in a CBA is effectively superfluous. 
Nevertheless, there is merit in including them when compiling a list of 
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project impacts, both to demonstrate comprehensiveness, and because 
they can provide useful information to decision-makers about the 
distributional outcomes of a project.
Some proponents of transport infrastructure favour the automatic 
inclusion of WEIs (Appendix 3) in project appraisals. A review of 
the WEI literature, however, found no reference to the need to also 
estimate the corresponding deadweight loss (Appendix 7) of a project. 
This is despite the fact that projects that can be expected to generate 
significant WEIs are also likely to require significant amounts of 
government expenditure, suggesting at least some degree of deadweight 
loss due to government borrowing or increased taxation. Some WEI 
studies do refer to potential negative effects of agglomeration, such as 
increased traffic congestion, but with no further investigation of the 
strength of such offsetting effects.
The Capital Metro Agency (2014) analysis of the Canberra light rail 
project includes as a benefit the WEI of the light rail, amounting 
to about 20 per cent of total estimated benefits. These so-called 
agglomeration benefits are largely calculated on the basis of the effect 
of government expenditure on the supply of labour. However, there is 
no countervailing inclusion of the marginal excess tax burden (METB) 
effects on disposable income, and hence transactions, or on the supply 
of labour. Costs have therefore been underestimated. 
It is important to not only list all the positive and the negative effects 
that might be expected to arise from a project, but also to justify why 
some are not rigorously investigated. It need hardly be pointed out 
that failure to do so invites risk of bias. 
4.4.4 Causality
Demonstration of causality is not a common aspect of CBA studies, 
despite its analytical importance. Methodological harmonisation 
requires, at the very least, an attempt to demonstrate causation, 
rather than relying on statistical correlations alone. Transport safety 
interventions, in particular, require an understanding of the possible 
range of impacts, rather than relying on experience in other countries. 
On the basis of a survey of American regulatory impact statements, 
a conference paper by Johnston (2015) argued that: 
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epidemiological evidence alone is highly unreliable as a measure of 
actual health impacts. This point is made with a detailed analysis of 
estimates of the impact of fine particulates on excess mortality. The data 
show that particulates have their biggest impact on cardiovascular 
mortality among the elderly in the winter months. However, the 
medical literature reveals a variety of mechanisms that account for the 
heightened risk of death from cardiovascular causes among the elderly 
during the winter, and these mechanisms do not involve exposure to 
elevated levels of fine particulates. If researchers look statistically 
at only one particular factor — fine particulates — while ignoring 
others, then estimates are subject to omitted variables bias. A better 
approach is to look first to identify potential causal mechanisms so 
that all potential factors are controlled for in statistical studies … 
The cases of WEIs and the METB provide another example. A key 
qualification in the estimation of WEIs is that the direction of causality 
needs to be demonstrated for the relationship between effective 
density and productivity. It is also important to demonstrate that the 
relationship has not been overestimated because explanatory variables 
have been omitted. In the case of the estimated deadweight social loss 
due to increased taxation used to fund a project, a prior condition 
is the need to demonstrate that the expenditure can be attributed to 
increased taxes rather than borrowing or a countervailing reduction 
in expenditure elsewhere in the budget. Automatic inclusion of either 
effect without appropriate supporting evidence would likely result in 
a biased estimate of net benefits.
4.4.5 Primary and secondary markets
In listing the expected impacts of projects, it is useful to distinguish as 
far as possible between primary and secondary markets. 
There are no firm rules for such distinctions, but the primary market 
can usually be divined from the objective of the CBA study. Textbooks 
such as Boardman et al. (2011) provide guidance on the circumstances 
in which impacts in secondary markets should be included in the 
appraisal. WEIs are an example of secondary market benefits, although 
not all the effects are suitable for inclusion in a CBA. Productivity 
effects on GDP, for example, are not commensurable with social surplus 
estimates in a CBA.
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4.4.6 Recommendations
The following are worthwhile conventions for analysts compiling 
a catalogue of expected project impacts: 
• provision of a comprehensive list of impacts and an explanation 
of all assumptions made in predicting impacts
• provision of a list of persons and sources consulted to identify 
project impacts
• provision of evidence-based justification of causality for all impacts 
identified
• cogent explanations for excluding impacts that have not been 
short-listed
• all costs and benefits, including the costs of preliminary analyses 
or administrative preparation, should be attributed to the project, 
even where the project is implemented in stages that may appear to 
be separate projects
• inclusion of all relevant implementation costs, including post-
implementation and final ex post review on completion of the 
project or program
• identification and/or valuation of major transfer payments that are 
significant enough to include in a distributional analysis 
• require the use of official sources for key variables employed in the 
base case
• explanation of reasons for use of estimates not based on official 
sources
• ensure consistency of time period used with that of the base case
• where relevant, ensure consistency of project impact assumptions 
with those used in the base case.
4.5  Estimate the economic value of the 
costs and benefits
Identification of the costs and benefits of the base case and those of 
the projects being assessed, needs to be followed by the estimation 
of their economic values. Costs are valued as opportunity costs, and 
benefits are valued in terms of social surplus. Boardman et al. (2011) 
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define the social surplus as consisting of consumer surplus, producer 
(i.e. factor) surplus, government surplus and externalities, but other 
categories could also be used. 
Various methods are used to estimate WTP in order to estimate 
various aspects of social surplus. Commonly used approaches include 
econometric estimation where data are available, travel cost methods, 
market analogies, contingent valuation surveys, choice modelling, and 
hedonic pricing (Boardman et al., 2011; Campbell & Brown, 2003). 
Each of these methods has advantages and disadvantages, so that the 
analyst needs to choose the one best suited to the project at hand. 
4.5.1 Harmonisation of variable values
The transport sector has a predilection for standardised variable 
values. Austroads, for example, has for many years provided detailed 
values, most recently in Tan et al. (2012). Similarly, the New Zealand 
Transport Agency provides evaluation methodologies and benefit 
parameter values in its Economic Evaluation Manual, which is updated 
annually. The European Commission (2008) guide to CBA also contains 
detailed instructions and variable values for use in a variety of major 
projects as part of its cohesion policy, the objective of which is to 
reduce regional socio-economic disparities. 
Whether Australian agencies should adopt harmonised values for key 
variables is open to question. To ensure consistency and comparability 
between different projects, there may be some justification for 
harmonising the value of a variable such as the VOSL, because it is 
used by two different sectors, transport and health. There may also be 
a similar rationale for harmonising key variables, such as the value of 
time, because it is used across different transport modes in road and 
rail projects, and because larger projects may be federally funded so 
that their merits should desirably be fully comparable. 
One drawback of adopting a set of standardised or harmonised statistics 
is that they need to be updated regularly. Updating requires not only 
resources for continued research, but also agreement on methodology. 
For example, the WTP for a reduction in the risk of premature death 
due to road crashes in New Zealand in 1991 was estimated at NZD2 
million by Miller and Guria (1991) using the contingent valuation 
method (CVM). This figure has been used since for transport appraisals 
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in New Zealand, but it has been indexed using the ordinary time 
wage rate. As Guria (2010) points out, this method is flawed because 
indexation by price inflation should have been used instead. 
A further complication may arise in the case of choosing a single 
default value for a variable, such as the VOSL. A stated preference 
estimate of a road crash VOSL may differ from one estimated for 
death due to a plane disaster or terminal cancer, because the risk or 
contextual factors may be perceived differently. 
Sanderson et al. (2007) report on research within Business Economics 
Research Limited, which was commissioned by the NZ Fire Service 
Commission to establish ‘a technically robust and defensible fire-
related … VOSL for use in Regulatory Impact Statements’. Because 
of the age of the 1991 car crash estimate, the preferred method of 
Sanderson et al. (2007) was to estimate the relativity between the fire 
VOSL and the road VOSL as a reflection of the current preferences 
of the NZ population. It was argued that a stand-alone estimate may 
not have been strictly comparable with one carried out some 15 years 
earlier. Their study found that the value of an additional life saved 
from fire was perceived to fall in the range of 57 to 66 per cent of the 
road VOSL.4
However, Guria (2010) notes that an Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) study shows that people’s 
willingness to pay for a reduction in the risk of death in a house fire is 
greater than that for transport accidents. He concludes that:
To make sure government funds are used to best effect, the VOSLs need 
to be right. This would best be achieved by developing an appropriate 
and common methodology for estimating VOSLs for different risks in 
different areas and establishing the relativities between them.
Clough et al. (2015) also consider that a transport VOSL could be a 
benchmark for other risk areas, with appropriate adjustment if the 
value relativity between different risks is appropriately estimated. 
They further argue, however, that because VOSL is affected by base 
4  The key question asked in the survey was: ‘Suppose the Government could increase 
funding to safety programmes, which would result in 20 accidental deaths being averted per 
year. How many of these would you prefer to be saved from reduced car accidents, and from 
reduced residential fire accidents?’ Respondents indicated on average that 12.4 of the 20 lives 
saved should be from car crashes and 7.6 from residential fire accidents.
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risk and income of the affected population, a VOSL is not likely to 
be the same in transport as in other risk domains, such as workplace 
safety or health interventions. They therefore recommend that separate 
VOSLs should ideally be determined for each domain, reflecting its 
own particular risk characteristics.
4.5.2 Harmonisation of methodology
The VOSL can be estimated in a number of ways, but the two major 
contenders in Australia and New Zealand are the human capital 
approach and the stated preference (either choice modelling or the 
CVM) approach. The human capital method is an ex post present value 
of identifiable costs, such as earnings forgone, over a standard period 
(typically 40 years) representing an average working life, hospital 
care, and property damage. It therefore excludes retirees and non-
working-age children. Further, it does not include family grief or 
pain and suffering, although the Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport 
and Regional Economics (BITREs) (2009) ‘hybrid model’ seeks to 
incorporate such effects. Conceptually preferable to the human 
capital approach, stated preference methods include all tangible and 
intangible effects by eliciting people’s average, ex ante WTP to reduce 
the risk of death, based on econometric analysis of survey information.
The methodology used to estimate transport VOSL differs among 
jurisdictions. Transport NSW employs the WTP approach, as do the 
New Zealand Ministry of Transport and the New Zealand Transport 
Agency. Other jurisdictions use the human capital estimate established 
by BITRE, adjusted for property costs, earlier funerals, and pain and 
suffering of relatives. Queensland Transport and Main Roads uses the 
human capital approach, except for safety-related projects (e.g. the 
Black Spots program) where a WTP figure is used. 
Reflecting general agreement among its members that the WTP 
approach is the most appropriate method for determining VOSL and 
crash costs, Austroads (Naude et al., 2014) produced a scoping study 
that explored the process for implementing a WTP study across 
Australia. It recommended a national WTP survey that ‘would provide 
a set of robust values for the country, based on a sound and consistent 
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methodology’ every 8–10 years with regular updating bi-annually. 
The cost of a national study was estimated at about $1 million at 2012 
prices.5 
Use of CBA in the health sector is comparatively rare. Both clinical 
and pharmaceutical studies rely on measures such as quality adjusted 
life years (QALY) and disability adjusted life years (DALY). A QALY 
combines changes in life expectancy with a composite ‘quality of 
life’ index of changes in health states as the result of a treatment. 
For example, a treatment may extend a person’s life expectancy, but, 
at the same time, reduce their quality of life for the remainder of 
their life, perhaps because of unpleasant side effects induced by the 
treatment. Treatment costs are compared to the change in a QALY or 
DALY in so-called cost-utility analysis, a form of cost-effectiveness 
analysis that does not, however, involve the economic concept of 
utility (Drummond et al., 1997). 
Stated preference methods could be used to estimate people’s 
willingness to pay for changes in risk of death or injury for specific 
illnesses and treatments. Unless relativities between the different 
conditions could be established, however, a large number of expensive 
studies would be required. 
Abelson (2012, ch. 32) outlines an alternative approach. An estimated 
VOSL can be transformed into an annuity over some assumed life span 
such as 40 years. The equal annual amounts,6 termed the value of a 
life year (VLY), can be multiplied by a relevant QALY index number 
to provide a proxy annual estimate of people’s willingness to pay for 
a specific treatment. Clough et al. (2015), however, argue that VLY 
should be estimated directly, based on survey results, rather than 
simply annualising the VOSL. The study also recommends investigating 
whether VLY varies with different levels of quality of life arising from 
an injury.
5  By way of comparison, the BITRE (2009) estimate, based on the human capital approach, 
involved four project staff, plus various contributions from another eight departmental officers. 
Assuming that the study took about two years, the saving in staffing costs had BITRE not 
undertaken its theoretically questionable approach, could have funded a national WTP study.
6  An annuity ‘spreads’ a given amount (like the value of life, VOSL) over a given number 
of years (assumed here as 40 years) so that the value is equal in each of the 40 years. 
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Given the readily available possibilities, it is only fair to ask why the 
health sector does not turn to CBA, rather than continuing its use of 
cost-effectiveness methods. One health sector official interviewed for 
this publication pointed out that the reason for the inertia is that the 
current system is based on a balance of incentives among the various 
vested interests. Large pharma-companies, government officials, and 
the medical profession are unwilling to change because their current 
profits, processes and invested knowledge are all geared to the current 
system. Any change would require authoritative intervention by an 
entity with an overriding interest in economic efficiency. 
4.5.3 Optimism bias
Flyvbjerg (2009), and his earlier work on optimism bias, is well known. 
Nevertheless, the problem of underestimation of infrastructure costs is 
enduring. The Capital Metro Agency (2014, Table 1) business case for 
the proposed Canberra light rail estimated construction costs at less 
than $600 million in nominal terms, excluding a contingency of $173 
million and an ‘escalation’ provision of $65 million. However, Canberra 
Times (20 July 2015, p. 1) reported that a government letter to an agent 
engaged to promote the project with international financiers put the 
cost at $900 million. No explanation for the difference in estimates is 
publicly available. Moreover, the letter is reported to have been issued 
two months before publication of the business case, 
The issue of cost underestimation is not an easy one to resolve, mainly 
because of the difficulty of quantifying, ex ante, what the extent of any 
potential optimism bias might be. The same is true of overestimates of 
patronage for Sydney’s Lane Cove and Cross City tunnels and the Clem 
Jones tunnel in Brisbane. 
But it is at least arguable that, for project cases for large infrastructure 
projects in particular, author-analysts should be required to 
explain why  they do not consider their work to have significantly 
underestimated costs or overestimated benefits. For example, a range 
of similar projects could be cited, with an analysis of any cost blowouts 
and how the project being proposed will safeguard against similar 
occurrences. Risk analysis using the Monte Carlo technique should 
also be used, perhaps with a suitably skewed probability distribution 
for expected construction costs. 
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Capital Metro Agency (2014, s. 5.1.2) stated that it used a ‘cost 
estimation firm with deep, recent Australian light rail experience to 
calculate a non-risk adjusted base cost estimate’. The contingency 
provision estimate was based on workshopped consideration of risk 
and likely distributions (s. 5.2.1), with Monte Carlo analysis used 
to determine confidence levels in a range of cost estimates. This is a 
useful contribution, but fuller disclosure would have been preferable.
Full disclosure of the identity of experts undertaking estimates of 
costs and benefits is desirable from both a procurement perspective 
and from that of a CBA. Over time, it would become readily apparent 
whether particular experts are prone to optimism bias, especially if 
ex post CBAs are carried out. Inveterately over-optimistic analysts 
could be avoided by agencies that commission CBA studies: market 
pressure would eventually reduce any tendency towards optimism 
bias among consultants. Further, procurement officers and ministers 
would be less likely to be placed in the invidious position of having to 
seek additional funds because of underestimated costs, or criticism of 
unsuccessful projects. 
4.5.4 Replicability 
Whatever approach is taken to harmonising values used in CBA, 
it is important that full information be provided, possibly in detailed 
appendixes, on the sources of data and the methodology used to 
derive estimates of variables. The amount of detail provided should 
be sufficient to allow other researchers to replicate the estimates 
of economic values used in the study.
4.5.5 Recommendations 
Harmonisation could involve the adoption of a set of conventions, 
including the following:
• provision of explicit justification for the timeframe used for analysis 
• explanation of reason(s) for selecting a particular method 
of estimating benefits, rather than feasible alternative method(s) 
• ensure replicability of results by making data publicly available 
(e.g. online), or providing specific references to sources used
• as a default option, use of official or authoritative sources for 
variables employed in projections
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• comprehensive tabulation of all costs and benefits, including those 
that are attributable to the project but are incurred outside the 
period of analysis
• consideration of greater use of stated preference methods on a 
national basis to permit estimation of benefits on a comparable 
basis
• recording of all variables that it is not possible or practicable to 
quantify
• providing a statement explaining measures taken to minimise 
potential optimism bias in estimating infrastructure construction 
costs or predicted benefits, possibly by comparison with projects 
that have been completed in similar circumstances, but also 
including the identity of the author of the estimates.
4.6  Adjust costs and benefits for risk
Risk is commonly understood to be either a negative event outcome, 
or its combination with the consequence of the negative outcome. 
Wikipedia expresses the concept as the potential of losing something 
of value. Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand (2009) define 
risk as the ‘effect of uncertainty on objectives’, with ‘effect [defined as] 
a deviation from the expected — positive and/or negative’, although 
earlier formulations had been framed primarily in negative terms only.
Common usage of the term ‘risk’ implies a solely negative connotation, 
involving an adverse outcome for an event. For example, it is normal to 
speak of the risk of rain spoiling a picnic. In context, this vernacular 
use of the term ‘risk’ is valid and has a specific, generally accepted 
meaning. 
Financial analysts and economists, however, envisage risk as meaning 
that an event can have either a negative or a positive outcome 
compared to an expectation. In the case of the picnic, the weather 
forecast may suggest a dry but cloudy day, which, in the absence of 
other information, is the accepted expectation. The economic concept 
of risk in this case could involve a negative outcome like rain, or a 
positive outcome like sunshine rather than cloud. In other words, the 
outcome could be either better or worse than expected.
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In CBA, the concept of risk is generally associated with the statistical 
measure of variance — the degree of deviation from an expected value 
like the mean — a unit that can include both positive and negative 
deviations. For example, a road project may be designed to reduce 
travel times but a construction flaw may result in the need to impose a 
low speed limit for safety reasons. The outcome would be higher than 
expected travel times. Alternatively, a design improvement during 
construction may reduce the length of the road, or permit smoother 
traffic flows, so that travel times are reduced below their expected 
value. Estimation of probabilities of various possibilities could be used 
to construct a probability function that would allow calculation of its 
variance. The expected benefit of the road (in this case travel time) can 
then be calculated in probability-adjusted terms using a technique 
like Monte Carlo analysis (see Appendix 6).
Economists have generally accepted the distinction between risk and 
uncertainty put forward by Knight in 1921 (2009, p. 121). In the case 
of risk, ‘the distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is 
known (either through calculation a priori, or from statistics of past 
experience)’. Risk is therefore often characterised as the calculable 
variation — positive or negative — around a point of central tendency 
of a probability distribution. By contrast, the probability of uncertain 
events is, by definition, not known or measurable. 
A traditional, but increasingly infrequent, means of allowing for risk 
in CBA has been to adjust the discount factor by some additional 
amount. A major disadvantage of doing so is the implicit assumption 
that the level of risk increases exponentially each year over the period 
of analysis, and that it applies equally to all costs and benefits. Loading 
discount rates is also potentially open to manipulation of the results 
of NPV calculations. An alternative is to use a risk-free discount rate 
after converting all costs and benefits into ‘certainty equivalents’, 
but this is generally considered impractical because people’s utility 
functions are not known. 
Where probabilities of occurrence of costs and benefits are known 
or can  be estimated, they can be expressed as expected values: 
the aggregated values of all possible outcomes weighted by their 
corresponding probabilities. A drawback of the expected value 
approach  is that it is an average that is unlikely to reflect an actual 
outcome. For  example, the likelihood of rain may be a probability-
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weighted average of rain in different parts of a given area 
(e.g.  70  per  cent), but the actual outcome can only be that it rains 
(100 per cent probability) or does not (0 per cent) in any particular spot.
Decision trees can be used to model different possible outcomes and 
their corresponding probabilities. This ‘decision theory’ approach has 
the advantage of being able to take into account varying circumstances 
over different time periods. Because costs and benefits are adjusted for 
risk through the application of probabilities, discounting takes place 
using a risk-free discount rate to avoid double counting the effect of 
risk. However, decision trees are based on expected values, and suffer 
from the disadvantage of not providing information about the variance 
associated with their calculated result. 
Most modern texts express a preference for the Monte Carlo approach 
for incorporating risk into estimates of NPVs. Its advantage is that 
it permits simultaneous variation in multiple variables, yielding 
a probability distribution of NPV values rather than a single point 
estimate. A drawback is that the application of Monte Carlo analysis 
requires knowledge of — or assumptions about — the probability 
distributions of the variables involved. Nevertheless, the use of the 
Monte Carlo method is growing in large corporations and among 
government agencies.
4.6.1 Provision for contingencies
Infrastructure projects often make provision for ‘escalation’ and 
for ‘contingencies’, but details are not always provided. Escalation 
amounts may refer to price increases for inputs, but disclosure of 
their exact nature would be desirable to remove any ambiguity in the 
analysis. 
Disclosure is also desirable where ‘contingency’ amounts are 
incorporated into costs. The rationale and the method of estimating 
the contingency is important if it is intended to serve as a proxy for 
risk analysis. Explicit explanations of the derivation of contingency 
amounts can help to reduce or avoid estimates based on arbitrary 
assumptions. 
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4.6.2 Sensitivity analysis
Some analysts confuse sensitivity analysis with risk analysis. Risk 
analysis involves the application of probabilities to estimates of 
costs and benefits. Sensitivity analysis does not involve the use of 
probabilities, and is limited to testing the effect of a specific change in 
value of a cost or benefit on the calculated NPV. Sensitivity analysis 
should be carried out after adjustment of costs and benefits for risk.
4.6.3 Recommendations 
Harmonisation could involve the adoption of conventions such as the 
following:
• risk analysis should, in principle, be undertaken for all CBA studies
• where risk analysis is not used, an explicit explanation should be 
provided of the reasons for the omission
• Monte Carlo analysis is preferred, provided that relevant probability 
functions can be specified with sufficient confidence
• the rationale and estimation method for cost ‘contingencies’ and 
‘escalation’ factors should be disclosed fully
• if the Monte Carlo technique is employed as part of risk analysis, 
details should be provided regarding the derivation and rationale 
for the probability functions used.
4.7  Calculate the net present value of the 
costs and benefits
Calculation of the NPV in a CBA is ultimately a straightforward, 
mechanical exercise in arithmetic. The basic formula contains four 
variables: costs and benefits in each time period, the discount rate, 
and the time period over which discounting takes place. Each of 
these variables is potentially subject to mis-estimation or to deliberate 
manipulation. Nevertheless, attention in the last few years has focused 
almost exclusively on the discount rate. 
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4.7.1 Discount rates
It is not the intention here to review the numerous approaches 
advocated  for the determination of discount rates. The technical 
literature is voluminous, but some of the more accessible sources 
include Zhuang et al. (2007), Portney and Weyant (1999), Boardman 
et al. (2011), Pearce et al. (2006) and Harrison (2009). Appendix A.4 
reviews some of the values used: Australian and New Zealand 
government agencies appear to have an unexplained preference for a 
real discount rate of about 7 per cent per annum. 
Discount rates are not unimportant in calculating NPVs, especially 
over long time periods. However, the effect of differences even 
between rates such as 7 and 4 per cent per annum can be swamped 
by the uncertainties inherent in estimating future costs and benefits. 
The question therefore arises whether government agencies should 
simply adopt a common rate of discount to ensure consistency and 
comparability between the NPVs for different projects, or whether the 
search for the holy grail of an ideal rate should continue.
There is an arguable case for harmonising the methodology for setting 
common discount rates, should that be considered desirable by the 
various jurisdictions. A lower ‘consumption’ rate may be considered 
appropriate for projects in the health or environment sectors if benefits 
are generally consumed at the time that they accrue (and so cannot be 
reinvested) and resources used do not have significant opportunity 
costs. However, if the capital expended on the project represents 
forgone investment opportunities that would have provided a stream 
of benefits that could have been reinvested in perpetuity, then the 
‘producer’ (social opportunity cost of capital, or ‘investment’) discount 
rate should be preferred (Pearce & Nash, 1981, s. 9.7.1; Abelson, 
2012, ch. 8; Department of Finance and Administration, 2006, ch. 5). 
Central agencies in Australian jurisdictions have generally adopted the 
‘producer’ rate.
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Shirking the chore of specifying a discount rate a priori by using the 
artifice of sensitivity analysis is puzzling.7 If discount rates reflect 
social time preferences and opportunity costs, then they are better 
treated as parameters than variables in CBA (but not necessarily so 
in financial or investment analysis). It is in any case obvious from the 
NPV formula that different discount rates will affect the final value 
of the NPV, so the point of testing NPV for sensitivity to different 
discount rates is not entirely clear. 
Further, plugging in arbitrarily selected higher and lower values of a 
discount rate cannot edify the decision-maker as to which rate is the 
more appropriate. The decision-maker is simply left to choose between 
several differing NPV values without a clear decision rule. 
4.7.2 Real and nominal values
Whether NPV is calculated in real or nominal values is immaterial, 
provided that all the variables in the formula are expressed in the same 
dimensions. There is, however, a case for presentational consistency in 
any particular study. 
In its business case for the proposed Canberra light rail project, Capital 
Metro Agency (2014) flips between the use of real and nominal values; 
for example, tables 1, 18 and 38. The lack of transparency complicates 
comprehension of the analysis, and leaves the reader wondering if 
the findings have not been compromised somewhere by a mistake 
involving the inconsistent use of variable values.
For the sake of both transparency and confidence in the findings of 
CBA studies, jurisdictions should agree that studies must be expressed 
entirely in either nominal or in real terms. This requirement would not 
preclude the presentation of results in both forms in order to suit the 
7  The Department of Finance and Administration (2006, p. 187) handbook condones the 
application of sensitivity analysis to discount rates. Boardman et al. (2011, ch. 7) is more 
circumspect, drawing attention to the conceptual problem of ‘mixing uncertainty about 
predicted effects with uncertainty about how we value those effects’ and suggesting that the 
discount rate be treated as a fixed value. Sugden and Williams (1978, p. 226) indicate that if an 
analysis is found to be sensitive to the discount rate, then ‘the decision-maker will be obliged to 
commit himself to some statement about the social MTPR [marginal time preference rate], even if 
only implicitly’.
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needs of a particular audience. An implicit condition, however, would 
be the inclusion in the study of an exposition of the methodology used 
to derive the expected rate of inflation for future time periods. 
4.7.3 Recommendations
To enhance transparency — and hence comprehension — as well as 
reducing the scope for potential manipulation of results, it would be 
desirable for jurisdictions to consider harmonisation in the following 
areas:
• prior to commencement of the analysis, specification of a single 
social discount rate to be used in the CBA
• adoption of a common discount rate, at least within jurisdictions
• consistency within a CBA study in terms of use of either real 
or nominal values
• if real values are used, derivation of the expected future rate 
of inflation for each period should be explained.
4.8  Conduct sensitivity analysis
It is far from unusual for CBA studies to contain a section on sensitivity 
analysis that consists simply of tables or statements reporting the 
effect on NPV calculations of some variation in the magnitude or range 
of all the variables. In such cases, the effort involved in estimating 
the effect on NPV is entirely nugatory. While tables of sensitivity 
testing may help pad out a report, and perhaps give the impression 
of analytical input, the lack of interpretative commentary leaves the 
analysis incomplete. 
Lack of clarity about testing for sensitivity may be a factor in the 
absence of interpretative analysis of its implications. A confounding 
fact is that sensitivity analysis is often discussed in textbooks in the 
context of risk analysis, despite the fact that risk analysis is based 
on probabilities, while sensitivity analysis is not. The nature and 
purposes of the two are distinct. 
At the simplest level, sensitivity analysis is used to determine whether 
NPV changes significantly when changes are made in variables used 
to calculate that NPV. Its ultimate purpose is to identify variables 
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that strongly influence NPV and to check their estimated values for 
robustness or accuracy. In other words, if NPV is shown to be sensitive 
to changes in a particular variable, it provides a signal to the analyst to 
check the robustness of the estimates being used for that variable and 
possibly also the adequacy of risk analysis. 
Some judgement is required as to which variables should be tested. 
Where a CBA includes, say, 17 variables and the sensitivity analysis 
considers the most plausible value as well as one level that is higher 
and one that is lower, the number of combinations will be 317, yielding 
over 129 million results. As a first step, then, variables in whose 
estimation the analyst has confidence, or which are obviously unlikely 
to influence NPV significantly could be excluded from sensitivity 
testing to increase tractability.
General practice is to vary the expected or most plausible value by 
a certain percentage, both up and down. However, this may lead to 
inconsistent results. A 5 per cent variation in a cost of $50 million 
per annum, for example, will affect NPV differently to a 5 per cent 
variation in an annual wage rate of $100,000. The two variables should 
be tested on the same basis, perhaps by varying the expected value 
for each by one standard deviation (Perkins, 1994, s. 15.7.2). In many 
cases, however, relevant probability distributions may not be known 
for key variables.
Partial sensitivity analysis involves testing the influence on NPV by 
changing one variable at a time. This is the most common approach, 
and may involve testing ‘best’ and ‘worst’ case values for a variable. 
It  is also possible, however, to change the value of more than one 
variable at the same time. Where this is done, care is required to ensure 
that the two variables are independent of each other. Negatively 
correlated variables, for example, could result in only a small effect on 
NPV, although their effect when altered separately may be quite large. 
Sensitivity analysis can also be used to discover switching points 
(sometimes also called threshold, crossover or breakeven values) of 
variables (Sinden & Thampapillai, 1995, ch. 10). If the NPV has been 
calculated to be positive, for example, then a particular variable may 
be reduced (or increased) until the NPV falls to zero or switches to 
a negative amount. If decision-makers consider that it is plausible 
that the variable in question could in future reach such a switching 
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point, they may not proceed with the project, even if the calculated 
point NPV is ostensibly positive. Although it is inappropriate to vary 
social discount rates in sensitivity analysis, the switching point of 
zero NPV provided by the internal rate of return may be sought by a 
decision-maker. 
4.8.1 Monte Carlo (risk) analysis and sensitivity 
analysis
Monte Carlo analysis involves random selection of values from the 
probability distributions of multiple variables at the same time. 
The  result is the generation of a probability distribution of NPV 
values rather than a single point estimate. However, this simultaneous 
drawing of sample values from different variables’ distributions 
is confused in some texts as representing multivariate sensitivity 
analysis. In fact, software programs such as Palisade’s @RISK carry out 
a separate sensitivity analysis after completion of the Monte Carlo risk 
analysis. In the case of @RISK, the sensitivity test results are presented 
in the form of a tornado chart. 
4.8.2 Recommendations
CBA reports should:
• focus sensitivity testing on key variables
• avoid treating social discount rates in CBA as variables to be subject 
to sensitivity testing
• interpret and analyse the results of sensitivity testing.
4.9 Determine distributional consequences 
and distributional weighting of costs and 
benefits
Distributional issues cause confusion and controversy. It is therefore 
desirable to clarify their role in CBA studies, to facilitate understanding 
and transparency of results.
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A ‘positive economics’ approach is to examine the implications of a 
proposed project, including flows of transfer payments, by describing 
in detail the benefits and costs accruing to the main stakeholders. 
A normative approach seeks to influence the overall outcome of an 
analysis by adjusting the estimated benefits and costs in a manner 
that advantages specific stakeholders in society. Such ‘distributional 
weighting’ may involve multiplying benefits that accrue to low-
income groups in society with weights greater than one, for example. 
Where this occurs, the calculated NPV will be increased, so that the 
project has a greater chance of being accepted.
4.9.1 Distributional consequences
Traditional texts such as Gramlich (1981), Mishan (1988) and Musgrave 
and Musgrave (1976) tended to address CBA issues from the perspective 
of society as a whole. If the benefits or gains to all members of society 
exceeded total opportunity costs, the project or policy was considered 
to be worthwhile overall. If the gainers in society also compensated the 
losers and were still left with net benefits, the situation was considered 
to satisfy the Pareto criterion that there be at least one winner and 
no losers. Under the so-called Hicks–Kaldor criterion, projects can 
also be considered to be overall socially beneficial where the potential 
exists for winners to compensate losers, even in the absence of actual 
compensatory transfers. 
In order to determine whether it is possible in theory or in practice 
for the winners from a government project or policy to compensate the 
losers, it is essential to be able to identify the flow of benefits and costs 
between different sections of society. In theory, it would be possible to 
identify the gains and losses accruing to each member of society, but 
the identification of key groups is usually adequate for most policy 
considerations.
According to Lichfield et al. (1975, p. 78), a Planning Balance Sheet 
method was developed by Lichfield in the 1950s to identify the 
incidence of costs and benefits on various social groups in urban and 
regional planning proposals. This approach consisted of a conventional 
CBA, but with detailed accounting of costs and benefits by category 
of the social groups affected. Alexander (1978) applied the method 
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to a  series of development proposals in the Blue Mountains, to the 
west of Sydney, with 18 categories of producers (mainly government 
agencies) and a similar number of consumer groups. 
Krutilla (2005) adopted a similar disaggregated approach in promoting 
what he terms a ‘Hicks–Kaldor tableau’ for presenting the results of 
a CBA. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are modified tableau presentations used by 
Krutilla (2005), illustrating three variants of a public project where 
labour is hired at a wage W to produce a good or service of benefit 
value B.
Table 4.1 represents a situation where labour is paid a wage of W by a 
private or government employer, but also incurs an opportunity cost 
(OC), perhaps due to loss of leisure time by previously unemployed 
persons. The wage itself is a transfer from the employer to labour, 
and nets out in the final column, and hence the overall calculation of 
net benefits created by the project. Nevertheless, the tableau format 
records the fact that a financial flow occurred due to the project, 
and was received by the labour sector. While the financial flow of 
wage payments does not affect the net social benefit in the simplified 
Table 4.1 scenario, the information contained is likely to be of interest 
to decision-makers, especially at the political level.
Table 4.1: Implementation of synthetic project, using labour











Financial charge –W W 0
Economic cost –OC –OC
Net benefit B –W W–OC B–OC
Source: adapted from krutilla (2005)
Tableau formats are flexible enough to reflect other features. Table 4.2, 
for example, indicates that local labour receives a wage as a windfall 
transfer, but the source of the wage is from an entity that has been 
excluded from the ‘standing’ of the project (perhaps a foreign 
government or investor). The net benefit from a ‘local only’ perspective 
is now (B+W–OC). 
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Table 4.2: Synthetic project, assuming ‘standing’ is local only







Financial charge W W
Economic cost –OC –OC
Net benefit B W–OC B+W–OC
Source: adapted from krutilla (2005)
Where the distributional consequences of a project are of interest 
to decision-makers, a tableau format can prove useful. In particular, 
a tableau can provide an indication of how much compensation may 
need to be offered to those opposed to a project because they will suffer 
some detriment. From a broader perspective, the tableau approach also 
promotes a degree of transparency that may not always be present in 
a conventional presentation of the efficiency effects of a government 
policy or project. A particular advantage of using a format that is 
useful to decision-makers because of the distributional information it 
contains, is that it would help promote the use of CBA. 
Should jurisdictions find the tableau format useful, it could be 
considered as a standard feature to be used in CBA studies. However, 
two issues would need to be resolved:
• Greater levels of disaggregation are likely to involve greater 
analytical effort. It is not immediately obvious where the balance 
between cost and degree of detail might lie. 
• Australian and New Zealand public servants have a duty to remain 
apolitical. Disaggregating CBA detail to the level of electorate 
boundaries may be unethical. Whether sufficient detail should be 
provided to allow ministers’ offices to piece together the puzzle 
themselves is also an issue requiring careful resolution.
4.9.2 Distributional weighting of costs and benefits
Applying weights to the costs and benefits that affect different social 
groups is contentious at best. 
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In principle, adjustments to estimated costs and benefits accruing to 
particular social groups can be made on the basis of various criteria. 
For example, benefits from a road project that accrue to residents of a 
regional area may be increased by some factor because decision-makers 
consider that improved transport links between regional and urban 
areas are desirable, or that regional residents should be compensated 
with better transport links to make up for the disadvantage suffered 
due to isolation. Alternatively, low-income groups may be favoured by 
increasing the benefits attributable to them. Using choice modelling, 
Scarborough & Bennett (2008) estimate community distributional 
preferences favouring younger generations.
Pearce and Nash (1981, ch. 3) argue in favour of the use of distributive 
weights. Mishan (1988, ch. 30), on the other hand, argues that the use 
of such weights is ultimately subjective and arbitrary, as well as being 
a misplaced use of fiscal policy because income redistribution could be 
better achieved through general taxation policy. 
Some safeguards can be adopted to promote transparency and reduce 
the degree of arbitrariness where decision-makers insist on the use of 
distributive weighting as part of a CBA.
• Justification for the use of weights, and for their value, should be 
established and recorded before commencement of the analysis, 
preferably certified by a high-level decision-maker.
• Because of the scope for potential manipulation of overall results, 
subsequent changes to the value of weights used should not be 
permitted.
• Two sets of results for the CBA should be presented: one with, and 
one without application of distributive weights.
4.9.3 Recommendations
• Jurisdictions should give consideration to the use of extended 
tableau formats to present the distributional consequences of CBA 
studies. 
• Adoption of comprehensive tableau formats should be subject to 
safeguards that maintain the apolitical nature of public service 
advice.
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• Justification for the use of weights, and for their value, should be 
established and recorded before commencement of the analysis.
• Because of the scope for potential manipulation of overall results, 
subsequent changes to the value of weights used should not be 
permitted.
• If distributional weights are used, then two sets of results for the 
CBA should be presented: one with, and one without application 
of weights.
4.10 Arrive at a conclusion or 
recommendations for the results of the CBA
It is not uncommon to read a CBA study where the executive summary 
or the concluding section asserts various findings, but where the 
claimed results are difficult to find in the body of the text or in the 
appendices. It is inefficient to search for greater detail, or for the 
evidence on which any conclusions are based. 
In order to reduce search costs, conclusions or summaries of findings 
should be fully referenced to the section from which they have been 
sourced. For example, a calculated NPV should be referenced to a 
specific table or paragraph in Section 4.7 (in this publication), or to 
a relevant appendix. Some form of such referencing is important not 
only for transparency, but also to help ensure the internal consistency 
of the analysis.
An analytically complete study should also record sufficient data and 
calculations to allow reviewers to check the validity of the conclusions. 
Replicability is an important means of ensuring the credibility of the 
results.
More frequent publication of CBA studies would promote their 
credibility because both consultants and decision-makers would be 
faced with the ‘sniff’ or ‘pub’ test. During interviews a number of 
jurisdictions pointed out that publication would also assist long-term 
harmonisation because those commissioning CBA studies would have 
previous examples as models that could be followed. Commercial 
confidentiality is often claimed as a reason for not releasing CBA 
studies, but, given that project expenditure cannot occur without 
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parliamentary appropriation, much of the claimed commercially 
sensitive information may well be released into the public domain at 
some stage anyway.
4.10.1 Recommendations 
Jurisdictions should consider harmonisation of the following aspects 
of the concluding or executive summary sections:
• All statements and assertions regarding findings should be 
referenced to tables or paragraphs in the body of the study, or to 
relevant appendices.
• Sufficient data should be provided in the body of the study, or in 
relevant appendices, to permit reviewers to replicate key findings.
• In the absence of genuine commercial or national security 
sensitivities, studies should be published in full to allow public 





What not to do: A ‘belts 
and braces’ enhancement 
of harmonisation
Introduction: Common misconceptions 
in cost-benefit analysis
A range of agencies in the Australian and New Zealand jurisdictions 
occasionally publish manuals, fact sheets and guidelines to assist their 
staff in preparing or commissioning studies employing cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA). Examples include the New Zealand Treasury (2015), 
Department of Finance and Administration (2006) and Transport 
for NSW (2013). An obvious advantage of publishing manuals and 
guidelines is that individual agencies reinforce their advocacy of the 
use of CBA in evaluating project proposals. 
One, possibly unintended, consequence of publishing manuals and 
guidelines is that they foster a degree of harmonisation between agencies 
and even between jurisdictions. Most agency manuals cover similar 
topics and generally cite or copy sections of other agencies’ manuals 
and guidelines. The Department of Finance and Administration (2006) 
Handbook of Cost-Benefit Analysis is an exception in that it refers 
almost entirely to academic publications, although it is often itself 
cited by other agencies in their manuals.
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Preparation and publication of a manual or handbook requires 
considerable effort. No matter how skilled an author in a government 
agency, he or she will inevitably face reviews of multiple drafts by 
superiors and others in the organisation. Considerable resources are 
ultimately devoted to the production of a CBA manual. It is therefore 
pertinent to ask whether publication of manuals by individual 
agencies is an effective use of resources, and whether the contents 
could be improved in some way. Several perspectives are relevant.
Given the number and range of textbooks of various levels of 
sophistication that are readily available, an obvious question to ask is 
why agencies bother to replicate or rewrite published, peer-reviewed 
material. One answer might be that manuals are intended to distil 
concepts and methods that may be expounded at greater length and 
in a more theoretical context in academic textbooks. Abstraction 
from a theoretical context in an area like CBA, however, risks 
misapprehensions and mistakes of the sort dealt with in the examples 
examined in this chapter. 
A second issue relates to the degree of detail and level of sophistication 
that should be incorporated into a manual. The problem is that a mixed 
readership requires different levels of information and explanation. 
Officials in specialised government agencies are likely to become bored 
with basic material, making little use of a publication. On the other 
hand, overly succinct explanations or instructions are likely to leave 
novices puzzled. An example is the frequent reproduction of the 
present value formula: unnecessary for those who already understand 
the concept of discounting, but unnecessarily confusing to those not 
used to interpreting mathematical formulae. 
Manuals tend to be written in a prescriptive manner that informs users 
about what is to be done in an appraisal. Some point to the pitfalls 
of standard problems such as double counting. In general, however, 
they fail to clarify or specify what should not be done. A ‘belts and 
braces’ approach that also advises what should be avoided would aid 
comprehension and the quality of CBA studies.
It is important to be explicit about undesirable methodologies. 
An example is the treatment in CBA of employment creation, a topic 
of interest to most decision-makers at the political level. The need to 
take into account political considerations has generally been handled 
111
5 . whAT NoT To Do
adroitly by recommending that job creation should be ‘reported 
separately’ to the results of the CBA itself. Despite the neatness of 
the solution, there is nevertheless a risk of fostering the erroneous 
perception among readers that ‘jobs’ are in fact an additional benefit, 
on top of other quantified benefits. 
Recommendations
• Manuals and handbooks on CBA that are produced by agencies 
should specify methodologies that are not considered to be 
desirable, with explicit explanations for why this is so.
• Agencies should consider the relative value of supplementing 
official manuals with training courses that provide a fuller context 
to the contents of manuals and handbooks.
• Publication of CBAs should be encouraged as a means of fostering 
wider discussion of methodology and the values used.
5.1 The misconception that the purpose 
of discounting is ‘to allow for inflation’
A not uncommon misconception among public servants is that 
discounting means ‘allowing for inflation’. It is possible that the 
confusion arises because the arithmetic used in making adjustments 
for inflation is similar to that used for discounting. 
CBA provides a comparison of the sum over time of the additional 
projected benefits and the sum of the additional attributable costs of 
a proposed project or policy. Adding up costs and benefits requires 
that they be expressed in common units or mathematical ‘dimensions’. 
Ensuring commensurability should ideally involve, at a minimum, 
adjusting values to reflect their receipt or incidence at different 
periods of time, expressing them consistently in either real or nominal 
values, and adjusting for risk.
Placing discounting, inflation-adjustment and risk analysis within the 
broader context of commensurability is a useful means of avoiding 
confusion among generalists who may not be familiar with the different 
concepts. There is no single, fixed method of conducting a CBA, so it 
is important to stress the underlying concept of commensurability, 
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rather than simply prescribing discounting. The following section 
demonstrates that it is possible to work in either real or nominal 
values, provided all variables are expressed in consistent units. 
A similar illustration could be provided for the adjustment of costs 
and benefits for risk.
5.1.1 Real versus nominal: Does it really matter?
It is typically the case that costs and benefits are first converted to 
real values and then discounted by a rate that is also expressed in 
real terms. The same result could be obtained, however, by working 
exclusively with nominal values for both the benefits, costs and the 
discount rate, with no adjustments for inflation. Table 5.1 compares 
the two approaches. 
Table 5.1: Discounting with real and nominal values
Nominal values Real values (t = 0)





at  3% p.a.
1 $10 $9 .52 $9 .80 $9 .51
2 $10 $9 .07 $9 .61 $9 .06
3 $10 $8 .64 $9 .42 $8 .62
4 $10 $8 .23 $9 .24 $8 .21
Present value $35 .46 $35 .40
Source: leo Dobes
Ignoring the difference due to rounding error1 when working with 
exponential values, it is clear that the same result can be obtained by 
working in nominal values only, or in real values alone. The key issue 
is that the ‘dimensions’ of the values used (benefits, costs, discount 
rate) in either approach must be consistent with each other.
In practice, it is difficult to forecast future values in nominal terms. 
For example, forecasting the cost of petrol for each year for the next 
15  years is fraught with difficulty because observed prices at the 
pump are likely to fluctuate during the year, as well as between years. 
A workaround is to choose a long-term average value and treat it as a 
1  The two approaches are in fact mathematically equivalent. Sugden and Williams 
(1978, s. 3.5) provide a short but elegant proof.
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real cost. For example, a cost of about $1.20 per litre might be chosen 
as a long-run average, without being adjusted any further for inflation 
on the assumption that it will increase at approximately the same rate 
as all other prices. The present value of petrol costs over the 15 years 
would then be obtained by applying a real discount rate. 
5.2. Qualification of the decision rule that a 
BCR > 1 or NPV > 0 indicates that a project 
should proceed
It is not uncommon for proponents to claim that projects should 
proceed because their benefit-cost ratio (BCR) is greater than 1. 
At first glance, such calls seem unobjectionable because a BCR ratio 
that exceeds unity implies that benefits exceed costs. The use of BCR 
therefore offers a readily accepted decision rule. In practice, the reality 
may be different. 
5.2.1 The standard benefit-cost ratio and the net 
present value decision rule
The most common, standard use of a BCR refers to a ratio of the present 
value of all the benefits, divided by the present value of all the costs 
(including capital and operating). 
A better alternative to citing a BCR is to refer to the net present value 
(NPV) which equals the present value of all social (private plus public) 
benefits minus the present value of financial operating and capital 
costs, as well as economic costs like externalities. Table 5.2 illustrates 
the importance of presenting costs and benefits separately.
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Table 5.2: Comparison of standard benefit-cost ratio (BCR) 
and net present value (NPV)
Project 1 Project 2 Project 3
Present value of all benefits 11 1100 11
Present value of all costs 10 1000 9
Benefit‑cost ratio 1 .1 1 .1 1 .2
Net present value 1 100 2
Source: leo Dobes
At first glance, Project 3 appears to be the superior alternative in 
Table 5.2 because it has a BCR of 1.2, while projects 1 and 2 have BCRs 
of only 1.1. On the basis of BCRs, projects 1 and 2 are also equivalent 
in merit. On the basis of BCRs alone, a decision-maker would choose 
Project 3, and remain indifferent between projects 1 and 2 if a second 
choice were available. The problem is that ratios do not clearly 
distinguish between the numerator and denominator so it is not clear 
how relatively attractive they are. 
Use of NPV, on the other hand, is comparatively unambiguous, with 
Project 2 clearly showing the greatest contribution to economic 
welfare in absolute terms. In comparison, the relatively small NPV 
values for projects 1 and 3 suggest that they would be eliminated from 
further consideration. While BCRs may be preferred by some project 
proponents for presentational reasons, NPVs are a more transparent 
approach for displaying the result of a CBA and should be preferred to 
a BCR in presenting the results of a CBA. 
It may be argued that an NPV by itself does not inform the decision-
maker how large the difference between social costs and social benefits 
may be relative to the overall social cost. The cost of a project, however, 
is not itself relevant to decision-making in CBA. What is relevant is 
the magnitude of the additional benefit that can be gained from an 
additional social cost, taking into account feasible alternative projects. 
Nevertheless, the standard decision-making rule of NPV > 0 that 
is presented in some texts should not be applied automatically or 
indiscriminately. 
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5.2.2 When use of the NPV > 0 criterion alone 
may be problematic
Even if NPV > 0 or BCR > 1, there may be better projects available 
with a higher NPV. The point is that a positive NPV or a BCR that 
exceeds unity are not in themselves sufficient to conclude that a 
project should be implemented. Overall social well-being can be 
increased by selecting alternatives with the highest NPVs. For 
example, a school or hospital may have a higher NPV, even if the 
focus of a particular study is on the construction of better roads. 
Special interest advocates typically ignore alternative potential uses 
of social resources, sometimes in the genuine belief that the social 
merit of their proposed project is self-evident and should therefore 
be given precedence.
Further, there are three specific situations when use of NPV > 0 is not 
necessarily an appropriate decision criterion:
• where there is a budget constraint in a given year that precludes 
the financing of all the projects that yield a positive NPV
• where two or more projects have different lives: a longer time 
horizon is likely to involve the accretion of more costs and benefits, 
so that a project with a shorter life cannot be validly compared 
with a more protracted one
• if a real (quasi) option is present: the flexibility of not needing to 
invest fully at the start of the project in a situation of uncertainty 
generates additional value that should be added to the NPV.  The 
topic is too complex to address succinctly below, but see, for 
example:  Dixit & Pindyck (1994), Trigeorgis (1996), Treager (2014), 
The Economist (1999, August).
5.2.3 Selecting projects under a budget 
constraint
In a situation of limited budgetary resources, it may not be possible 
to fund every project that demonstrates a positive NPV. Giving 
preference to projects with the highest NPV may not maximise overall 
NPV, especially if projects with high NPV also require a high level of 
initial funding for their implementation. It is possible that selection 
of lower NPV-yielding projects can maximise overall NPV. Table 5.3 
illustrates this possibility.
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Table 5.3: Ranking of projects by NPV and profitability ratio 
($ thousands)
Project PV (K) PV (B) NPV (rank) B/K (rank)
A 100 130 30 (5) 1 .30 (2)
B 400 433 33 (4) 1 .08 (5)
C 200 303 103 (1) 1 .52 (1)
D 400 494 94 (2) 1 .24 (3)
E 500 558 58 (3) 1 .11 (4)
Note: k = capital cost of investment; B = benefits net of operating costs; B/k = net benefit 
investment ratio (NBIr): also known as the profitability ratio 
Source: reproduced from Table 3.3 in Campbell & Brown (2003)
Table 5.3 compares five fictitious projects ranked by their NPV 
(4th  column) and by their rank on the basis of the net benefit 
investment ratio (NBIR, 5th column). The NBIR can easily be confused 
with the standard BCR. However, rather than including only benefits 
in its numerator and all costs in the denominator, as for the standard 
BCR, the NBIR includes in its numerator benefits minus operating 
costs, with the denominator being limited to the capital or investment 
cost alone. An alternative term for the NBIR could be the profitability 
ratio because it shows the net return on the initial investment. 
Campbell and Brown (2003) posit an $800,000 limit on financial 
resources with decision-makers faced with the projects shown in 
Table 5.3. If the projects with the highest NPV were given preference 
by decision-makers, projects C and D would be funded first, and 
then 40 per cent of project E, assuming that it could be part-funded. 
The overall NPV achieved would be $220,000.2 If, instead, decision-
makers ranked projects according to the NBIR, they would choose 
projects C, A, D, and 20 per cent of project E, yielding an overall NPV 
of $239,000.
2  NPV = $103 + $94 + 0.4*$58 = $220,000
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In cases where projects are indivisible, it may still be possible to 
choose a set that have generally lower NPVs individually, but together 
yield a higher overall NPV within the budgetary limit. The NBIR can 
again be used to rank such ‘lumpy’ projects. 
Brealey et al. (2006, ch. 5.4) point out, however, that the use of NBIR to 
rank projects subject to a budget constraint is ‘inadequate whenever 
there is any other constraint on the choice of projects’. Examples of 
constraints include cases where one project depends on another or 
two projects are mutually exclusive, or there is a budget constraint 
in more than one year. In such cases, resort to linear programming 
methods may be required to identify an optimal set of projects.
5.2.4 Comparing projects with different lives
Projects with different timeframes cannot be compared directly on the 
basis of their NPV values. The longer of the two project periods will 
accrue a greater number of benefits and costs than the shorter one. 
It would therefore not be appropriate to compare the two on the basis 
of NPV alone. 
One means of validly comparing projects with different time horizons 
using only NPV is to replicate them in a way that results in the same 
period for both. For example, a two-year and a three-year project would 
be replicated three times and two times respectively, so that both are 
six years long. However, this approach may not always be practicable 
— for example, if one project is seven years in length and the other 
nine years — because the common time period may be too long. 
A  lengthy time period necessarily needs to assume that technology 
and other conditions remain the same; otherwise a comparison over 
the extended time period becomes unrealistic. 
Table 5.4 illustrates the alternative approach of deriving equivalent 
annual values (EAV) by converting NPVs into annuities. A government 
agency needs to choose between two types of motor vehicles its senior 
management. They are of equivalent quality and performance but 
differ in price and length of effective life. Vehicle A costs $25,000 
to purchase, with annual maintenance costs of $6,000. It is kept for 
three years and then sold for $5,000 at the end of the third year and 
then replaced with the same vehicle type. From the annuity table, 
the annuity factor for 3 years at 5 per cent p.a. is 2.72. Vehicle B costs 
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$20,000 to purchase, with annual maintenance costs of $7,000. It is 
kept for only two years and then sold for $5,000 at the end of the 
second year and then replaced with the same vehicle type. The two-
year annuity factor in the annuity table is 1.86 at an interest rate of 5 
per cent per annum.
Table 5.4: Using EAVs to compare projects with different time 
horizons ($ thousand)
C0 C1 C2 C3 PV @ 5% p.a.
vehicle A 25 6 6 (6‑5) = 1 37 .01
eAv 13 .61 13 .61 13 .61 37 .01
vehicle B 20 7 (7‑5) = 2 ‑ 28 .48
eAv 15 .31 15 .31 ‑ 28 .48
Note: eAv = equivalent annual value; Pv = present value 
Source: leo Dobes
Because the PV of the costs for vehicle A ($37.01) is higher than 
for vehicle B ($28.48), the decision rule of choosing the least cost 
vehicle, vehicle B would be chosen. If the vehicles were being bought 
and replaced over a longer period (e.g. 10 years) then it would be 
financially more favourable to use vehicle A, because its annualised 
value of $13.61 is lower than that for vehicle B ($15.31).
Conversion of NPV values to EAVs permits direct comparison of the 
two machines on the basis of annualised constant costs. The EAVs 
are derived by dividing the NPV of each by the annuity factor 
corresponding to the life of each project. For example Machine A has a 
PV of $28.37. Dividing the PV by the annuity factor for three years at 
a 6 per cent per annum discount rate (equal to 2.673) provides an EAV 
of $10.61. Comparing the two machines on the basis of annualised 
values leads to a decision to choose Machine A, even though the PV 
of its costs is higher than that of Machine B.
The EAV approach is sometimes also used for projects where there are 
large costs at the end of the project, as well as large capital costs at the 
beginning of the project. An example might be a comparison between 
a nuclear power station and a coal-fuelled one, where decommissioning 
costs are incurred. In such situations, there is a reversal of the sign of 
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cash flows — from initially negative during construction, to positive 
during the operational phase, and then to negative again when 
decommissioning occurs.
In sum, NPV should be used as the decision criterion for CBA. Care 
is required to ensure that NPVs are used validly, however, especially 
where projects with different time horizons are being compared. It is 
also desirable to present as much information as possible to decision-
makers, rather than providing only an NPV. Itemising all social costs 
and social benefits is particularly desirable. 
5.3 The furphy that the period of analysis 
should not exceed 30 years because the 
effect of discounting is to make any present 
values negligible after this length of time
There are no hard and fast rules for the time horizon of a project. 
The relevant timeframe should be determined by the period over which 
impacts are typically expected, rather than any effects of discounting. 
Nevertheless, even respected publications like The Economist 
(for example, 26 June 1999, p. 94) may on occasion recommend a time 
horizon not exceeding about 30 years for discounted cash flow analysis.
Table 5.5: Present values of $1 for selected years and discount 
rates
Years 3% p.a. 5% p.a. 10% p.a.
10 0 .74 0 .61 0 .39
20 0 .55 0 .38 0 .15
30 0 .41 0 .23 0 .06
40 0 .31 0 .14 0 .02
50 0 .23 0 .09 0 .01
Source: adapted by leo Dobes from appendix 2, Campbell & Brown (2003)
Table 5.5 presents a selection of years and discount factors for present 
values. It is clear that, even with a 5 per cent per annum discount 
rate, the present value of $1 is still almost a quarter (0.23 cents) after 
30 years. A similar figure holds after 50 years if the discount rate is 
only 3 per cent per annum. Even a relatively high discount rate of 10 
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per cent per annum would see approximately 1 cent in every dollar 
preserved at the 50-year mark. It is therefore not clear why blanket 
advice should be given to avoid exceeding periods of 30 years for 
discounting project costs and benefits. 
5.4 Caution required regarding treating 
increased property prices around a new 
road or railway as a benefit
It is obviously important to distinguish between the various effects of 
a project when conducting a CBA. 
Primary effects are typically those that reflect most closely the purpose 
or objective of the project. In the case of a dam that is constructed to 
reduce flooding, the primary effect will be to reduce flood damage, but 
there may also be ancillary or associated costs or benefits that need to 
be attributed to the project. For example, the dam may be constructed 
in such a way that it also produces hydroelectricity, or it may result in 
the negative externality of exterminating a fish species that requires a 
free-running river. 
Analysts are sometimes tempted to include in a CBA less direct effects, 
variously termed ‘indirect effects’, ‘secondary effects’ and ‘transmitted 
effects’, possibly because of their prominence in the public psyche. 
A  common example is the expected increase in property prices in 
areas near a new road or railway. The creation of additional jobs due 
to a project is another impact that is invariably emphasised at the 
political level.
In the case of a new or improved road or railway, the primary benefit 
is the reduction in travel cost experienced by existing and new users 
of the transport route. The benefit may be due to reduced travel time 
if the route is shorter, or if it is upgraded to permit faster travel. 
Fuel  savings may also be reaped, representing a resource saving. 
Safety improvements can reduce mortality from crashes. 
An increase in property prices is not a separate effect; it simply reflects 
the value of the primary benefit. People living near the improved road 
or railway will benefit from faster travel times or reduced fuel costs, 
so demand for those properties will increase, resulting in increased 
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prices. The increase in property prices is caused by the increased 
benefit of improved transport. It is not additional to it. Another way 
of looking at this is to consider that the gain from improved transport 
is distributed, or ‘trickles down’ to other sectors like real estate or to 
shops close to a train station. To include both the primary effect of 
time and fuel savings, as well as increased property prices, would be 
to double count the benefits of the project.
A second reason why it would not be appropriate to include increased 
property prices as a benefit of a road or railway improvement project 
is that the increased demand for properties close to the upgraded 
transport route may be offset by reduced demand for properties 
elsewhere. For example, those people wishing to move closer to 
the upgraded road or railway are likely to sell their existing, more 
distant residences. The price of those more distant residences is likely 
to fall, offsetting to some extent the increase in prices closer to the 
transport route. In a broad sense, there is an element of transfer or 
pecuniary effect, with price gains in one area being offset in another, 
and therefore the gains are cancelled out.
A focus on secondary or transmitted effects may be justified, however, 
when the primary benefits cannot easily be valued. If it were not 
possible, for example, to estimate travel time and fuel savings due 
to a road or railway upgrade, then any increase in property prices 
could serve as a proxy benefit value that reflects the underlying travel 
benefit. Similarly, if estimating the value of the additional water 
produced or harvested by the construction of a dam is not feasible, 
then the value of the resulting additional crop production could serve 
as a proxy measure. 
Care is required in using secondary markets as proxies for primary 
effects. In the case of property prices, it may be difficult, if not 
misleading to designate a particular area as benefitting from improved 
transport, especially if not all the users of the upgraded road or railway 
live locally. And an improved railway route may reduce road congestion 
as an ancillary benefit. In the case of the dam, estimates of increased 
crop production would need to be controlled for the additional cost 
of fertilisers or altered rainfall patterns due to evaporation from the 
nearby dam. Further, increased crop production would exclude other 
benefits of the dam, such as recreational swimming and fishing, as well 
as negative ones such as the destruction of trees and animal habitats. 
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5.5 Is it really true that ‘you can’t monetise 
things like the environment’? 
There is little dispute that it is not possible to monetise environmental 
services and impacts. It is therefore surprising that critics of CBA 
should focus on this aspect.
Economists do not attach monetary values to intangibles like 
environmental services and impacts. But they do seek to establish 
what values people place on them. The techniques for doing so are 
covered in most textbooks. Hedonic pricing, for example, is typically 
presented to explain the valuation of the negative value of noise: 
prices of houses near an airport can be compared with similar ones 
further away. The  difference in price, other things being equal, is 
taken to reflect the willingness of people to pay to avoid the ‘bad’ of 
noise. The higher house price represents the sacrifice of other goods 
and services that could have been purchased instead of a house less 
exposed to noise. 
The essence of attaching a value to an intangible environmental 
quantity lies in determining its opportunity cost. In a world of limited 
resources and goods, not all wants can be satisfied. It is generally 
necessary to give up something of value in exchange for another 
good or service. The maximum amount or value of the forgone good 
or service thus provides a measure of the value placed on the object 
that is acquired in its place. Where markets exist, so-called ‘revealed 
preference’ methods like hedonic pricing can be used.
In the absence of markets (for example, the value placed by people 
on the preservation of a wetland), ‘stated preference’ techniques like 
contingent valuation methods and choice modelling can be used. 
Choice modelling considers goods or services in the form of a ‘bundle’ 
of constituent characteristics, including price, that can be traded-off 
in various combinations. It is instructive that commercial firms like 
supermarkets employ so-called conjoint analysis, a technique similar 
to choice modelling, to estimate how much customers are likely to pay 
for a new type of good once it is placed on the shelf. 
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5.5.1 Choice of numeraire
It may be that critics of CBA are confused because CBA does in 
fact express costs and benefits in dollar values. However, monetary 
units are used for cognitive convenience, rather than because of any 
supposed myopically pecuniary worldview held by economists. 
It would be conceptually feasible to measure costs and benefits in 
terms of alternative units of measurement, such as sea shells or cups 
of coffee. But dollars are preferred, simply because they are readily 
understood by most people. Without first translating into monetary 
units, most people would find it difficult to assess how many cups 
of coffee they would be willing to trade-off to save a koala or some 
threatened species. The monetary value of other goods and services 
that people are prepared to give up in exchange for a koala reflects 
their willingness to pay to save it. 
5.5.2 The non-measurable
Finally, Gramlich (1981, p. 5) addresses several misconceptions about 
CBA, one being that: 
benefit-cost analysis is a mechanical substitute for common sense. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. Benefit-cost analysis is really 
a framework for organizing thoughts, for listing all pros and cons, 
and for placing a value on each consideration … in the real world 
there will be some considerations that cannot easily be enumerated or 
valued … the sensible way to deal with such omitted considerations 
is not to abandon all efforts … but rather to … quantify what can 
be quantified, to array and rank nonquantifiable factors, and then to 
make a decision.
5.6 Can benefits be measured as ‘costs 
(or damage) avoided’?
It is not uncommon to see CBA studies estimating benefits in terms of 
the damage cost averted, invariably in financial terms. The practice 
is particularly prevalent in disaster situations and in climate change 
modelling. The ‘costs avoided’ approach is also sometimes presented 
as the ‘defensive expenditures method’ (e.g. Boardman et al., 2011, 
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ch. 14). It appeals particularly to those who perceive costs and benefits 
in terms of production function effects. However, the outcome is 
essentially a cost–cost study, rather than a conceptually ideal CBA. 
Flood mitigation benefits are often estimated in terms of the damage 
avoided. Such estimates tend to focus on the financial cost of replacing 
or repairing damage to houses, furniture, and infrastructure. 
They  therefore exclude the more subjective value placed by people 
on items such as family photographs or heirlooms that may have 
been destroyed and are an underestimate of the likely willingness of 
residents to pay to avoid a flood event. 
Studies of droughts (climate-induced or not), often combined with 
appraisals of constructing dams, may well overestimate benefits by 
taking a production-oriented approach. Such studies tend to take as 
a given the current level of production of a specific crop. A disaster 
is then assumed to fully destroy the crop, possibly in perpetuity in 
the case of a climate change effect. Avoiding the total cost of the fully 
destroyed crop is counted as the potential benefit. 
In reality, farmers might not sow a crop in a bad year, saving on seed, 
fertiliser and other inputs and/or engaging in off-farm employment, 
or they may substitute a less water-dependent crop. That is, farmers 
are in reality more likely to adapt to changing conditions rather than 
continuing to plant their usual crop each year, and waiting passively 
for it to be destroyed. Benefits estimated as the avoided cost of fully 
destroyed crops into the future are thus likely to be overestimates.
An example provided by Boardman et al. (2011, ch. 14) is that of a 
smoggy city where residents periodically hire workers to clean their 
windows. This ‘defensive expenditure’ can be used as an estimate of the 
cost of mitigating or eliminating the negative externality. Avoidance 
of part or all of this expenditure can be considered to be a measure 
of the benefit of a policy that reduces the amount of smog. To the 
extent that ‘smog also leads to dirtier shirts and to health problems’, 
the window-cleaning approach will result in an underestimate of the 
benefit of cleaner air. Hanley and Barbier (2009, ch. 6) point out that 
modern production function approaches seek to estimate the effect of 
environmental changes on consumer and producer surplus in response 
to changes in costs and prices of the final marketed good. 
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Mishan (1988, ch. 3) refers to an apparently popular practice of 
estimating the benefit of reducing or eliminating a disease using a 
‘costs avoided’ approach. The approach includes three separate 
categories: 
• expenditures on medical care, including the costs of the services of 
physicians and other medical personnel, drugs, hospital facilities 
and equipment
• loss of production, measured in terms of loss of earnings
• pain and discomfort, although this area cannot be measured 
directly.
Mishan’s judgement about the approach is worth quoting in full:
The … [averted costs] … method of calculating the benefits of 
eliminating a disease cannot strictly be justified by reference to 
economic principle. A reduction in cost can be directly translated into 
a benefit for society only when — as in an increment of consumer 
surplus from a fall in price — we are operating on the demand curve 
for a specific good. If, for example, the good in question were a 
standardized health unit which could be purchased on the market, and 
the unit cost fell by an amount that resulted in a saving of $5 billion 
a year for the same number of health units bought, then the benefit 
would indeed be equal to the cost saving of $5 billion a year.
To some extent popular use of the ‘damage costs avoided’ approach 
is understandable, because costs are generally easier to estimate than 
benefits. However, when ‘stakeholders’ (typically vested interests) 
are able to marshal political support by producing dramatic anecdotal 
material or egregious cost estimates, the well-being of the community 
can suffer. A significant increase in expenditure on a familiar ailment, 
such as arthritis, may ‘crowd out’ the introduction of a new, but 
hitherto unknown cancer drug. It is therefore important to compare 
alternatives on the basis of additional expenditure and additional 
benefits rather than just total costs avoided (see Section 5.6). 
For some variables, it may be apposite to determine associated dose-
response relationships: for example critical concentration levels of 
specific nutrients in rivers that will cause algal blooms (Read Sturgess, 
2000), or vehicle operating costs per kilometre at different speeds 
(Tan et. al., 2012). A pertinent example is a study by Ludwig et al. 
(2009), who modelled the effect of a large decline in rainfall on a number 
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of sites in the Western Australian wheat belt. Simulations indicated 
that not only did crop yields not fall, but leaching of fertiliser also 
decreased, thus reducing costs to farmers, and the spread of dryland 
salinity was reduced significantly. Further, beneficial profit outcomes 
were obtained through minor variations in planting periods for two 
wheat varieties.
5.7 Conjuring up the benefits of jobs — ‘it’s 
not what you see, it’s what you don’t see’
In highlighting job creation as a social benefit of a pet infrastructure 
project, politicians bear a considerable affinity to magicians. 
By drawing the attention of the audience to the obvious job-creating 
effects of a project or policy, they are able to neglect consideration 
of corresponding, but less visible losses in employment or social 
well-being. 
An oft-cited example of the job-creation fallacy is the ‘broken window’ 
allegory by Frederic Bastiat (1850), who distinguished ‘between a good 
and a bad economist [on the basis that] … the one takes account of the 
visible effect; the other takes account both of the effects which are 
seen, and also those which it is necessary to foresee’. In effect, Bastiat 
draws attention to the need to take opportunity costs into account. 
Bastiat (1850) posits an angry shopkeeper whose careless son has just 
broken one of the shop windows. As an inquisitive throng of shoppers 
mills around the scene commiserating with the shopkeeper, one 
bystander offers the consolation that ‘everybody must live, and what 
would become of the glaziers if panes of glass were never broken?’. 
Bastiat points out that this is to focus on the obvious and immediately 
visible consequence, to the exclusion of other effects. It presupposes 
that the shopkeeper pays an amount of, say, six francs to the glazier. 
The shopkeeper gains a good — a new window pane — that he values 
at six francs, and the glazier gains an equal amount of six francs; so 
society as a whole is no better or worse off than before. 
It is only by taking into account a wider perspective of the whole of 
society that one appreciates the fallacy, points out Bastiat. Had the 
window not been broken, the shopkeeper might have fulfilled his 
original desire to buy a pair of new shoes. One needs to take into 
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account all other third parties, like the shoemaker, or some other 
tradesman, who suffer by the loss of their potential sale. In other 
words, the additional employment of the glazier is exactly offset by 
the forgone opportunity of employment of the shoemaker or some 
other tradesman. There is no net offsetting gain in employment to 
society, which simply loses the asset of a previously existing window.
5.7.1 Two less immediately discernible effects 
that merit consideration
It is not clear why people — even those with some training in economics 
— are willing to be side-tracked by claims of ‘more jobs’ as an indicator 
of social benefit of a project or policy, without considering the wider 
impacts. Lakoff and Johnson (2003, ch. 13) argue that metaphors such 
as ‘labour is a resource’ and ‘time is a resource’ reflect cultural values 
about work and the ability to quantify labour. These perspectives even 
induce a notion of ‘leisure time’ as a resource not to be wasted, with 
a whole industry devoted to ensuring that it is used productively. 
It is also possible that wider public awareness of Keynesian economics 
has engendered an unwarranted view of government expenditure and 
employment creation as being ‘good things’ in themselves and in all 
situations. 
Whatever the reason for the apparent allure of job creation, there are 
two broad, less visible issues that merit consideration in any claimed 
job creation benefits. The first of these is analogous to the fallacy 
identified by Bastiat (1850). 
First, while project proponents are keen to emphasise as many job 
creation impacts of a project as they can, it is rare to see discussion of 
any countervailing deadweight loss to society due to the funding of 
the project (Appendix 7). If a major project is unambiguously funded 
by increased taxation, the aggregate level of both consumption and 
savings in the economy are likely to fall because people’s disposable 
income is reduced. A reduction in consumption levels, and reduced 
investment due to reduced savings, will reduce overall economic 
activity, and consequently employment levels. However, this negative 
effect on employment levels may be partially offset by an increased 
desire by some individuals to work more, in order to recoup their loss 
in disposable income. 
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An alternative would be for the government to borrow the funds 
required to finance a project. Whether the funds are borrowed 
domestically or overseas, they eventually need to be repaid, most 
likely through increased taxes at some future time. The 19th-century 
economist David Ricardo argued that public borrowing would be 
perceived by rational citizens as being a precursor to increased future 
taxation, and they would therefore curb their consumption from the 
outset in anticipation. Although not uncontroversial, this concept of 
‘Ricardian equivalence’ is argued to result in reduced consumption due 
to public borrowing in the same trajectory that would be observed in 
a scenario of increased taxation at the time of project implementation. 
An alternative that involves neither increased taxation nor borrowing 
is to reduce current government expenditure in other areas of the 
economy, for example on education or defence. In this case, the social 
cost of tax financing becomes irrelevant. While this would avoid the 
problems of deadweight loss and Ricardian equivalence, it would also 
have a direct, negative effect on employment in those areas where 
cutbacks occur.
A second issue that requires consideration is the source of the additional 
labour that is employed on a new project. For example, the government 
of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) in October 2014 called for 
expressions of interest to build and operate a light rail system to 
connect the north of Canberra with the city centre. A key supporting 
argument for the project was that it would increase employment 
opportunities in the ACT. Although the ‘standing’ or perspective 
taken by the business case was not specified, the proposition of 
increased employment opportunities does not necessarily translate 
into more jobs for Canberra residents. Nor was it explained why the 
objective of more jobs should be fulfilled by construction of a light 
rail system — employment could also have been increased by building 
more hospitals or schools, or even by digging and refilling holes.
In a situation of reasonably full employment in the ACT economy, 
a Canberra resident employed in the ACT who takes up a newly created 
position on the light rail system will not increase the total level of 
employment in the ACT. The net effect will simply be a transfer of 
employment from one occupation to another within the ACT. Indeed, 
in a situation of full employment, the vacated position is more likely to 
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be filled by someone from outside the ACT. In this case, the net effect 
is that the number of Canberrans employed as a result of the project 
will not change, despite the increase in job vacancies created. 
If the vacated position cannot be filled even by workers from 
outside the ACT because of high employment levels across Australia, 
there may even be some offsetting loss in production in the ACT. 
An  increase in the wages offered could attract outside workers, but 
the increased cost of labour may also force some ACT businesses to 
cease production and hence reduce employment opportunities within 
the ACT. This reduction will offset some of the additional jobs created 
by the light rail project. 
In a situation of frictional or less than full employment in the ACT 
economy, it will be possible for at least some Canberrans to accept a 
position on the light rail system, assuming that they have the requisite 
skills, or can acquire them on the job. The individual worker will gain 
the benefit of a wage — including tax that is gained by the Federal 
government — that exactly offsets the cost to the employer (the so-
called ‘equilibrium assumption’: Mannix, 2013). However, there will 
be an additional loss to Canberra society because of the individual 
worker’s loss of leisure time on taking up employment. 
Leisure time is another of those commonly ‘not seen’ effects of job 
creation where previously unemployed workers choose to work. 
Defined variously as ‘non-paid work time’ or simply ‘non-work 
time’, leisure can include anything from doing absolutely nothing, 
sleeping, minding children, gardening, or listening to music. All of 
these are economic benefits, despite the fact that they may not result 
in the production of marketed goods or services. Depending on an 
individual’s preferences, each item contributes to their personal 
utility, and hence to the overall well-being of the society to which the 
individual belongs. Because employment necessarily results in the loss 
of some leisure, its loss represents an opportunity cost to a previously 
unemployed individual, and hence to society.
Other issues that might be considered in a detailed CBA would be 
the transaction costs of a worker changing employment or taking up 
a job when previously unemployed. Transaction costs could include 
new clothing, travel costs, possible residential relocation costs, or 
childminding costs. Employers, too, face additional costs in interviewing 
job applicants, training new workers, placing vacancy advertisements, 
and loss of productivity due to errors made by new workers.
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5.7.2 How to accommodate politicians’ 
perspectives?
In general, it would be conceptually difficult to argue that job creation 
in itself generates social benefits. It might, however, be argued that 
there is some form of ‘existence value’ gained by people who are happy 
that unemployed residents have been able to find paid work. If it is 
accepted that higher employment levels are associated with reduced 
crime, and causation can be demonstrated, then there may also be 
a wider social benefit of increased employment levels. Attribution 
of any of these benefits would, however, require direct evidence of 
their existence, and some form of measuring their magnitude. Adler 
(2013), for example, argues that research is required into the nexus 
between unemployment and physical and psychological health and its 
monetary equivalent.
Nevertheless decision-makers at the political level invariably require 
information on the employment impacts of a project or policy. Some 
Australian jurisdictions accommodate this requirement by providing 
a separate brief, or a separate section following a CBA, that provides 
information on likely job creation. This approach satisfies the need to 
provide employment impacts, without compromising the integrity of 
the CBA by including job creation as a benefit in calculations, or in 
presentation.
5.8 True or false?: Taxes are just transfer 
payments, so they can be disregarded
It is true that a tax collected (or subsidy provided) by government 
is a transfer payment.3 Taxes in themselves do not constitute a social 
benefit or a social cost. Analogous to a voluntary charity donation, 
a tax is simply a transfer from taxpayers to government. Subsidies 
involve transfers from government to a particular segment of society. 
3  A transfer payment differs from a normal market transaction in that resources are transferred 
from one party to a second party, but nothing is provided in return by the second party to the 
first.
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Nevertheless, taxes, and their obverse, subsidies, represent economic 
distortions that create differences between prices paid by producers 
and consumers for a particular good or service. It is therefore important 
in estimating the social cost or social benefit of goods or services to 
take into account the taxes and subsidies that apply to them. 
The subject of adjusting market prices for taxes and subsidies is not 
always entirely straightforward. Sinden and Thampapillai (1995, p. 50) 
whimsically provide a guideline to the effect that ‘Taxes and subsidies 
should sometimes be included, and sometimes be excluded’. 
Prices adjusted for taxes and subsidies are typically referred to as 
‘shadow prices’.4
The concept of willingness to pay (WTP) can be used to determine 
how benefits (outputs) should be adjusted for taxes and subsidies. 
Opportunity cost can be used to adjust the costs of inputs. In each 
case it is important to also identify whether a project results in an 
increase in outputs or inputs, or whether it displaces the quantity of 
existing inputs or outputs in the market. Table 5.6 provides a broad 
categorisation. 
Table 5.6: Adjusting for taxes levied (and subsidies provided) 
on inputs and outputs
Supply/demand Increase in availability Displacement or diversion 
of existing units
outputs A  Market price, including taxes 
less subsidies, to reflect 
willingness to pay to acquire 
the output.
B  Market price plus subsidies less 
taxes. The benefit is the value of 
the units saved by not producing 
the existing units of output.
Inputs C  Market price less taxes plus 
subsidies. The benefit is the 
resource (opportunity) cost 
of the additional inputs.
D  Market price, including taxes 
less subsidies, to reflect 
productivity in previous use.
Source: adapted from Department of finance (1991), Department of finance and 
Administration (2006), and Sinden and Thampapillai (1995)
4  Boardman et al. (2011, ch. 4) describe shadow pricing as a means of assigning benefit or 
cost measures ‘when observed prices fail to reflect the true social value of a good accurately or 
observed prices do not exist … thereby finding “in the shadows” needed values that are not 
readily observable’. It is also useful to note that shadow prices used in CBA are not the same 
concept as the one used in linear programming.
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Quadrant A represents an increase in availability of an output, which 
would be valued at the market price. For example an increase in the 
supply of water from a newly constructed dam should be valued on 
the basis of farmers’ willingness to pay for it; that is, the market price 
inclusive of taxes but excluding any subsidies. At least some of the 
dam water would have previously formed part of the flow of a river and 
has now been diverted to agricultural use (quadrant B). It is therefore 
likely to have displaced the benefits of recreational use by people 
swimming or fishing in the river that has now been dammed. In other 
words, part of the benefit to farmers is gained at the expense of the 
output of water (a benefit) that is no longer available to recreational 
users. The benefit that is diverted from (lost to) recreational users to 
farmers is the resource value that is ‘saved’ by reducing recreational 
use and would therefore exclude taxes. Determining the resource cost 
of the river water, however, may be problematic.
Shadow pricing the cost of inputs depends on whether there is an 
increase in availability of the input (quadrant C), or whether existing 
uses of the input are diverted (quadrant D) to the new project. 
The value of additional inputs is determined by the opportunity cost 
of the resources. An example is the employment of additional workers 
who were previously unemployed: the cost of these additional workers 
is the opportunity cost of the loss of their leisure time. The use on a 
project of workers already employed elsewhere is the opportunity cost 
of the marginal revenue product that they would have generated in 
their previous employment had they not been displaced: reflected in 
the wage — including income and payroll tax minus any subsidies — 
their previous employer was willing to pay them. 
Perkins (1994, ch. 7) provides a range of further examples for both 
distorted and undistorted markets of the Harberger approach to 
estimating shadow prices, including relevant formulae. The Harberger 
approach involves calculation of weighted averages of increased 
outputs or inputs and the corresponding amounts that are displaced or 
diverted. As might be expected, economic benefits and costs depend 
on the relative elasticities of demand and supply, changes in quantities 
and prices, and the presence of taxes and subsidies. However, the 
Department of Finance and Administration (2006, s. 3.5) points out 
that it is not uncommon for project demand for inputs to be relatively 
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small compared to total production, and the price elasticity of demand 
is usually large (‘flat’ demand curve), so that shadow prices ‘will be 
close to the market price and this sort of analysis is unnecessary’.
5.8.1 Correctional (Pigovian) taxes
One purpose of taxation is to raise revenue. An alternative rationale 
for levying taxes is to encourage or discourage consumption or 
production of goods and services. 
However, the distinction may not always be clear cut. Campbell & 
Brown (2003, p. 111) pose the question whether a tax on tobacco is 
intended to raise revenue because of its inelastic demand, or whether it 
is a correctional tax intended to reduce consumption to avoid imposing 
costs on the health system. In assessing this distinction, a degree of 
judgement is required on the part of the analyst conducting the CBA.
Corrective taxes5 or charges imposed unambiguously to reduce negative 
externalities, such as traffic congestion, should be set to reflect the 
additional cost imposed by each driver on other car drivers. By not 
taking into account (internalising) the cost imposed on others, drivers 
demand an increased amount of output in the form of additional trips. 
The corrective tax is intended to reduce the demand for road trips 
to a socially optimal level, by equating the marginal benefit to the 
marginal social cost. Imposition of the corrective tax therefore diverts 
resources that would otherwise have been used for car travel to other 
uses. However, the correct shadow price of road usage should include 
the corrective tax, in contrast to the approach of excluding a purely 
revenue tax in Table 2.8 for a diversion or displacement of existing 
outputs. 
A subsidy on diesel used by farmers will see farmers paying a lower 
price than the market price paid by other users at the bowser. If the 
government reduces distance travelled by building new wheat silos 
closer to farms, farmers will save on fuel. Campbell & Brown (2003, 
ch. 5) point out that value of the fuel saving should be calculated on 
5  Sometimes called Pigovian taxes after AC Pigou (1920, Vol. 1, ch. 9), who proposed the 
imposition of compensatory payments on private individuals who produce negative externalities 
to reflect social costs of production.
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the basis of the market price because it reflects the cost of production. 
In other words, the subsidy needs to be removed from the price paid 
by farmers in order to obtain the resource cost.
5.8.2 Marginal excess tax burden (deadweight 
loss due to taxation)
When a project is funded through increased taxation, the level of 
economic activity will be reduced because of the negative effect on 
consumption and/or investment. The resulting loss of social surplus is 
a deadweight loss. Appendix 7 deals with this issue.
5.8.3 Discount rates
Harberger (1976, ch. 2) argues in favour of the investment-oriented 
social opportunity cost of capital over the consumption-oriented 
social rate of time preference for discounting, but emphasises the 
need to adjust private returns for taxes. The argument is analogous to 
including taxes when considering the value of additional production 
or diverted use of inputs in Table 5.6 above. Part of any additional 
product is skimmed off by government in the form of taxes:
There are a number of possible sources of divergence between the 
social and private benefits of private investment; but of these, by far 
the most important consists of taxes … Of two investments with the 
same private yield, one of which generates corporation income tax 
payments equal to its private yield, and the other of which generates 
no tax payments at all, the former is clearly socially preferable, as it 
either enables the public sector to have more command over real goods 
and services or, alternatively, it permits the public sector to reduce 
some other tax and thus permits the private sector to buy more real 
goods and services. The indicated procedure is therefore to include 
corporation tax payments generated in any industry as part of the 
social return to capital in that industry. And if the social rate of return 
to capital is estimated for the private sector as a whole, the entire 
yield of the corporation income tax should be added to the income 
perceived by private enterprises in order to convert the latter to a 
social concept of ‘income generated by capital’. 
Where indirect taxes exist on a final product, they lead to a situation in 
which the value of the marginal product of each factor of production 
involved in that good’s production exceeds the income earned by 
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that factor by the percentage rate of indirect tax. In this case, the 
income from capital (gross of corporation tax) should be augmented 
by a fraction of the receipts from the indirect tax, the fraction being 
capital’s share in the value added in the industry in question.
Harrison (2010) explores in more detail tax adjustments from the 
perspective of discount rates. 
5.9 Another misconception: Sensitivity 
analysis should be used to adjust for risk 
in a CBA
Sensitivity analysis is distinct from the adjustment of costs and 
benefits for risk. It is specifically directed at ascertaining how the NPV 
of a project would change if the magnitude of one of the variables 
included in the calculation was altered. 
5.9.1 Adjustment for risk
To aggregate costs or benefits requires that they be expressed in 
commensurate units or ‘dimensions’. Values are routinely adjusted for 
inflation by conversion to real values, and for time by discounting. 
Adjustment for risk is also worthwhile because receipt of a risky 
dollar is unlikely to be valued in the same way as the certain receipt 
of an identical amount: a bird in the hand is invariably worth two in 
the bush.
Following Knight (2009 [1921]), risk is generally conceptualised as 
variation from a measure of central tendency, such as the mean. It 
therefore requires knowledge of the associated probabilities of events 
— such as the size of a benefit, or timing of a cost — occurring. 
Adjustment for risk can be carried out by calculating expected values 
in the form of probability weighted averages. An extension of this 
approach is to employ decision trees and to attach probabilities to 
different scenarios. Boardman et al. (2011, ch. 7) provide an exposition 
of both expected values and analysis using decision trees.
Monte Carlo analysis offers a more sophisticated form of risk analysis, 
but requires specification of associated probability distributions, 
rather than single-point estimates of probabilities of occurrence. 
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Repeated random sampling from the probability density functions 
attached to the variables included in estimating the CBA generates 
a probability distribution of possible NPV, rather than producing 
a single-point estimate of the NPV. Software such as @RISK (www.
palisade.com/risk/) allows straightforward application of the Monte 
Carlo method.
5.9.2 Sensitivity analysis
Despite a common misconception, sensitivity analysis is not a form 
of risk analysis; nor is it a substitute for risk analysis. Risk analysis 
requires the application of probabilities to input variables. Sensitivity 
analysis can be carried out whether or not risk analysis has been 
undertaken. Its primary objective is to discover the extent to which 
each of the constituent variables of the CBA influences the final result, 
the calculation of NPV. Some analysts also vary input variables to 
determine ‘break-even’, ‘switch-over’, or output ‘switching points’, 
such as the point when NPV becomes zero or changes sign.
Sensitivity analysis can be carried out simply by changing the value 
of one variable at a time, or even several or all the variables together. 
Some sensitivity analyses choose ‘worst case’ and/or ‘best case’ values. 
Alternatively, it is possible to use an absolute or percentage variation 
either side of the input variable values used in the calculation of the 
NPV, although Perkins (1994, s. 15.7.2) points out that comparability of 
the sensitivity of NPV to different input variables should be based on 
equivalent variations, such as one standard deviation from the mean. 
Software like @RISK produces a sensitivity analysis of the Monte Carlo 
result in the form of a tornado chart. That is, sensitivity analysis can, 
and should be applied after any adjustment of input variables for risk. 
In the case where a change in the value of a particular input variable 
exhibits a substantial influence on the calculation of NPV, sensitivity 
analysis provides a valuable signal. If the analyst is not fully confident 
that the value of that particular input variable has been robustly 
estimated, then it would be prudent to revisit the estimation method 
to ensure that the variable value is as accurate as possible. If the 
estimation cannot be improved, then the CBA report should draw 
the decision-maker’s attention to the fact that a particular variable is 
influential in determining the NPV, but its value may benefit from 
improved estimation.
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Where an NPV has been estimated as a probability distribution on 
the basis of risk analysis, sensitivity testing can be applied in a more 
sophisticated form than mere absolute or percentage deviations from 
estimated values of input variables. Software such as @RISK can also 
be used to vary the parameters of the probability density functions 
that have been used to define the risk attached to each input variable. 
In other words, advanced sensitivity analysis can involve not only 
the most plausible or expected value of each input variable (the first 
moment of the distribution), but also its variance (the second moment 
of the distribution) and the degree and direction of skewness (the third 
moment). 
5.10 Confusing marginal and average: 
Does a positive mid-term economic 
appraisal indicate that a program should 
continue, or be expanded?
A CBA is typically carried out before a project is implemented 
(and ideally before a decision is made to implement it). This ex ante 
approach is (less frequently) supplemented by an ex post appraisal, 
after finalisation of the project. It is much rarer still for a mid-term 
(in media res) evaluation to be carried out.
A particular advantage of a mid-term CBA evaluation, perhaps as part 
of an implementation review of a project, is that it offers the option 
of terminating or expanding the project, as well as simply continuing 
it as originally envisaged. An example of a mid-term review is the 
evaluation of the Australian Government’s Rural Transaction Centres 
program (Dobes, 2007). The CBA found that the provision of a range 
of government and commercial services to about 50 smaller regional 
towns was socially beneficial. 
It can be tempting, but wrong, to consider a positive NPV result 
obtained from a mid-term review to be an indication that an expansion 
of the project or program would consequentially also be socially 
beneficial. The fallacy here of course is that the mid-term review will 
estimate an NPV based on the average results of the project. However, 
an expansion of the project or program requires consideration of all 
additional costs and additional benefits attributable to the expansion. 
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The base case is no longer the original ‘do minimum’ counterfactual, 
but rather the project that has already been (partially) implemented. 
Any attempt to carry out the CBA simply for an expanded project 
against the original counterfactual would be misguided, even if the 
overall result still produced a positive NPV.
The distinction between average and marginal results is also important 
in the case of inputs accounted for in a CBA, whether ex ante, ex 
post, or in media res. It is often the case that average values are used 
because market prices can be readily observed. A large project that 
draws heavily on a particular input (e.g. concrete, or highly specialised 
workers), however, may see an increase in cost. It is the increased cost 
that should be used in the CBA, not the average price that exists before 
the project is implemented.
The distinction between marginal and average values of benefits is 
equally important. The Washington State Institute for Public Policy 
(2014, p. 172) puts it well:
One important concept for long term portfolio analysis is that of 
diminishing returns. This is the precept that, as a program serves 
more and more of its eligible population (that is, as it reaches market 
saturation), the effectiveness of the program for each new participant 
may be reduced.
The Rural Transaction Centres program analysed in Dobes (2007) 
provides a concrete example. At the outset of the program, smaller 
towns that are distant from regional centres were provided with 
government assistance. As the number of assisted towns grew, it was 
inevitable that the additional towns receiving assistance would be 
larger and closer to regional centres. Because a key determinant of 
benefits was the generalised cost of transport between the assisted 
town and a proximate regional centre, the additional benefit to the 
overall program contributed by each extra town would be lower. At 
some point, further expansion of the program would be ineffective, 
once additional costs outweighed the additional benefits. 
Finally, choice modelling (see s. 5.5 above) has the useful attribute of 
yielding estimates of the additional WTP if one or more characteristics 
of a good or service are increased. CVMs, on the other hand, are 
generally restricted to estimating a single WTP value for a good or 
service. In terms of estimating the benefit of program expansion, 





It is possible at present to obtain virtually any desired result that one 
might wish from a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) study. Although the 
methodology and concepts in CBA are well established, their practical 
application leaves much to be desired, at least in some Australian 
jurisdictions. 
To accept the current situation as merely a practical matter of 
little import in the real world would involve a misplaced sense 
of  complacency. Anecdotal evidence indicates that public servants 
and their political masters are not averse to hiring consultants with a 
flexible disposition. 
For example, Craig Emerson (2015), a former Australian minister for 
trade and competitiveness, writing about bilateral and regional trade 
agreements, recalled recently: 
in what might seem a perverse decision, the Labor government 
rejected a recommendation that a cost-benefit analysis be done on 
all trade deals before they were locked into place. The reason was 
not based on opposition to transparency. It was a repudiation of the 
farcical approach that had been adopted by previous governments of 
hiring a favoured private consulting firm to produce pre-determined 
results in support of negotiated agreements. 
Absurdity reached dizzying heights when a quantitative analysis of 
the trade-liberalising effects of the US–Australia free trade agreements 
was unable to produce any tangible positive results. With little else 
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to show its client, the consultant threw in a massive positive effect 
on the Australian economy of a decision by the Howard government 
to increase the amount of American investment that would be free 
of screening by the Foreign Investment Review Board from about 
$240  million to $1 billion. Professor Ross Garnaut described this 
analysis as failing to pass the laugh test.
Worse still, there is a tendency for some politicians to refuse to 
obtain information on which to base a decision about the net social 
benefits of a pet project. Senator Stephen Conroy, the then Minister 
for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, famously 
refused to commission a cost-benefit study of the major National 
Broadband Network project (e.g. Jones, 2010). Similarly, in discussing 
the mooted Mt Isa to Tennant Creek railway project, the Chief Minister 
for the Northern Territory stated that ‘[we] don’t need a feasibility 
study to tell us that we should open up opportunities to develop the 
significant resources we know exist in this region’ (Giles, 2015).
A survey of economists and other professionals (Chapter 2) confirms 
the view that all is not entirely well in the area of CBA studies.
Two aspects in particular afford considerable leeway in determining 
the results of a CBA:
• the use of a diversity of values in the various jurisdictions allows 
analysts and consultants to pick and choose those that may suit a 
specific purpose or desired outcome. Values of variables, such as 
the value of statistical life and the social cost of carbon emissions 
are common examples. In the absence of harmonised values — or 
at least ranges of values — it is possible to justify any particular 
value, either by reference to usage in another study, or by more 
nebulous reference to claimed plausibility
• the absence of a ‘belts and braces’ analytical framework. For example, 
it is currently acceptable to nominate only the basic project — such 
as funding a new road — and to compare it to a hypothetical base 
case situation. This binary approach automatically excludes other 
possible projects, such as a rail link, or a market-based solution 
like congestion charging. A ‘belts and braces’ framework would 
require analysts and consultants to provide a list of all feasible 
strategies that address a specified objective, and then to both list 
those chosen for analysis and to justify the exclusion from further 
consideration of the remainder.
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It would be unrealistic to expect an overnight development 
of  scrupulously honest and rigorous analyses in the case of every 
government project of policy. Organisational culture and governance 
play a key role, irrespective of formal guidelines. However, a greater 
degree of confidence could be engendered through the adoption of 
a harmonised CBA framework that provides more detailed and specific 
guidance than that currently presented in government manuals and 
guidelines. 
As a first step, the adoption of a common framework for presenting 
the results of all CBA studies would improve transparency. Finding 
relevant assumptions, data and results in idiosyncratic CBA studies is 
difficult because there is no pattern or location to assist readers to find 
information. Adoption of a common framework, like that proposed in 
the 10 sequential categories below (see Chapter 4), would be a useful 
first step. 
1. specify the objective of the analysis
2. define ‘standing’ and scope
3. establish the base case: establishing a reference point
4. predict the impacts of the policy or project over its life cycle
5. estimate the economic value of the costs and benefits
6. adjust costs and benefits for risk
7. calculate the net present value of the costs and benefits
8. conduct sensitivity analysis
9. determine distributional consequences and distributional 
weighting of costs and benefits
10. arrive at a conclusion or recommendations for the CBA.
Based on discussion in the body of this monograph and in the 
appendices, it is recommended that jurisdictions should consider 
adopting a framework CBA harmonised around the following points: 
1. Specify the objective of the analysis 
• record explicitly the objective of the proposed project or policy
• provide a full list of alternative projects and policy initiatives that 
could be used to achieve the objective, including market-based 
alternatives to construction of infrastructure or its expansion 
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• provide reasons for not including alternative projects in the CBA 
analysis
• ensure that a process of objective and independent peer review is 
instituted at an early stage of the analysis as a matter of course for 
all government-funded studies.
2. Define ‘standing’ and scope
• explicit specification of ‘standing’ should be provided in all 
CBA  studies. Where more than one perspective is adopted 
(e.g.  to  provide additional information requested by decision-
makers), results should be shown separately for each specification
• adoption of a national perspective for all CBA studies, should be 
the default position. Studies should clearly identify the parties 
whose benefits and costs are included, as well as those who are 
specifically excluded from the analysis
• consideration should be given to adopting a convention that all 
residents of Australia, not just citizens, be granted standing in 
a CBA study.
3. Establish the base case 
• a list and full explanation of all assumptions should be made 
in choosing or developing the base case scenario
• as a default option, use official sources for key variables employed 
in projections
• require specific justification for use of estimates that are not based 
on official sources
• require specification and justification of the time period selected 
for the base case
• where relevant, ensure consistency of base case assumptions with 
those used in projections of impacts of the project or policy.
4. Predict the effects of the policy or project over 
its life cycle
• provision of a comprehensive list of impacts and an explanation 
of all assumptions made in predicting impacts
• provision of a list of persons and sources consulted to identify 
project impacts
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• provision of evidence-based justification of causality for all impacts 
identified
• cogent explanations for excluding impacts that have not been 
short-listed
• all costs and benefits, including the costs of preliminary analyses 
or administrative preparation, should be attributed to the project, 
even where the project is implemented in stages that may appear to 
be separate projects
• inclusion of all relevant implementation costs, including post-
implementation and final ex post review on completion of the 
project or program
• identification and/or valuation of major transfer payments that are 
significant enough to include in a distributional analysis 
• require the use of official sources for key variables employed in the 
base case
• explanation of reasons for use of estimates that are not based on 
official sources
• ensure consistency of the time period used with that of the base 
case
• where relevant, ensure consistency of project impact assumptions 
with those used in the base case.
5. Estimate the economic value of the costs 
and benefits
• provision of justification for the timeframe used for analysis 
• explanation of reason(s) for selecting a particular method 
of estimating benefits, rather than feasible alternative method(s)
• ensure replicability of results by making data publicly available 
(e.g. online), or providing references for sources used
• require use of official or authoritative sources for variables 
employed in projections
• comprehensive tabulation of all costs and benefits, including those 
that are attributable to the project but are incurred outside the 
period of analysis
• consideration of greater use of stated preference methods on 
a national basis to permit estimation of benefits on a comparable 
basis
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• recording of all variables that it is not possible or practicable 
to quantify
• provide a statement explaining measures taken to minimise 
potential optimism bias in estimating infrastructure construction 
costs or predicted benefits, possibly by comparison with projects 
that have been completed in similar circumstances, but also 
including the identity of the author of the estimates. 
6. Adjust costs and benefits for risk
• risk analysis should, in principle, be undertaken for all CBA studies
• where risk analysis is not used, an explicit explanation should be 
provided of the reasons for the omission
• Monte Carlo analysis is preferred, provided that relevant probability 
functions can be specified with sufficient confidence
• the rationale and estimation method for cost ‘contingencies’ and 
‘escalation’ factors should be disclosed fully
• if the Monte Carlo technique is employed as part of risk analysis, 
details should be provided regarding the derivation and rationale 
for the probability functions used.
7. Calculate the net present value of the costs 
and benefits
• prior to commencement of the analysis, specification of a single 
social discount rate to be used in the CBA
• adoption of a common discount rate, at least within jurisdictions
• consistency within a CBA study in terms of use of either real 
or nominal values
• if real values are used, derivation of the expected future rate 
of inflation for each period should be explained.
8. Conduct sensitivity analysis
• focus sensitivity testing on key variables
• avoid treating social discount rates in CBA as variables to be subject 
to sensitivity testing
• interpret and analyse the results of sensitivity testing.
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6 . CoNCluSIoNS AND reCoMMeNDATIoNS
9. Determine distributional consequences and 
weighting of costs and benefits
• consideration should be given to the use of extended tableau 
formats to present the distributional consequences of CBA studies
• adoption of comprehensive tableau formats should be subject to 
safeguards that maintain the apolitical nature of public service 
advice
• justification for the use of weights, and for their value, should be 
established and recorded before commencement of the analysis
• because of the scope for potential manipulation of overall results, 
subsequent changes to the values of weights used should not be 
permitted
• if distributional weights are used, then two sets of results for the 
CBA should be presented: one with, and one without application 
of weights.
10. Arrive at a conclusion or recommendations for 
the CBA
• all statements and assertions regarding findings should be 
referenced to tables or paragraphs in the body of the study, or to 
relevant appendices
• sufficient data should be provided in the body of the study, or in 
relevant appendices, to permit reviewers to replicate key findings
• in the absence of genuine commercial or national security 
sensitivities, studies should be published in full to allow public 
scrutiny and to facilitate their use as models for evaluating other 
projects or policies.
Implementation
• CBA manuals and handbooks produced by agencies should specify 
undesirable methodologies
• agencies should consider supplementing manuals with training 
courses that provide a fuller context to the contents of manuals 
and handbooks.
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• publication of CBAs should be encouraged as a means of fostering 
wider discussion of methodology and the values used
• jurisdictions should adopt a common approach in presenting the 
results of CBA studies, using a harmonised framework, such as the 
10 steps outlined above
• in the absence of a formal inter-jurisdictional agreement, a central 
agency should take an informal leadership role by adopting a 
framework along the lines outlined in this chapter
• section 47C(3)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 should 
be amended to specifically include the social sciences within the 








Information and professional perspectives for this publication were 
obtained from a range of sources:
• a desktop literature survey. This avenue yielded only a limited 
amount of directly relevant material on the topic of harmonisation 
of CBA values and methodologies
• manuals and guidelines published by government agencies and 
industry bodies, such as Austroads 
• semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with government 
agencies responsible for the health, environment and transport 
sectors, as well as central agencies such as Treasury, Finance, 
premiers’ departments or equivalent. Interviews were conducted 
in Wellington, Canberra, Melbourne, Brisbane, Hobart, Sydney, 
Adelaide, Perth, London and Paris. It was not possible to conduct 
interviews in the Northern Territory
• a survey of members of the Economic Society of Australia and the 
New Zealand Government Economics Network
• feedback was obtained on an exposure paper on harmonisation 
presented to the annual conference of the American Society for 
Benefit Cost Analysis in Washington in March 2015.
Manuals and guidelines published by portfolio agencies provided an 
important source of information regarding CBA practice. They did 
not, however, always provide a complete picture of the information 
sought. In some cases — for example the Queensland Treasury — the 
guidelines at the time of interviews were non-prescriptive and did not 
contain any CBA input variable values, whereas those of some other 
jurisdictions do. In some cases, agencies stated that the guidelines were 
being updated, so that they could not validly be used as an accurate 
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record of current practice. Some guidelines — for example, those of 
the NSW Treasury — contained instructions to consult the Treasury 
on particular issues, such as application of real options. 
Information collected during semi-structured interviews was not 
always as complete or productive as might have been hoped. Larger 
groups of interlocutors often made it difficult to keep the focus of 
the group on the questions of immediate interest to this publication 
because participants were often keen to tell their own stories and to 
ensure that they were part of the conversation. Combined with time 
limits, acquisition of relevant data and information was therefore 
occasionally rather limited. Discussion notes were compiled as soon as 
possible after interviews, and were sent to interlocutors to afford them 
the opportunity to confirm or amend the record of discussion. 
On the other hand, the broad nature of a portfolio like health meant 
that it was possible sometimes to only obtain information about one 
area. For example, the interlocutor available at an agency may have 
been from the clinical evaluation side, or from the pharmaceutical 
evaluation side. While they occasionally commented on studies 
conducted in other areas, they were often able only to provide detailed 
explanations of practice in their own field. 
The problem of arranging interviews with the most informed officials 
within agencies was compounded on occasion by the absence on leave 
of relevant interlocutors, a fact that sometimes only became known 
at the last minute, and despite prior arrangements. In some cases, 
agencies responded to requests for interviews by stating that CBA 
expertise was not available. In one or two cases, agencies failed to 
respond to requests for interviews, despite multiple approaches by 
phone and email.
Ideally, all government portfolios would have been included in the 
interview process, but this was not possible with the resources 
available. Time and logistics limited interviews to three target sectors: 
transport, health and environment. By interviewing Treasury and 
Finance officials as well, more general information was obtained, but 
time constraints on both sides again precluded more than an hour’s 
discussion at most. Further attempts to fill in gaps were made by 
initiating discussions with research agencies such as the National 
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Health and Medical Research Council, the Bureau of Infrastructure, 
Transport and Regional Economics, and some interested public 
servants from portfolios outside the three target sectors. 
The results of interviews with agency personnel have not been 
tabulated because of requests by a number of interlocutors to maintain 
confidentiality. The results of the surveys of members of the New 
Zealand Government Economics Network and the Economic Society 





The rapid growth of composite indexes in recent decades attests to 
their seductive qualities. Popular indexes include a species that 
ranks  the ‘world’s most liveable cities’, including one version 
published by the Economist Intelligence Unit. World university 
rankings attract considerable attention among tertiary education 
aspirants, while  the Worldwide Governance Indicator, the Global 
Slavery Index, the  Climate Change Vulnerability Index, the Global 
Democracy Ranking, and many others, regularly attract the attention 
of the media. 
Composite indexes seek to summarise disparate data about a specific 
topic or issue, typically conflating them into a single numerical value. 
Numerical rankings are based on various measures for different 
characteristics or criteria, generally weighted by their relative 
importance in the index, and then aggregated. Multi-criteria analysis 
(MCA) is ultimately based on the same approach.
Detailed critiques of composite indexes and MCA can be found 
in Luskin and Dobes (1999), Vincent (2007), Cox (2009), Dobes 
and Bennett (2009), and Pollitt (2010), amongst others. It is not the 
intention to replicate these arguments here, but rather to illustrate 
the arbitrariness of analyses based on composite index methods by 
presenting a simplified example of an MCA process. We are not aware 
of any textbooks that present comparable material.
Dobes (1999) bemoaned the fact that it was not possible to obtain a 
‘live specimen’ of an MCA, despite the fact that at least one state road 
agency was then using the method. This circumspection on the part 
of governments was noted again by Dobes and Bennett (2009) after 
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a  futile request for a copy of the unpublished MCA that was used 
by the Victorian Government to justify diversion of Goulburn River 
water to Melbourne in the Sugarloaf Pipeline Project. 
Due to the paucity of published government MCAs, a simplified 
example of an MCA is used below to illustrate the essential approach. 
Proponents of the MCA method would rightly point out that there is 
a considerable body of mathematically and statistically sophisticated 
superstructure related to the selection of criteria, weights and scores 
(Chankong & Haimes, 1983), but the intention here is to examine the 
underlying fundamentals. 
Table A2.1 portrays a hypothetical approach to a road-widening project 
in the form of a goals-achievement matrix (GAM) that is typically used 
in MCA. The first column is the key to the process, because it specifies 
the factors — termed attributes or criteria — that are to be taken 
into account in the analysis. There is no theory or specific guideline 
governing their choice, so their selection is essentially arbitrary and 
may reflect the priorities of politicians, decision-makers or special 
interests (i.e. ‘stakeholders’). Cost-benefit analysis, on the other hand, 
requires that the costs and benefits that affect all members of society 
must be taken into account. 
Apart from the temptation for an analyst to second-guess the 
preferences of decision-makers, there is considerable risk of double 
counting in MCA due to its emphasis on a set of desired outcomes 
specified by the analyst. In Table A2.1 this is deliberately illustrated 
by including both the creation of jobs and the growth in local business 
revenue, a not unusual set of policy-desirable attributes. Sophisticated 
MCA practitioners, however, would undoubtedly seek to reduce the 
scope of double counting by, for example, checking on correlation 
levels between attributes. 
No specific numeraire is used in MCA, with attributes assessed by 
allocating a score to the estimated impact of the project on each 
attribute. In Table A2.1, a Likert scale that ranges from –4 to +4 
has been used. The weight allocated to each attribute reflects its 
relative importance in the expected outcomes from the project. Scores 
and weights may be determined by the analyst, a focus group, or a 
decision-maker, but there is no theory to guide their determination 
so that they are essentially subjective and arbitrary. The final step is 
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shown in the right-hand column, where the products of the scores 
and weights in Table A2.1 are shown and aggregated, giving a unitless 
total weighted score of 190.
Table A2.1: Simplified goals-achievement matrix for 
a road-widening project






Travel time saving 
per trip
Minutes 13 2 10 20
Growth in local 
business p.a.
revenue ($) 56,000 4 40 160
reduction in 
crashes p .a . 
Number 4 3 10 30
Employment Jobs 23 3 20 60
Cost of project $ 89,000 –4 20 –80
Total 100 190
Source: leo Dobes
Table A2.2 demonstrates the effect of a change in the nominated 
attributes of the project. In this case, a different hypothetical analyst 
may have decided to take into account the environmental aspects of 
the road-widening project by including wombat mortality rates and 
greenhouse gas emissions. Because there is no underlying theory to 
guide the selection of attributes, or their number, there is no reason 
to either exclude or include these environmental effects. The scoring 
scale remains the same, but the weights have necessarily been adjusted 
to ensure that they continue to add up to 100: a different analyst 
might also have chosen different weights for each of the attributes. 
The total weighted score has now changed to 30. Because the weighted 
aggregate score is unitless, it is not possible to conclude whether it is 
slightly worse, much worse or not at all worse than the previous result 
of 190. Nor is it possible to compare either result to an alternative use 
of resources like building a hospital or a school.
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Table A2.2: Selection of different attributes for the project






Travel time saving 
per trip
Minutes 13 2 10 20
Growth in local 
business p.a.
revenue ($) 56,000 4 10 160
reduction in 
crashes p .a . 
Number 4 3 10 30
Employment Jobs 23 3 10 60
Cost of project $ 89,000 –4 20 –80
Dead wombats Number 27  –4 20 –80
More CO2 Tonnes 55 –4 20 –80
Total 100 30
Source: leo Dobes
A different scoring scale has been used in Table A2.3, but with no 
other change from Table A2.1. The extension of the scoring range 
from –4 to +4 to the new range of –5 to +5 yields a total weighted 
score of 250. Again, there is no theory to guide a decision to use one 
or the other scoring scale, or to assess the significance of the difference 
in results.
Table A2.3: Different scoring scale used to assess the project 






Travel time saving 
per trip
Minutes 13 3 10 30
Growth in local 
business p.a.
revenue ($) 56,000 5 40 200
reduction in 
crashes p .a . 
Number 4 4 10 40
Employment Jobs 23 4 20 80





As would be expected, a change in the weights used in Table A2.1 
will produce a different total weighted score, as shown in Table A2.4. 
As before, there is no method grounded in theory that allows the 
determination of the relative significance of the results. 
Table A2.4: Different weights attached to each attribute






Travel time saving 
per trip
Minutes 13 2 20 40
Growth in local 
business p.a.
revenue ($) 56,000 4 20 80
reduction in 
crashes p .a . 
Number 4 3 10 30
Employment Jobs 23 3 40 120
Cost of project $ 89,000 –4 10 –40
Total 100 230
Source: leo Dobes
Proponents of MCA sometimes argue that it is preferable because it 
does  not require the monetisation of factors that are considered in 
assessing a project. Unless all cost considerations are fully excluded, 
however, MCA does in fact produce implicit monetary values. 
In Table A2.4, for example, the project cost of $89,000 is estimated to 
create 23 jobs, a cost per job of about $3,870. A similar calculation can 
be made for the number of crashes avoided, or for travel time savings, 
raising the question of whether these outcomes could not have been 
achieved at lower cost by some other means. 
The MCA approach is also attractive, if not seductive, because it is 
relatively easy to carry out. It essentially requires only an ability to 
specify criteria, scores and weights. The production of numerical scores 
also provides a semblance of systematic analysis. The mathematical 
appropriateness of aggregating disparate attributes measured in 
incommensurable units by linking them to scores and weights must, 
even so, be subject to serious reservation.
Absent the aggregation of weighted scores, the least desirable aspect 
of MCA would be avoided because incommensurable units would not 
be combined mathematically. Nevertheless, the selection of criteria to 
be addressed, and the allocation of weights and scores still involve 
SoCIAl CoST‑BeNefIT ANAlySIS IN AuSTrAlIA AND New ZeAlAND
158
a  degree of arbitrariness. The MCA approach therefore begs the 
question of why one should expend effort on employing numerical 
values when a simple qualitative comparison of the positive and 
negative criteria of a project could achieve the same outcome. 
If, despite the above reservations, MCA is used as an analytical tool, 
its use will present decision-makers with a dilemma because there is 
no consistent way of choosing between, say, a road-widening project 
and the construction of an art gallery or the preservation of a wetland. 
Each project has different attributes, so that comparisons of their 
aggregated weighted scores would be meaningless. 
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Appendix 3: 
Wider economic impacts 
in the transport sector
A conventional cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of transport projects 
invariably focuses on items such as savings in travel time and 
fuel costs, as well as on changes in externalities, like negative 
environmental outcomes. The 1990s, however, saw a growth in calls 
by Australian transport infrastructure proponents for the inclusion 
of ‘additional’ benefits of road and rail projects. Interest centred on 
logistic improvements, such as reduced trip times and just-in-time 
delivery, which were claimed to reduce warehousing and inventory 
costs (e.g. Rockliffe, 1996).
More recently, proponents of transport infrastructure projects have 
sought to broaden the conventional analytical perspective to encompass 
the effects of large projects on the economy as a whole, rather than 
limiting the estimation of benefits to particular routes alone. Initially 
referred to as wider economic benefits (WEBs) (e.g. Department for 
Transport, 2005), the literature has more recently adopted the term 
wider economic impacts (WEIs), which reflects the fact that many of 
the posited impacts relate to changes in GDP and employment, rather 
than to the social welfare measures used in CBA. 
Various authors recognise that a number of the effects initially 
categorised as WEBs may be better treated separately as complementary 
outcomes of transport projects (e.g. Department for Transport, 2014; 
Laird & Mackie, 2010; Worsley, 2011; Abelson, 2011). This recognition 
is based on the lack of definitive evidence in posited WEBs of the 
direction of causality (e.g. higher wages in large cities), onerous data 
requirements for modelling, confounding effects (e.g. the effect on 
productivity or competition of the internet), limitations of many 
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transport models (e.g. fixed-trip matrices and lack of responsiveness 
to changes in land use), double counting, and potential ambiguity 
(transport projects may result in dispersion of economic activity 
as well as agglomeration).
A3.1 Categories of wider economic 
impacts for transport
A generally accepted taxonomy of WEIs includes the three major 
categories, which are examined below. A fourth category — increased 
competition as a result of improved transport links between different 
markets — was identified in the Department for Transport’s (DfT) 
2005 Transport, Wider Economic Benefits and Impacts on GDP, but 
was abandoned in the updated, 2014 version (p. 1, fn. 3) because it was 
not considered to be relevant in the United Kingdom, where transport 
links were already well developed and existing transport networks 
were ‘unlikely to be a significant constraint on competition’. 
A3.1.1 Agglomeration economies
As the generalised cost of transport (travel time, fuel, externalities) 
falls, firms and workers in their existing locations will effectively be 
brought closer to each other. In other words, the ‘effective density’ of 
the area where production occurs will increase because workers can 
more easily reach it, even if they live elsewhere. 
Although simple distance (e.g. kilometres) or travel time (e.g. minutes) 
are sometimes used as proxies, DfT (2005, annex 1, para 153) defines the 
effective density of a location more realistically as ‘the employment in 
and surrounding the area, weighted by their proximity (in generalised 
cost of transport) to the location’. It is recognised, however, that reduced 
generalised costs of transport may also result in some countervailing 
reduction of effective density if workers or firms relocate further away 
from the central business district. 
Increased ‘effective’ proximity of firms and workers to each other as a 
result of better transport links is seen as raising productivity due to 
positive spillovers. Firms are considered to learn more from other firms 
and about innovations generally if they are ‘clustered’ physically close 




O’Flaherty (2005, ch. 2) argues that workers in cities can more easily 
change jobs, bringing new knowledge to their destination firms when 
they move. Jaffe et al. (1993) show that new patent applications are five 
to 10 times more likely to cite patents from the same metropolitan area 
compared to patents from outside it. Proximate firms are more likely 
to have available a greater variety of inputs from local suppliers, and 
can therefore choose those that best suit their production processes. 
They  can also benefit from lower transport costs, search costs and 
sharing of costly infrastructure. Firms that can draw on a larger pool 
of workers benefit from greater opportunities for matching available 
specialised skills with their particular needs. Workers on the other 
hand, can more easily move to the jobs they prefer.
A3.1.2 Increased output in imperfectly 
competitive product markets 
Conventional transport CBAs implicitly assume a situation of perfect 
competition throughout the economy, including in sectors that use 
transport services to obtain inputs and deliver outputs. In a perfectly 
competitive situation, users of transport services for commuting and 
for freight pay a price that matches the value to them of the services. 
Conventionally estimated consumer surplus provides a satisfactory 
measure of social surplus. 
The situation is different in the case of business users operating in 
imperfectly competitive markets. Where business users of transport 
services have monopoly power in their various markets, a reduction in 
transport costs is likely to have two separate effects. One effect, already 
captured in conventional CBA, is an increase in consumer surplus 
accruing to users of transport services from additional (generated or 
induced) trips. The other, additional, effect is an increase in social 
welfare because lower costs may induce transport-using monopoly 
industries to increase their output and, hence, the quantity of goods 
and services available to society.1 The literature (e.g. Vickerman, 2007a, 
p. 603; Kernohan & Rognlien, 2011, pp. 116–21) generally illustrates 
1  To induce customers to buy the extra output, the monopolist must reduce its price. 
Consumers benefit from the lower price. But society also benefits from the larger number of units 
of output made available compared to a monopoly output. The monopolist also benefits from the 
additional output. Although the price reduction cuts into monopoly revenues, the additional 
units sold increase overall receipts. 
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this situation by presenting a standard monopoly-type diagram and 
then deriving an ‘uprate factor’ based on the Ramsey (1927) pricing 
model (Brown & Sibley, 1986). The ‘uprate factor’ is intended for 
scaling up benefits that have been calculated for business-related trips 
in a conventional CBA. 
A monopoly-style diagram is also relevant to the Cournot solution for 
a duopoly, which is an approach adopted by Kernohan and Rognlien 
(2011), among others. Two perfectly cooperating duopolists can 
jointly achieve a monopoly price and output by sharing market output 
equally. Each effectively maintains a monopoly over their own share of 
the market. In the case of a homogenous product, an attempt by either 
duopolist to reduce price or increase output will need to be followed 
by their competitor, taking both away from the monopoly position 
towards the perfect competition equilibrium. There is no single, 
determinate position, however, especially once the assumptions of a 
homogenous product and identical cost of production are discarded.
By adding more firms, the Cournot solution can be extended to 
represent an oligopoly. But a larger number of firms will reduce the 
likelihood of a durable collusive agreement on price or output, while 
increasing the likelihood of product differentiation (e.g. through 
branding). As Leftwich (1970, p. 239) points out:
As a practical matter, sellers in most oligopolistic industries sell 
differentiated products … Industries approaching pure oligopoly 
include cement, basic steel and most other basic metal-producing 
industries. Even here there are elements of differentiation among the 
products sold in a particular industry. Locational factors, service, 
and even personal friendships may differentiate the products of the 
various sellers in an industry.
And reactions of oligopolists in claiming market share are less likely to 
be based on the assumption that the other firms will not react in turn 
and will keep their output and prices fixed. However elegant, it is at 
least arguable that a Cournot solution is an unrealistic portrayal of the 
real world. 
An oligopolistic market may, therefore, be better portrayed in terms 
of the classic ‘kinked demand curve’ case, where products are 
differentiated, and individual firms find it unrewarding to alter prices 
because of the potential reactions of their competitor oligopolists. 
The discontinuous, vertical marginal revenue curve below the kink 
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suggests a degree of price and output rigidity for the industry whether 
marginal costs increase or decrease. If the kinked demand curve 
interpretation of an oligopolistic industry’s structure and conduct is 
preferred to the Cournot approach, then it would be less convincing 
to argue that reductions in the generalised cost of transport will result 
in welfare improvements in imperfect markets. In such situations, any 
automatic application of ‘uprate factors’ based on a Cournot model 
would be decidedly misguided.
In practice, price wars do occur between oligopolists. On the other 
hand, non-price competition in various forms is also feasible, obviating 
the need for price and output adjustments, and hence retaliatory price 
wars. Advertising, changes in quality and design, use of technology 
to reduce barriers to entry, and issue of loyalty cards to customers, are 
some forms of this competition. Price wars, product differentiation, 
and other potential real-world oligopolistic practices mean that there 
is no single approach to modelling oligopoly. Serious doubt must 
again be cast on the wisdom of the automatic application of ‘uprate 
factors’ to increase estimated benefits of transport services used by 
oligopolistic industries.
A simple analysis of monopolistically competitive markets is also 
tricky. Products may be highly differentiated, with a large number of 
independent sellers who tend to equate marginal costs with marginal 
revenues. According to Leftwich (1970, p. 275), ‘some slight restriction 
of output and increase in prices may occur under monopolistic 
competition, as compared with pure competition’, so that there may 
be some welfare gain from increased output following a reduction in 
costs. The degree of ease of entry into the industry and the extent 
of advertising and other forms of non-price competition that are 
used will, however, influence actual outcomes. No unique modelling 
approach is available.
In discussing imperfect competition generally, Vickerman (2007a, 
p. 602) cautions that: 
In order to be able to apply CBA in these circumstances, we need first 
to assess the way in which any transport improvement will affect 
different activities, then assess the competitive structure of those 
activities in order to be aware both of the markup and the likely 
competitive response of firms or other agents, and only then can we 
hope to evaluate the benefits accurately.
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DfT (2005, para 101) is equally explicit about the need for evidence 
and the facts of a situation before estimating benefits associated with 
imperfect competition:
Two steps are required to estimate the impact of these additional 
effects on welfare. First we need to know how firms respond to 
transport cost savings, specifically what the impacts are on output. 
Then we need to know the size of the additional benefits delivered by 
the additional output.
A3.1.3 Changes in the labour market
Lower transport costs may induce more workers to travel in order to 
enter employment, or seek more remunerative employment. This  is 
a benefit to travellers that is captured in conventional CBA in the 
‘generated demand’ triangle. Worker-travellers take their decision to 
increase travel (or not) on the basis of after-tax earnings. The wage 
paid to the worker by the employer, however, includes payroll and 
income taxes, because it is the total before-tax wage that reflects the 
worker’s contribution to the value of their output for the employer. 
Although the tax component is not captured in conventional CBA 
analysis of transport projects, it reflects part of the additional value 
of production attributable to new commuting trips of workers, or 
to those now earning higher wages in different jobs. Additional tax 
revenues can be used to fund other socially desirable projects that 
would otherwise not have been funded, or they can be used to reduce 
taxes imposed elsewhere in the economy. They therefore constitute 
an additional social benefit, an impact that is not captured in the 
conventional analysis.
Rather puzzlingly, the other side of the taxation coin is ignored in 
the literature on WEIs and by proponents of increased spending on 
transport infrastructure. Infrastructure projects that raise significant 
amounts of additional taxation receipts because of the postulated 
increase in labour supply, would arguably also be significant enough 
to require substantial financial resources. 
Whether the funding for infrastructure construction and operation 
is raised by general taxation, printing money, or by loans, there will 
be some consequential opportunity cost to the economy. Government 
borrowing will reduce consumption and divert resources away from the 
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private sector. Inflation generated by excessive printing of money will 
distort resource use. Taxes distort markets and may reduce the supply 
of labour. Whether the deadweight loss of these effects outweighs the 
additional tax raised from an increased labour supply — or indeed 
all WEI effects — depends on the particular circumstances of each 
project. Failure to include both the positive and negative effects of an 
infrastructure project can only result in a less than impartial analytical 
approach.
A3.2 Some empirical issues
Estimation of posited WEIs is largely an empirical issue. A preference 
for harmonisation of the parameters or variables employed, therefore, 
needs to take into account issues that are relevant to empirical analysis.
A3.2.1 Agglomeration economies
Conceptually, agglomeration benefits are measured as the increase 
in output (GDP) due to the implementation of the transport project. 
A key variable that requires estimation is, therefore, the elasticity of 
total productivity with respect to the effective density of employment 
for industry i in area j. Evidence of causality is thus required to 
establish that changes in productivity or output are due to an increase 
in effective density generated by a specific transport project, but this is 
rarely, if ever, provided in the transport literature or CBAs. Paucity of 
data and the effort that is required to estimate agglomeration benefits, 
however, encourages use of ‘uplift’; factors derived from large cities, 
whether they are appropriate or not. Mare and Graham (2009, p. 4) 
add that confounding effects in correlations may also bias estimated 
productivity impacts upwards. 
Effective density is estimated as a gravity model, with agglomeration 
factors falling away exponentially with generalised travel cost. 
Definition of zones used by transport models is therefore critical: 
many models include only origin–destination data for trips between 
zones, so that larger zones will exclude more within-zone trips. Some 
models also rely on physical distances between zone centroids rather 
than on generalised costs of travel. 
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A further concern is that changes in productivity may be attributed 
solely to transport projects, potentially risking a form of confirmation 
bias. Supporting infrastructure, such as the availability of high 
speed internet, may not be as conspicuous as a major highway or rail 
upgrade, but may play a key role in increasing urban productivity. 
Some,  (e.g.  Florida, 2003) might similarly argue that entertainment, 
high level educational facilities and life-style ambience are also essential 
to attracting the ‘creative class’ of high-productivity individuals to 
jobs in cities. 
Nor does the WEI agglomeration literature typically feature in its 
modelling the constraint of travel time budgets (TTB). Based on 
detailed analysis of historical data, Zahavi (1979), Marchetti (1994) and 
others have argued that people will only travel a daily total of about 
an hour from home to work and return. Unless a transport project 
improvement captures a significant additional number of workers who 
can now reduce their daily travel time to an hour or so, the number of 
additional workers may not increase enough to change productivity 
levels. Improved transport modes may also result in increased fares, 
thus dissuading some workers from travelling. 
Mean travel times of between 60 to 90 minutes per day are considered 
to be historically stable, but Milthorpe (2007, Table 1) found that 
they had increased in Sydney from about 73 minutes in 1981 to 
81 minutes in 2005. As Milthorpe (2007, s. 2.2) notes, increased TTBs 
may involve use of mobile phones and laptops, either for recreation or 
work. The ready availability of technology in urban areas, as well as 
transport improvements, may therefore also play a role in determining 
effective densities and agglomeration economies.
On a broader level, use of GDP or its sub-national equivalents is not 
compatible with the welfare approach adopted in CBA. But even the 
fundamental issue of standing appears to have been neglected in the 
literature. Reporting on studies of transport projects in Germany 
and China (Laird & Mackie, 2010, para 2.2.4) that do not address the 
issue explicitly, Laird and Mackie (2010, para 2.1.5) comment more 
generally that:
An improvement in transport supply in one region will make that 
region more accessible to other regions and potentially result in the 
displacement of economic activity to the ‘other’ regions. This is known 
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as the two-way road effect. Thus an improvement in transport supply 
in one region may increase the size of the economy at the national 
level but reduce it at a sub-national level.
In sum, empirical analysis of WEIs can be problematic due to 
deficiencies in available transport models and the paucity of data 
relevant to specific projects. Detailed critiques are provided by DfT 
(2014); Worsley (2011); Laird and Mackie (2010); Graham et al. (2009) 
and Byett et al. (2015), among others.
A3.2.2 Output change in imperfectly competitive 
product markets 
It is not clear why the WEI literature has focused so strongly on the 
aspect of imperfectly competitive markets. The implication is that 
it is ignored in conventional CBA. However, standard texts, such as 
Boardman et al. (2011, ch. 5), inform readers in some detail of the need 
to examine secondary markets that are distorted by taxes or other 
government interventions, externalities, or imperfect competition. 
The outcome differs for factor markets, primary markets and 
secondary markets, and depends on the efficiency of each. Further, 
Rouwendal (2012) examines different forms for demand functions 
(not just the straight line) for a number of different models of imperfect 
competition, finding that the indirect effects ‘may have the same order 
of magnitudes as the conventionally measured direct effects, may be 
much smaller, or may exceed them substantially’. 
DfT (2005, para 204) derives an expression that it recommends should 
be used as an ‘imperfect competition uprate factor’ that is the product 
of the elasticity of demand of the imperfectly competitive firm and 
the percentage mark-up of the price in excess of the marginal cost. 
The  uprate factor is used to scale up travel time savings and any 
transport reliability gains to businesses (but not commuters). 
Drawing on a number of price-cost studies for UK manufacturing 
industries and economy-wide elasticities, DfT (2005) recommended 
an uprate factor of 0.1, based on a price-cost margin of about 0.2 and 
a price elasticity of demand of 0.5. That is, for imperfectly competitive 
firms, any welfare gain due to business travel time savings, as well as 
transport reliability gains, should be increased by 10 per cent above 
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values estimated using the conventional analysis in CBA. Although it 
refers to an ‘uplift factor’, rather than an ‘uprate factor’, DfT (2014) 
confirms this recommendation.
Abelson (2011) notes that improved transport infrastructure may 
also result in economies of scale that reduce costs and hence increase 
welfare gains. He points out, however, that ‘because the gains from 
economies of scale are particular to each situation, these economies 
cannot be incorporated simply into a standard appraisal. They must 
be justified and estimated on a case-by-case basis’.
Tyers (2014) examined the economy-wide effects of oligopolistic service 
industries in Australia. In particular, his analysis explored the effect of 
government price-cap regulation and price surveillance of the sectors 
that had been privatised or made more competitive since the 1980s: 
telecommunications services, transport, health, education, utilities 
and finance. According to Tyers (2014, p. 6), the privatised services 
(electricity, gas, water, finance, transport and telecommunications) 
account for at least 20 per cent of Australia’s GDP, but ‘the precise 
extent of imperfect competition in Australia’s service industries is 
difficult to quantify’. 
Oligopolistic vehicle manufacturing in Australia is being wound 
down under the Australian Government’s Automotive Transformation 
Scheme. Increasingly sophisticated use of the internet by producers 
and distributors (The Economist, 2 May 2015) is likely to increase 
the degree of competition in a range of other industries. Companies 
like Uber and Lyft, for example, are pressuring governments to allow 
individuals to offer passenger transport services in competition 
with taxis. Napster and Spotify (music sharing), PayPal (electronic 
payments), Prosper and Lending Club (peer-to-peer lending), and 
multiple online sites for rating restaurants, toilets, and performances, 
are just some of the growing number of suppliers and information 
providers. Even where entry of competitors has not yet occurred, the 
mere threat of the possibility is likely to constrain less than competitive 
behaviour.
Another relevant issue that has not been addressed directly in 
modelling WEIs is the effect of government regulation, rather than 
market structure, in limiting competition. Australian examples of 
legislated rigidities and imperfect competition include chemists, 
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newsagents, taxis, centralised wage determination mechanisms, some 
postal services, trade union and professional association restrictions, 
after-hours penalty rates, occupational health standards (such as 
truck driver hours and maximum weights of bags that may be lifted 
manually). Institutional rigidities preclude significant increase in 
production or fall in prices, even if a producer’s transport costs are 
reduced. 
While not denying that reduced transport costs in imperfectly 
competitive industries can generate benefits additional to those 
estimated in conventional CBAs, there is an arguable case for 
considerable caution in automatically applying multipliers like the 
DfT (2005) ‘uprate factor’ in an analysis. Given the diversity of firms 
within an industry, and differences between industries and countries, 
mechanistic application of standardised WEI factors is unlikely to 
produce a robust, defensible analysis.
A3.2.3 Changes in the labour market
DfT (2005, paras 109, 118) summarises the effect of improved labour 
supply as follows: 
If a transport improvement facilitates increased GDP, there will be tax 
consequences, whether the additional work involves more people in 
employment, additional hours, or moving to more productive jobs. 
The welfare effects of small changes in time savings will be marginal 
for individuals, but the GDP effects can be more substantial for the 
minority of people affected … in some cases, relatively small welfare 
benefits from time or cost savings can lead to significant GDP effects. 
There is no theoretical reason to be certain whether the welfare 
effect of such savings will be smaller or larger than the GDP effect … 
[It is] likely to be significant only where a transport scheme relieves 
a significant transport constraint, and then only for a minority of 
individuals (insofar as transport cost changes lead to a change in 
employment or in employment patterns).
A transport intervention that reduces the generalised cost of transport 
to a commuter can be thought of as an increase in the effective wage. 
It is therefore possible to estimate an elasticity of labour supply with 
respect to effective wages, and to use it to estimate a change in the 
level of employment. The product of the change in employment and 
GDP per worker (average labour productivity) yields the overall 
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change in GDP. Studies relevant to the United Kingdom find that 
the labour supply elasticity with respect to wages ranges from 0.5 to 
0.15, so DfT (2005, para 241) proposes 0.1 as ‘best estimate’. In a UK 
study, Venables (2007, p. 186) concluded that increased incomes due 
to workers moving to higher productivity jobs ‘typically yield[s] total 
gains several times larger than those that would be derived from a 
standard cost-benefit analysis’. 
DfT (2005, paras 245–47) refers to evidence that time savings on 
commuting journeys tend to result in longer commuting distances, 
and that ‘workers are not very responsive to changes in wages when 
choosing how much to work’. It therefore recommends that the GDP 
effect should be assumed to be zero. DfT (2014, para 4.1.25) states, 
however, that 40 per cent of the change in GDP is due to the labour 
supply impact, and 30 per cent of the change in GDP is due to moves 
to jobs of different productivity levels. 
A3.3 Wider economic impacts in the 
Australian and New Zealand jurisdictions
A report to the Council of Australian Governments Reform Council 
by SGS (2012a) reviewed the literature on agglomeration economies 
and provided estimates of projected changes to metropolitan GDP. 
The report was based on case studies of proposed transport projects 
in Melbourne and Adelaide, and greenfield housing development in 
urban fringe areas of Sydney. 
The SGS (2012a) report adopts an approach similar to overseas studies 
by estimating changes in state gross value added (GVA) based on 
correlation between effective job density (EJD) and labour productivity 
by statistical local area (SLA). EJD is derived using travel time rather 
than generalised cost of travel. 
However, SGS (2012a) also proposes a different approach to estimating 
‘uplift’ in GVA, based on elasticities of changes in human capital due to 
changes in EJD. This approach is based on the hypothesis (SGS, 2012a, 
p. 2) that households are ‘knowledge intensive enterprises’ in their 
own right, and that transport projects will open more opportunities to 
learn and acquire skills. It is not entirely clear from the report whether 
the acquisition of additional human capital is hypothesised as being 
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due to better access to educational centres or to on-the-job training, 
but the calculated elasticities are based on the incidence of formal 
tertiary qualifications in each SLA.
With regard to productivity effects of agglomeration, the points made 
by SGS (2012a) are similar to those by DfT (2014), Worsley (2011), 
Laird and Mackie (2010), and Graham et al. (2009), among others. For 
example, ‘rather than firms being more productive because they are 
in a central location, firms that are more productive can command 
central locations’, so that the direction of causality runs in the 
opposite direction to the one usually hypothesised. A further problem 
is that researchers are not able to obtain access to detailed firm-level 
productivity data in Australia, whereas overseas studies have been 
able to do so. Indexes of EJD also do not distinguish between ‘jobs’ 
and their relevance to a particular sector in terms of their contribution 
to GVA: for example, a bank teller and an investment banker will be 
treated as equivalent occupations. SGS (2012a) also acknowledge that 
the use of cross-sectional data at a particular point in time to estimate 
elasticities may not be appropriate for projecting changes in future 
productivity due to a transport intervention or land-use strategy. 
Given these uncertainties, it is incongruous that SGS (2007, Table 14) 
should attribute over $17 million out of a total of $85 million in present 
value benefits to urban consolidation benefits as a result of replacing 
a railway level crossing with an underpass in suburban Springvale 
in Melbourne. Capital Metro Agency (2014, Table 18) attributes a 
similarly high proportion of about 20 per cent in WEIs to its estimate 
of the total benefits for a 13-kilometre light rail connection between a 
suburb that is already served by a rapid bus service and one out of the 
four existing Canberra town centres. 
Some other reports on WEIs commissioned by Australian jurisdictions, 
but not reviewed here include SGS (2012b), KPMG (2012), and Hensher 
et al. (2012). At the time of writing, a detailed study of elasticities 
of productivity with respect to employment density was being 
undertaken by SGS under the aegis of the Australian Government’s 
Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Economics on behalf of 
Austroads. 
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Studies have also been undertaken in New Zealand. Mare and Graham 
(2009) used more detailed data than those available to researchers in 
Australia to estimate agglomeration elasticities. Kernohan and Rognlien 
(2011, Table 8.2) analysed imperfect competition through the prism 
of a Cournot model using the price-cost differences of New Zealand 
firms. They recommend an uplift factor of 10.7 per cent be applied 
to business-user benefits. Agglomeration impacts or externalities are 
included in the NZ Transport Agency’s (2013, p. 5: 406–411) Economic 
Evaluation Manual. It includes weighted average agglomeration 
elasticities for New Zealand by industry, as well as the procedure to 
apply the agglomeration elasticities to estimate productivity changes 
by location. 
Discussions with transport agencies in Australia and New Zealand 
indicate a general acceptance of the need to include WEIs in evaluations 
of transport projects. Manuals issued by government agencies in a 
number of jurisdictions contain sections on WEIs or WEBs. Central 
agencies are typically more guarded, emphasising the need to avoid 
the application of elasticity and other values obtained from overseas 
studies or from other projects, although current methodologies are 
broadly supported. Most of those interviewed recognised the potential 
pitfalls of double counting, the need to demonstrate causality, and the 
limitations imposed by data availability. 
Infrastructure projects that are sufficiently large to generate WEIs are, 
however, also likely to require considerable funding resources. Raising 
substantial funds is also likely to have a negative effect on economic 
activity (see Appendix 7 on marginal excess tax burden). Somewhat 
worryingly, the apparent enthusiasm of government agencies to apply 
the WEI approach is not matched by a corresponding willingness 
to adjust costs and benefits for the opportunity costs of increased 
borrowing or taxation.
Infrastructure Australia (2013, p. 11) notes that WEIs may not always 
be positive and that ‘the availability of Australian specific data 
needed to calculate WEBs is currently sub-optimal’. It states that it 
will treat estimates of WEBs ‘separately to the traditional CBA’, but 




A3.4 Issues for consideration in 
harmonising approaches to wider 
economic impacts 
Vickerman (2007b) provides a comprehensive review of the debate 
regarding the existence of WEBs, distinguishing between macro-level 
and micro-level approaches, and noting the difficulty of ‘knowing 
whether an elasticity obtained from the macro-study is in any way 
applicable to a single investment decision’. After reviewing differences 
in approach in the estimation of elasticities in macro-studies (output, 
productivity, or employment), the issue of direction of causality, and 
use of land use transport interaction (LUTI) models versus computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) models, he points out that most of the 
empirical evidence relates to ex ante studies. He cites ‘one of the 
relatively few ex post studies’ by Hay et al. (2004) to the effect that 
‘a very significant project, the Channel Tunnel, has not produced 
significant wider benefits over its first ten years of operation, at least 
on the regional economies close to the tunnel’. 
Reviewing the effects of a number of Train à Grand Vitesse (TGV) 
projects between pairs of major French cities, Vickerman (2007b) finds 
that traffic levels generally increased in both directions, but that there 
was no overall net impact on these major cities, although there was 
a tendency for increased concentration of economic activity towards 
them from their regional hinterlands. Vickerman (2007b, p.  16) 
concludes that ‘what is clear is that there is little evidence of there 
being standard transferable [wider economic benefits] multipliers 
region to region or project to project’ that can be applied to estimated 
benefits in individual ex ante analyses.
DfT (2014, s. 5.2) reviews a number of data and modelling issues in the 
United Kingdom that can affect the robustness of estimates of WEIs. 
Lack of modelling of intra-zonal travel in transport models is likely to 
produce inaccurate estimates of agglomeration effects. Where transport 
models do not employ generalised cost matrices, there is likely to be bias 
in WEI assessments because changes in agglomeration effects depend 
on costs. Insufficient segmentation of modes in transport models may 
affect estimates of effective density; for example, if the model does 
not include a public transport mode. Finally, models may not cover 
the geographic area under consideration, leading to unreliable results. 
SoCIAl CoST‑BeNefIT ANAlySIS IN AuSTrAlIA AND New ZeAlAND
174
Laird and Mackie (2010, pp. 1–2, para 5.1.3) report on British 
studies where estimates of the growth in GVA attributed to transport 
investments:
are significantly in excess of the Present Value of Benefits used in 
conventional cost benefit appraisal … Clearly these GVA estimates are 
large and, on the basis that they also exceed welfare benefit estimates, 
give rise to questions of consistency with the methods used to appraise 
transport projects … the methods available to estimate the potential 
GVA impact of a region post a transport investment are still in their 
infancy and need work to ensure they pass internal consistency and 
robustness tests. 
In a detailed review of using the UK GVA approach, rather than GDP, 
Byett et al. (2015, p. 94) noted that: 
One issue that was not fully resolved was whether the benefits 
measured are additional or inclusive of the rule-of-half benefits 
measured within the standard transport appraisal … Hence at this 
stage it is recommended that the GVA approach be used alongside 
the EEM [Economic Evaluation Manual, NZ Transport Agency], rather 
than as an additive effect.
More particularly from the perspective of this publication, 
in a summary table of pros and cons of the GVA methodology, Byett 
et al. (2015, Table 10.1, p. 95) also conclude that:
The GVA approach is not consistently defined across different 
studies. Likewise density measures also differ across studies. These 
inconsistencies reduce the ability to compare model outcomes and 
calibrate model parameters.
Abelson (2011) concludes that ‘searching for wider economic benefits 
is something of a holy grail in transport economics’ and that transport 
infrastructure:
often disperses employment rather than concentrates it; correlations 
of wage and employment density overstate the density effect on 
wages; attribution of significant agglomeration economies to a small 
number of generated trips is not very plausible; and the empirical 
basis for agglomeration economies driven by effective densities is 
thin and subject to unresolved technical issues. This paper concludes 




Just as there is sometimes unjustified aversion to new ideas, it can 
sometimes be the case that a new idea or approach is adopted without 
sufficient critical review. In the case of WEIs, enough caveats have 
already been expressed by various specialist observers to signal that 
a thorough review of the approach is desirable before its acceptance 
and automatic application to transport projects in Australia and New 
Zealand. Nevertheless, transport agencies appear to be willing to forgo 
more detailed review.
To ensure consistency and robustness in CBA studies of transport 
projects, a harmonised approach should be adopted to the following:
• review of the basic methodological principles used in the WEI 
approach, particularly from the perspective of its application to 
cost-benefit analysis
• review of the desirability of complementing the WEI approach 
with a corresponding application of METB estimates to costs and 
benefits
• peer review by non-transport econometrics experts of estimates 





Discounting is essential in cost-benefit analysis (CBA) because it 
provides a way to express all costs and benefits in terms of their 
present value. It does so by assigning smaller weights to values that 
occur further into the future than the present. Unless the values of 
costs and benefits are made commensurable by being expressed as 
present values, they cannot be aggregated.
Social discount rates reflect society’s preference or valuation on current 
well-being versus future well-being. Despite a voluminous literature, 
however, there is no consensus on the methodology for determining 
social discount rates, or their value. 
It is not the intention here to review the literature, or to recommend 
specific values for discount rates. An outline of the main conceptual 
approaches is provided below, but the focus is rather to record the 
range of rates that are used in Australia, New Zealand and other 
countries. This diversity of rates is problematic because the discount 
rate is a key factor, albeit not necessarily the most important factor, 
in determining the net present value of a project. 
A4.1 Conceptual approaches to 
establishing social discount rates
The so-called consumption and investment rates are the two major 
approaches to conceptualising social discount rates. Other perspectives 
tend to be some form of combination or extension of these approaches. 
Zhuang et al. (2007), Pearce et al. (2006) and Boardman et al. (2011) 
provide readable introductions to the topic.
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The social rate of time preference (SRTP) reflects the rate at which 
society is willing to forgo current consumption in return for more 
consumption in the future. It therefore assumes that all costs and 
benefits are consumption goods and services. Benefits are consumed 
rather than being reinvested. 
One method of estimating the SRTP empirically is by estimating the 
after-tax return on government or other low-risk bonds or securities. 
Individuals may, however, have preferences that go beyond those 
expressed in their participation in financial markets. Moreover, 
individuals’ preferences are unlikely to be the same as those of 
society’s collective attitude to trading off current consumption for 
more consumption in the future. An alternative method of estimating 
the SRTP is to use the Ramsey (1928) formula, but this approach is 
contentious because it requires the specification of a ‘pure’ rate of 
social time preference, as well as other variables. 
The other major alternative method for estimating the social discount 
rate takes an investment or producer perspective. Society’s resources 
are scarce. Their use by government will thus deny or reduce their 
availability to private investors. If private investors can obtain a higher 
rate of return than that achieved by the public sector project, society’s 
welfare could be improved by allowing the private sector to use the 
resources (or funds) instead of the government. Put another way, 
government projects should only proceed if they are feasible when 
discounted at the marginal social opportunity cost (SOC) of capital, 
which is the rate of return on private sector investment. 
Most countries, including the Australian and New Zealand jurisdictions, 
tend to use either the SRTP or the SOC approach (tables A4.1 and 
A4.2). It is also possible to calculate an average of the SRTP and SOC, 
weighted by the respective shares of tax funding (assumed to reduce 
consumption) and domestic borrowing (assumed to crowd out private 
investment). Some formulations of the weighted average approach 
include borrowing from other countries. The SRTP and SOC can also 
be combined into a shadow price of capital, defined by Boardman et 
al. (2011, p. 256) as the ratio of SOC to SRTP, and multiplying relevant 
costs and benefits to convert them to ‘consumption equivalents’ that 
can then be discounted using the SRTP.
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Other approaches, such as the use of intergenerational discount rates, 
are based primarily on subjective equity justifications. An approach 
that seeks to incorporate uncertainty about the future (interest rates 
or the state of the economy) by extending the Ramsay equation is 
‘time-declining discount rates’ (Pearce et al., 2006, ch. 13; Freeman 
et al., 2013). Time-declining rates, however suffer from the problem of 
time-inconsistency, which is the incongruence in behaviour between 
successive time periods.
A4.2 Diversity in discount rates
Table A4.1 demonstrates clearly the diversity of discount rates 
that have been adopted for use in transport projects by selected 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries. Table A4.2 reveals that considerable diversity exists within 
and between Australian and New Zealand jurisdictions, but discount 
rates are generally higher than those used in other countries. 
Table A4.1: Discount rate used by transport agencies 
in selected OECD countries
Jurisdiction Method Discount rate (real)
France risk‑adjusted social rate 
of time preference
4.5% (or project specific rate)
Germany Social rate of time preference 3% (for short‑term effects) and 
1% (for long‑term effects)
Japan Social cost of capital 4%
The Netherlands risk‑adjusted social rate 
of time preference
4% to 5 .5%
Norway risk‑adjusted social rate 
of time preference
4% reducing to 2% over 75 years
Sweden Social rate of time preference 3 .5%
United States Certainty equivalent 2 .5%, 3% and 5% (for estimation 
of social cost of carbon)
United Kingdom Social rate of time preference 3.5% reducing to 1% over 
300 years
Source: oeCD (2015)
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A4.3 The issue of harmonisation
The choice of approach to determine the public sector discount rate as 
well as the discount rate value has been, and is subject to continuing 
debate. It is unlikely that the matter will be resolved in the near future.
Given the unsettled theory and practice about appropriate social 
discount rates, agreement on harmonised values is unlikely, particularly 
between different jurisdictions. A degree of de facto harmonisation 
is occurring, however, in a number of Australian states, which have 
adopted the NSW 4 per cent, 7 per cent (central rate) and 10 per cent 
per annum approach. Infrastructure Australia also uses these rates, 
so that jurisdictions applying for federal funding are of necessity 
required to use them. 
Over time, the 4 per cent, 7 per cent and 10 per cent rates may become 
standard practice, but a considered review would nevertheless be 
worthwhile to ensure that the central rate at least is an appropriate 
and justifiable one. 
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Appendix 5: 
Greenhouse gas emissions 
and the carbon price
Climate change is an important policy issue for many countries. 
Despite considerable uncertainty regarding the extent, timing, 
intensity or frequency of expected changes in climate and extreme 
weather events, it has become commonplace in economic appraisals to 
include a monetary value for the greenhouse gas emissions generated 
by a project. The value is treated as a negative externality in cost-
benefit analyses (CBA). 
There has not, however, been work done to resolve some of the 
problems inherent in using any particular value. The purpose of this 
appendix is to raise issues that should be addressed in establishing 
consistent valuation of the so-called ‘carbon price’. 
A5.1 Consistency in measurement
The range of greenhouse gases includes, among others, water vapour, 
carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide and ozone. The radiative 
forcing effect of each of these is measured with respect to the reference 
gas, carbon dioxide. The total effect of any emission scenario is 
therefore expressed in the common unit of carbon dioxide equivalents, 
CO2(e). Nevertheless CBA reports are rarely clear on which greenhouse 
emissions have been included. It is generally not the practice, for 
example, to include water vapour, which is a potent greenhouse gas. 
An obvious area for harmonisation is to establish a common set of 
gases to be considered, thus allowing projects to be considered on a 
comparable basis.
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The change in radiative forcing caused by greenhouse gas emissions 
is a function of their addition to the atmospheric concentration of all 
greenhouse gases. This fact is often overlooked, which leads to the 
inappropriate measurement of the volume of emissions of greenhouse 
gases and the attribution of some negative ‘carbon price’ annual value 
to a project’s ‘bubble’ of emissions. The additional externality cost 
will in theory differ each year as the atmospheric concentration of 
greenhouse gases changes. Given the difficulty of forecasting future 
global concentration levels, it may be necessary to develop an 
adjustment factor for future project emissions, perhaps based on the 
representative concentration pathways (Moss et al., 2008) adopted in 
the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. 
Even less tractable is the joint nature of climate change cost due to 
an increase in emissions in a particular project. In cases where the 
standing of the project is defined as being national, it is not clear 
how much of any global change in climatic conditions should be 
attributed to a local project. Nor is it clear whether there may be a 
risk of exaggeration in current estimates of carbon prices if they are 
determined on the basis of damage cost avoided on a global basis.
As well as these conceptual issues, there are four main methods that 
are currently used to estimate the ‘cost of carbon’. Each has advantages 
and disadvantages. 
A5.1.1 Damage cost avoided approach
The ‘damage cost estimate’ aims to measure the present value of the 
stream of future damages associated with a marginal increase (e.g. a 
tonne) in CO2 emissions. In other words, this approach aims to measure 
the social cost of CO2 emissions. The damages considered typically 
include both market and non-market aspects, covering health, 
environment, crops and other property damage potentials (e.g. due 
to increased flood risk or adverse weather patterns) and wider social 
aspects (e.g. United States Government, 2013). 
A frequent problem with the damage cost avoided approach is its 
reliance on the so-called ‘dumb farmer’ assumption: that farmers or 
other actors will not adapt in some way that will reduce or limit the 
assumed damage incurred. Some of the adaptation framing issues are 
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canvassed in Dobes et al. (2014), including the more realistic modelling 
approach by Kurukulasuriya and Mendelsohn (2008) to estimating 
damage to agricultural production. 
Estimating the total or marginal damage cost of greenhouse gas 
emissions involves estimating how they contribute to atmospheric 
concentrations and hence on associated climatic effects. Integrated 
assessment models (IAM) have been developed to assess the damage 
impacts of an increase in global greenhouse gas concentrations, based 
on different assumptions. Their complex ‘black box’ nature, however, 
can mean that the level of transparency around how these models 
work is generally not particularly high. Pindyck (2013) provides a 
summary of their key characteristics:
Most economic analyses of climate change policy have six elements, 
each of which can be global in nature or disaggregated on a regional 
basis. In an IAM-based analysis, each of these elements is either part 
of the model (determined endogenously), or else is an exogenous input 
to the model. These six elements can be summarized as follows:
1. Projections of future emissions of a CO2 equivalent (CO2e) composite 
(or individual GHGs) under ‘business as usual’ (BAU) and one or 
more abatement scenarios. Projections of emissions in turn require 
projections of both GDP growth and ‘carbon intensity’, i.e. the 
amount of CO2e released per dollar of GDP, again under BAU and 
alternative abatement scenarios, and on an aggregate or regionally 
disaggregated basis. 
2. Projections of future atmospheric CO2e concentrations resulting 
from past, current, and future CO2e emissions. (This is part of the 
climate science side of an IAM.)
3. Projections of average global (or regional) temperature changes — 
and possibly other measures of climate change such as temperature 
and rainfall variability, hurricane frequency, and sea level increases 
— likely to result over time from higher CO2e concentrations. (This 
is also part of the climate science side of an IAM.) 
4. Projections of the economic impact, usually expressed in terms of 
lost GDP and consumption, resulting from higher temperatures. 
(This is the most speculative element of the analysis, in part because 
of uncertainty over adaptation to climate change.) ‘Economic 
impact’ includes both direct economic impacts as well as any other 
adverse effects of climate change, such as social, political, and 
medical impacts, which under various assumptions are monetized 
and included as part of lost GDP.
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5. Estimates of the cost of abating GHG emissions by various 
amounts, both now and throughout the future. This in turn 
requires projections of technological change that might reduce 
future abatement costs.
6. Assumptions about social utility and the rate of time preference, 
so that lost consumption from expenditures on abatement can be 
valued and weighed against future gains in consumption from the 
reductions in warming that abatement would bring about.
IAMs are typically developed for assessing the outcomes of mitigation 
options to inform related policy decisions, rather than to determine 
the damage cost of CO2 emissions. For models that provide such cost 
estimates, the range is typically high. For example, in the United States 
the estimates of the social cost of CO2 ranged from US$11 to US$109 
per tonne of CO2 in 2015, increasing to between US$26 and US4$220 
per tonne of CO2 by 2050 (US Government, 2013). 
Key limitations of the damage cost approach include the uncertainty in 
predicting climatic impacts, as well as assumptions about adaptation, 
mitigation measures and feedback processes, the discount rate and the 
robustness of the damage functions used in the assessment process 
(Pindyck, 2013; OECD, 2015). For global models that look at the effects 
of climate change on different countries or regions, the weighting used 
to aggregate the cost estimates and the assumptions around whether 
decision-makers are altruistic towards other countries can also affect 
the final results (Anhoff & Tol, 2010).
A5.1.2 Abatement cost estimate
Another approach to costing greenhouse gas emissions is ‘abatement 
cost’. This approach aims to measure the marginal cost of achieving a 
given level of CO2 emission reduction (either target based or individual 
mitigation policy based), rather than estimating the social cost of CO2. 
The abatement cost approach essentially involves estimating how 
much emissions and costs will change over time, with and without 
a specific mitigation policy. Its major limitation is its inability to 
measure the social cost due to climate change. It is, therefore, used 
primarily to compare the cost-effectiveness of different policy options 




According to a review conducted by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), countries that use the 
abatement cost approach include France, United Kingdom, Norway 
and the Netherlands. In the United Kingdom, the abatement cost 
estimate of CO2 ranged from £30 to £91 per tonne of CO2 in 2015, 
increasing to £110 to £329 by 2050 (OECD, 2015). 
A5.1.3 Market price of carbon
The market price of carbon is sometimes used to inform policy 
decisions. If the market price of carbon truly reflected the social cost 
of carbon emissions, it could potentially offer an effective means of 
incorporating it into CBA. However, carbon market prices are affected 
by a range of political and other considerations that control the 
emission allowances and exemptions for certain sectors or industries. 
For example, in the past year, the traded carbon price in New Zealand 
was below NZ$10 per tonne of CO2(e). This low value may not represent 
the social cost of climate change due to emissions.
A5.1.4 Willingness-to-pay estimates
Predicting the future climate at local levels is constrained by the 
lack of knowledge of the extent, timing, intensity or frequency of 
expected changes in climate and extreme weather events. Equally 
problematic is prediction of the effect of current mitigative actions on 
future climatic change. These problems make valuing the social cost of 
carbon emissions extremely difficult. 
Stated preference techniques typically involve asking respondents 
directly about their willingness to pay (WTP) (or accept) a good or 
services (or for the removal of a good or services) under a hypothetical 
situation. For example, Veldhuizen et al. (2011) conducted a pilot 
choice experiment in Australia to understand how people trade off 
the type and amount of a tax or levy they would be willing to pay 
for specific 2050 emission outcomes expressed in terms of CO2(e) 
concentration levels. 
Another approach is to impute WTP from market data (e.g. 
using vehicle-purchasing decisions to impute WTP for lower fuel 
consumption). Market-based estimates of damage due to climate 
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change, such as lower agricultural production due to changes in 
temperatures and rainfall, could be gained using hedonic pricing 
(Howard, 2014 p. 16). However, hedonic pricing requires market 
data, and these are only available for contemporary or past situations; 
application to future conditions would require subjective judgement 
or extrapolation.
Since climate change due to carbon dioxide and related emissions 
can affect different sectors and have different impacts, integrated 
assessment models are sometimes used to combine WTP estimates for 
different impacts to establish the overall impact. 
A5.1.5 Current practice 
Table A5.1 presents estimates of the social cost of carbon dioxide 
equivalent emissions that are used in different countries. 
Table A5.1: Current international valuation practice for carbon 
dioxide equivalent emissions
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Note: Co2(e) values for Australia and New Zealand were first inflated to 2013 prices in 
domestic currency using GDP deflators and then converted to uSD using PPP conversion 
factors. GDP deflators and PPP data are sourced from The world Bank. other Co2(e) 
estimates were sourced from oeCD (2015). The Austroads (2014, table 5.3) figure is based 
on estimates of european union data by Ce Delft et al. (2011).
Source: compiled by Joanne leung from the sources cited
A5.2 Harmonisation
Due to the uncertainty surrounding the nature of future climate 
change and its effects, it is difficult to establish a robust social cost for 
greenhouse gas emissions. Any attempt at strict harmonisation of a 
value for a ‘carbon price’ would be contentious, given the wide range 
of values that are shown in Table A5.1.
If jurisdictions consider it acceptable to include in CBA studies values 
that reflect the social cost of greenhouse gas emissions, despite the deep 
level of inherent uncertainty, then it would be desirable to initiate 
early discussion about the best method of estimating an acceptable 




Uncertainty, risk and sensitivity
Although his focus is on sensitivity testing of economic models, Pannell 
(1997) notes the paucity in the literature of ‘discussion and procedures 
and methodological issues for simple approaches to sensitivity 
analysis’. Even classical cost-benefit analysis (CBA) textbooks such as 
Harberger (1976), Mishan (1988), Sugden and Williams (1978), and 
Gramlich (1981) have limited discussion of sensitivity analysis per se, 
with generally minimal attention paid to uncertainty and risk. 
Some government-sponsored manuals conflate the concepts of risk 
analysis and sensitivity analysis. For example, the Austroads-sponsored 
project evaluation guide by Rockliffe et al. (2012, p. 24) states that 
sensitivity analysis ‘is the simplest kind of risk analysis’, although 
the following pages do in fact separately discuss quantitative risk 
analysis in probability terms. More disconcerting is the confounding 
by Rockliffe et al. (2012, pp. 29, 46–54) of the technical economic 
concept of risk that is used in CBA risk analysis with the more prosaic 
concept of a qualitative or quantitative combination of likelihood and 
negative impact. In everyday language, too, risk is generally perceived 
to constitute a negative outcome.
While the term ‘uncertainty’ is generally used in different ways 
to denote lack of precise knowledge or certainty, ‘risk analysis’ 
and ‘sensitivity analysis’ have specific and distinct meanings in 
CBA. The  distinction is ostensibly based on definitions of risk and 
uncertainty originally put forward by Knight in 1921 (2009), and 
which have since become conventional usage among economists. 
Following Knight, risk is generally conceptualised as positive or 
negative variation in outcomes from a measure of central tendency, 
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where the probabilities of deviations are known.1 Uncertainty is 
associated with unpredictable variation because the probability of 
events is not known. Recent usage, including in military circles and 
the climate change literature, may also refer to ‘deep uncertainty’ (an 
‘unknown unknown’), which implies lack of knowledge even of the 
nature of a future event.
A6.1 Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis is a traditional aspect of project evaluation. 
Sinden and Thampapillai (1995, ch. 10), devote a chapter to the topic, 
and define it as follows:
A sensitivity test is a recalculation of net social benefits with different 
data, together with the reinterpretation of the relative desirability 
of the alternatives.
An analyst has varying degrees of confidence in the values used to 
estimate the net present value of a project. For example, if the purchase 
of a standard item of equipment that is supplied in a competitive 
market is to occur soon after commencement of a project, then its 
price is likely to remain close to the initial estimate. Costs and benefits 
incurred or reaped further out into the future, on the other hand, 
are more likely to deviate from current estimates. 
In principle, the analyst could assume a number of different values 
for each variable. In the case of the cost of a standard item of 
equipment early in the project, it could be assumed that the upper 
and lower bounds might be 1 per cent either side of the current 
1  Knight (2009, p. 121) distinguishes risk and uncertainty in a number of places. 
However, the most cogent distinction is at the beginning of Chapter 8: 
To preserve the distinction which has been drawn in the last chapter between the 
measurable uncertainty and an unmeasurable one we may use the term ‘risk’ to 
designate the former and the term ‘uncertainty’ for the latter. The word ‘risk’ is 
ordinarily used in a loose way to refer to any sort of uncertainty viewed from the 
standpoint of the unfavourable contingency, and the term ‘uncertainty’ similarly with 
reference to the favourable outcome; we speak of the ‘risk’ of a loss, the ‘uncertainty’ 
of a gain … The practical difference between the two categories, risk and uncertainty, 
is that in the former the distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known 
(either through calculation a priori from statistics of past experience), while in the 
case of uncertainty this is not true, the reason being in general that it is impossible to 
form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with is in a high degree unique.
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estimate. An estimate for a cost 20 years into the future may merit a 
range that is 15 per cent either side of current expectations. Rockliffe 
et  al. (2012,  Table 5.3) suggest ranges for sensitivity analysis such 
as a plus or minus 50 per cent variation either side of the estimated 
traffic diverted or generated by a transport project, but only ± 0.3 for 
estimated average car occupancy. 
Having set the likely range or bounds for each variable, the analyst 
would then estimate the net present value (NPV) for the lowest (perhaps 
‘worst case’), highest (perhaps ‘best case’) and expected (‘most likely’ 
or plausible) levels of each variable. However, the number of results 
increases exponentially with the number of variables tested. If three 
levels (e.g. high, medium, and low) are used for each variable, then 
two variables will require 32 = 9 separate calculations. Four variables 
would require 34 = 81 calculations of NPV. Whether a decision-maker 
would find it useful to be presented with 81 separate possible values 
of NPV is open to doubt. Because it does not involve probabilities, 
sensitivity analysis provides no guidance as to which one of the 
81 results is to be preferred. 
Because comprehensive application of sensitivity analysis is subject 
to diminishing returns in a large, complex project, Sinden and 
Thampapillai (1995, ch. 10) recommend the exercise of judgement 
by limiting testing to so-called ‘critical’ variables that are likely to 
affect the calculated NPV so much that the project may be abandoned, 
or an alternative project chosen. Nevertheless, they acknowledge 
that the only reliable method of identifying critical variables is by 
systematic recalculation of NPVs, a task that is made easier by the use 
of spreadsheets and computers.
Little and Mirrlees (1974, p. 309) are explicitly sceptical about the 
usefulness of sensitivity analysis to decision-makers faced with more 
than one estimate of NPV. Squire and van der Tak (1975, p. 45) point 
out that different variables may be positively or negatively correlated, 
but sensitivity analysis assumes that variables are independent 
of each other (Campbell & Brown, 2003, p. 197). Perkins (1994, 
s.  15.7.2) considers that a key weakness of sensitivity analysis is 
its use of ‘randomly selected percentage values, such as 10 per cent 
or 20  per  cent’, rather than by standardised amounts such as one 
standard deviation. Finally, selection of ‘best’ and ‘worst’ case limits 
for a variable implies the selection of low-probability events that may 
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be highly unlikely to occur, but are likely to alter the calculated NPV 
noticeably, bringing into question the purpose of any sensitivity 
analysis conducted on the basis of extreme values.
Despite these complications, sensitivity analysis can play a useful role 
in CBA. If a small change in a particular variable produces a large 
change in NPV, then a prudent analyst will check the method and 
data used to estimate that particular variable. If appropriate, some re-
estimation may be justified. Even if there is sufficient confidence in 
the robustness of the estimated value, there may be a case for applying 
risk analysis to the evaluation of the project. 
An alternative application of sensitivity analysis is to identify the 
value of a variable, or group of variables, where NPV falls to zero; the 
so-called ‘switching’, ‘cross over’, or ‘break-even’ value. Knowledge of 
switching points can assist a decision-maker to assess the plausibility 
of the evaluation results.
Of particular relevance to possible harmonisation of the approach to 
conducting sensitivity analysis is the identification by Sinden and 
Thampapillai (1995, ch. 10) of potential misuses of the technique. 
They recommend that analysts should:
• summarise in the main report break-even values of variables, leaving 
the presentation of large numbers of NPVs from recalculations 
based on ‘several levels of several variables’ to an appendix 
• provide an interpretation of the results of sensitivity analysis, 
avoiding just the presentation of arithmetic results of such things 
as recalculations of NPVs or break-even values
• integrate sensitivity tests into the overall analysis by demonstrating 
which variables are critical to making choices between the project 
at hand and any alternatives
• not use sensitivity tests as a substitute for the valuation of unpriced 
outcomes.
It is important to note that sensitivity analysis is carried out without 
involving the use or application of probabilities. Risk analysis, on the 
other hand, is based explicitly on the application of probabilities. 
The  specification of probabilities, or probability distributions, 
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however, is also subject to uncertainty (in the everyday usage of the 
term). It is therefore appropriate that sensitivity analysis be applied 
even to the results of risk analysis — a topic that is addressed below.
A6.2 Risk analysis
Risk analysis can be carried out using expected values (probability 
weighted values of different variables) or with decision trees: Boardman 
et al. (2011, ch. 7) provide a detailed exposition. The availability of 
modern software facilitates the application of Monte Carlo analysis. 
Campbell and Brown (2003, ch. 9) provide an accessible explanation 
of Monte Carlo analysis using snapshots of spreadsheets based on the 
@RISK software (www.palisade.com). 
In essence, risk analysis requires the specification of probability 
distributions for some or all of the variables utilised in a project 
evaluation. Section A6.1 on sensitivity analysis cited Rockliffe et al. 
(2012, table 5.3) suggesting a 50 per cent variation either side of the 
estimated traffic diverted or generated by a transport project. The traffic 
volume variable could be represented by a symmetrical triangular 
distribution with its peak at the most likely or expected value of, say, 
100,000 vehicles per period, and the range ±50 per cent either side of 
this value, as illustrated in Figure A6.1. Note that sensitivity analysis 
would only have utilised the three values shown on the horizontal 
axis, but risk analysis further specifies the probability of observing 
those three values, as well as the intermediate ones. 
@RISK provides a menu of different probability distributions 
(e.g. normal, log-normal, binomial, Poisson) that can be specified as 
appropriate for each variable in an evaluation. The program then draws 
values randomly from each of the specified distributions and calculates 
NPV by combining the randomly selected values. The first draw may 
produce an NPV = x1. The second draw may result in NPV  =  x2, 
the third a different NPV = x3, and so on. A large number of draws 
(e.g. 10,000) will produce a histogram of NPV values. The histogram, 
or its smoothed probability distribution can be used to determine the 
probability of achieving any particular NPV value. 
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In other words, the representation of variable values by probability 
distributions rather than point estimates permits the analyst to 
incorporate risk directly into the calculation of NPV. The advantage 
of the Monte Carlo method is its combining of the risks attached to all 
variables into a single distributional outcome. It also has the advantage 
of avoiding more dubious approaches to allowing for risk, like adding 
a risk premium to the discount rate. But a particular disadvantage 
of the Monte Carlo method that cannot be easily or totally overcome 





Figure A6.1: Illustration of use of triangular distribution to 
represent estimated traffic volumes in a transport project 
evaluation
Source: leo Dobes
A6.2.1 Sensitivity testing of a risk analysis result
Sensitivity testing need not be limited to non-probabilistic point 
estimates of variable values. It can, and should, also be applied to the 
results of risk analysis. 
The triangular distribution shown in Figure A6.1, for example, can be 
subjected to sensitivity analysis. The triangular distribution is defined 
by two parameters: the extremes of its range (50,000 and 150,000) and 
the most likely value (100,000). Standard sensitivity testing of point 
estimates might have investigated the effect of changing the value of 
the traffic volume variable from the point estimate by also calculating 
NPV for the two values at either end of the range. The decision-




There is no reason, however, why risk should be represented by a 
single, static probability distribution. An analyst might just as well 
have set the range of traffic volumes at, say, from 40,000 to 160,000, 
forming a different symmetrical triangular distribution with a greater 
variance. Selection of a value range like 30,000 to 110,000 would 
generate a skewed triangular distribution. 
By specifying a set of values starting, for example, at 30,000 and 
increasing by increments of 10,000 up to 170,000, it is possible to 
allow @RISK to select randomly from a range of different triangular 
probability distributions for the variable ‘traffic volume per period’. 
Sensitivity analysis can now be carried out on changes in the most 
likely value of 100,000, as well as on its associated probability 
distributions. In principle, the sensitivity analysis of Monte Carlo 
results will incorporate the first three moments of the distribution 
— mean, variance and skewness — when testing the sensitivity of 
calculated NPVs.
A6.2.2 Discount rates and sensitivity analysis
Australian practice is typically to vary the discount rate as part of 
sensitivity tests. Infrastructure Australia (2013, p. 9) requires the use 
of 4 per cent, 7 per cent, and 10 per cent per annum in real terms 
for submission of project proposals, and justifies these values on the 
basis of common usage in the majority of Australian jurisdictions. 
The 4 per  cent and 10 per cent real per annum rates are based on 
the assumed social rate of time preference and the social opportunity 
cost of capital approaches respectively. Nevertheless, specification 
of multiple discount rates for use in sensitivity analysis would merit 
extensive deliberation in harmonisation of approaches to CBA. 
Market rates of interest can encompass a range of values, depending 
on the nature of various specialised financial markets. They can also 
vary with short-term market conditions. On this basis, one could 
surmise that sensitivity analysis applied to financial or investment 
analysis would include more than one value for the discount rate. 
The section on sensitivity analysis in a key text on corporate finance 
by Brealey et al. (2006, pp. 245–56), however, focuses on a range of 
project variables, but does not refer at all to varying the discount rate. 
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Most textbooks on CBA, on the other hand, include some reference 
to varying discount rates as part of sensitivity analysis. Yet the same 
CBA textbooks also devote space to discussing an appropriate social 
discount rate, or some average or shadow value, implying that society 
has a specific or particular time preference rate, absent complications 
like tax wedges, expression of costs and benefits in consumption or 
investment equivalents, and intergenerational issues. Conceptually, 
a social discount rate is presented implicitly as a point estimate 
parameter rather than a variable. 
Accounting for risk by adding a risk premium to a risk-free 
discount rate in CBA would require project-specific rates that justify 
sensitivity testing different rates, but adding risk premiums is rarely 
recommended in CBA textbooks for reasons summarised by Harrison 
(2009, ch. 4). Alterations to discount rates may also raise concerns 
about potential resort to ‘fudge factors’ in calculating the net social 
benefit of a project.
Variation of the discount rate in a sensitivity analysis is unlikely to add 
value or knowledge in the evaluation of a project. The present value 
formula guarantees that changing the discount rate will result in some 
change in the calculated value of net social benefit, commensurate 
with the extent of the variation in discount rate. There is no objective 
or unambiguous method for choosing the extent of the variation, 
however, any more than there is for choosing a ‘correct’ discount rate. 
And if the discount rate is subjected to sensitivity analysis and found 
to be influential in determining the NPV, it is not clear how a decision-
maker can or should choose between the different results, particularly 
if the calculated NPVs differ in sign. 
Government CBA manuals and textbooks rarely, if ever, provide an 
explicit justification for sensitivity testing of discount rates. Harrison 
(2010, p. 61), who supports the application of sensitivity analysis to 
the discount rate, argues that:
If the sensitivity analysis reveals that the choice of discount rate is 
important (changes the sign of the project’s net present value), then 
more consideration should be given to the choice of an appropriate 
rate — such as the risk characteristics of the proposal (for example, 
the extent of fixed costs and how costs and benefits vary with the 
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state of the economy). Project flows that are more sensitive to market 
returns and other factors should have a higher discount rate, while 
projects that are less sensitive should have a lower one.
There are two significant problems with this justification. First, it is 
not clear how risk premiums are to be determined for public sector 
projects on the basis of their sensitivity to market returns. The problem 
is obvious for non-marketed goods like health and education, at least 
in terms of the fact that government provision of such services differs 
substantially from limited market counterparts. Private hospitals and 
schools, for example, may be run on non-profit lines or be held by 
private owners with no exposure to equity markets. 
The second problem with Harrison’s (2010) justification is that it is 
circular. Having presumably chosen an appropriate discount rate, the 
decision-maker may find that sensitivity testing with different rates 
yields NPVs of different signs. The recommended solution is to give 
further consideration to the ‘appropriate’ rate, an approach that might 
be interpreted by a sceptic as fiddling with the discount rate to get the 
desired answer. It further begs the question of the basis for the initial 
choice of sensitivity values of 4 per cent and 10 per cent per annum. 
As Harrison (2010, p. 61, fn. 16) correctly points out, the increasingly 
conventional use of discount rates of 4, 7, 10 per cent per annum 
appears to represent equal, symmetrical deviations from the ‘central’ 
rate of 7 per cent per annum, but in fact produces non-symmetrical 




Deadweight economic loss 
caused by raising revenue for 
projects and programs
Government projects and programs can be financed by drawing on a 
variety of sources: taxes on incomes, payrolls, land, sales, domestic 
and overseas borrowing, petrol excise, mining royalties, stamp duties, 
parking fines, driving licences, reduced expenditure, and, ultimately, 
just by printing money. Table A7.2 provides a list of taxes, and Albon 
(1997) reviews a wide range of taxes imposed specifically by the states 
and territories.
Raising revenue from any of these sources will affect the economy in 
some way. Raising revenue is itself not costless, because of collection 
and compliance costs that add to the amount required to fund a 
project or program. Moreover, revenue-raising measures will impose 
opportunity costs on the community to the extent that they preclude 
activity or transactions that would otherwise have occurred, with 
consumer and producer surplus being forgone. 
A simple illustration of the concept of deadweight loss is provided by 
Bates (2001, pp. 50–51), reproduced in Box A7.1. 
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Box A7.1: A simple example of the excess burden of taxation
The following example illustrates how a tax can impose an excess burden 
(or deadweight loss) by eliminating market transactions and the economic surplus 
associated with those transactions . 
let us suppose that Jack mows Jenny’s lawn each week for $30, which is the going 
rate in the city where they live. Jenny would actually be prepared to pay Jack up to 
$33 to mow her lawn, taking into account the income she would forgo and the costs 
(including displeasure) she would incur if she mowed the lawn herself. Jack would be 
prepared to mow Jennys lawn for $28, because Jenny lives close to many of his other 
clients and the cost of mowing her lawn is, therefore, lower than for clients in another 
area, whom Jack regards as marginal to his business. This means that there is an 
economic surplus of $5 ($33 minus $28) associated with this transaction. 
Now, consider what happens when the government introduces a tax of 30 per cent, 
which applies to the income that Jack earns from lawn mowing . To keep the example 
simple, we will assume initially that Jenny does not have to pay the tax on her own 
income . 
After the tax is imposed, Jack tells Jenny that, in order to pay the tax, he will have to 
raise the price that he charges her to a minimum of $36.40 ($28 plus 30 per cent of 
$28). Jenny responds that the most she is prepared to pay is $33. Jack calculates 
that this would leave him with only $25.38 after paying the tax, which is not sufficient 
to compensate for the time involved in mowing Jenny’s lawn. So, the result is that 
Jenny mows her own lawn and both Jack and Jenny have lower levels of well‑being . 
No tax is collected, but the economic surplus of $5 is lost. This is the excess burden 
that is incurred by Jack and Jenny because the tax has discouraged a mutually 
advantageous transaction. 
The rate of tax is an important factor determining whether or not the transaction 
continues to occur following introduction of the tax. It could be expected to continue 
with tax rates of up to almost 18 per cent — that is, at rates that would not entirely 
remove the economic surplus that makes the transaction mutually beneficial. 
Substitution possibilities are also important. If Jenny were unable to substitute her 
own services for Jack’s by mowing the lawn herself, the initial economic surplus on the 
transaction would have been larger and she might have been willing to accept a pre‑
tax price of $36 .40, or even higher . Similarly, if Jack’s potential earnings in alternative 
occupations were a lot lower than in lawn mowing he might be prepared to continue 
to mow Jenny’s lawn for a post‑tax return of $25.38, or even less. 
When Jack’s clients also have to pay tax on their incomes, transactions with larger 
economic surplus are also eliminated. let us suppose that, prior to introduction of 
the tax, Jenny’s neighbour, Bill, has to work an additional 30 minutes at his job in the 
market economy in order to pay Jack $30 for mowing his lawn . Rather than mow his 
own lawn, Bill would be willing to work for up to an additional 50 minutes in the market 
economy. This means that there is an economic surplus of $22 ($50 minus $28) on 
Bill’s transaction with Jack . If the tax applied only to income from lawn mowing, Bill 
would have to work for 36.4 minutes in order to pay Jack $36.40. when Bill also has 
to pay the tax, he would have to work for 52 minutes in order to earn the $52 he would 
require before tax in order to pay Jack $36.40 (and the tax authorities $15.60). This is 
not acceptable to Bill, however, so, like Jenny, he mows his own lawn. The tax results 
in loss of the $22 economic surplus on Bill’s transaction with Jack.
Source: Bates (2001, p. 50–51)
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Different financing arrangements have differential effects on social 
surplus, but all of them involve some element of deadweight loss. 
Even reducing government expenditure in other areas to finance a new 
project is likely to reduce benefits (e.g. social security payments) in 
some way. More efficient revenue measures entail lower loss of benefits 
in the form of social surplus for any given amount of revenue raised. 
A land tax, for example, is often regarded as being relatively efficient 
because the low price elasticity of demand results in a relatively lower 
loss of consumer surplus. If the land is owned primarily by foreigners, 
who are excluded from a ‘national’ standing in a cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA), the loss of social surplus would be even lower. 
The relative efficiency of a revenue-raising measure — or, more 
specifically, a tax — is termed the marginal excess tax burden (METB). 
It is the ratio of the loss of social surplus (the deadweight loss) due 
to imposition of the tax, divided by the total amount of revenue 
collected. Such ratios can be calculated for various revenue-raising 
measures including, for example, a government bond issue (Campbell 
& Brown, 2003, ch. 10), royalties (Ergas & Pincus, 2012), land and 
other taxes (Cao et al., 2015). In the case of a tax with an METB of 
1.30, for example, raising $1 in revenue would impose a cost of $1.30 
on the economy.
A key question in CBA is whether costs should be adjusted by the 
METB — a form of shadow pricing — in order to take into account 
the wider economic effects of a project. Most textbooks indicate that 
an adjustment for the METB should be used (e.g. Brown & Campbell, 
2003; Boardman et al., 2011), but this rarely occurs in practice. Moore 
et al. (2010) is one of the few exceptions. Boardman et al., (2011, p. 65) 
also draw attention to the fact that projects can generate revenue 
for the government. Society benefits because the additional revenue 
allows the government to avoid raising public funds for other projects 
through taxation, so the revenue should also be multiplied by the 
factor (1 + METB).
One valid reason for not including the METB in a CBA — apart 
from avoiding an undesired increase in the cost side of the estimate 
of net present value (NPV) — is likely to be that governments tend 
to fund projects from general revenue. It is not possible to attribute 
the expenditure on a project directly to any specific revenue-raising 
measure. However, Campbell and Brown (2003, p. 224) argue that:
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If the government is rational and informed it will use each of these three 
sources of funds [taxes, borrowing, printing money] up to the point 
at which its marginal cost is equal to the marginal cost of each of the 
other two. In this way the total cost of collecting any given quantity 
of public funds is minimised. This implies that if we work out the 
marginal cost of funds obtained through, say, taxation, we can assume 
that this is the marginal cost of public funds from any source. There 
is some evidence that governments are rational and informed in the 
way that we are assuming: there has recently been much less reliance 
on inflation to fund public expenditures than previously. The reason 
is not so much that the cost of this resource has risen but rather that 
governments are better informed of its costs in terms of economic 
instability and resource misallocation. Since bond finance eventually 
leads to higher taxes to pay for interest and principal repayments we 
may be on reasonably solid ground if we use the marginal cost of tax 
revenues to approximate the marginal cost of public funds.
Boardman et al. (2011, pp. 65–66) provide a simple numerical example 
of how METB is calculated from changes in labour supply. Campbell 
and Brown (2003, ch. 10) illustrate the calculation of deadweight 
loss for both government borrowing through a bond issue, and the 
deadweight loss of producer surplus due to an income tax.
A7.1 Estimates of deadweight loss due 
to taxes and other imposts
Conceptually two sources of deadweight loss may flow from higher 
taxation: through changes in consumption patterns and through 
changes in the supply of labour. Calculations of METB tend to focus on 
the labour supply effect, as it is not clear exactly how net consumption 
will be affected by the provision of a government project or program 
and the associated form of taxation. 
Empirical studies have produced a wide range of values for the METB 
that may result from changes in labour supply (Table A7.1).
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Table A7.1: Estimates of the marginal excess burden of taxation
Study (year) Country Estimated 
METB
Data Tax used
Findlay and Jones 
(1982)
Australia 23% to 65% 1978–79 labour income 
Diewert and 
Lawrence (1995)







Freebairn (1995) Australia 2 .6% to 72 .7% 1993 labour income
Campbell and 
Bond (1997)
Australia 19% to 24% 1988–89 labour income
Bates (2001) New Zealand 50% Unstated labour income
KPMG Econtech 
(2010)
Australia –8% to 92% 2008 See Table A7 .2 below





goods and services, 
land, stamp duty 
and conveyances
Source: compiled by George Argyrous from the sources cited
As might be expected, attempts to estimate the METB in Australia 
and New Zealand require specific assumptions, so that the results are 
‘very sensitive to the estimation model and the parameter assumptions’ 
(Freebairn, 1995, p. 127). Key assumptions that affect these estimates 
are the particular tax that is assumed to be used to finance a public 
program, the rate and uniformity of the tax, and the elasticity of labour 
supply to changes in the after tax real wage rate.
Despite the range of estimates for the METB, the New Zealand 
Treasury’s Cost Benefit Analysis Primer stipulates ‘a rate of 20% as a 
default deadweight loss value in the absence of an alternative evidence 
based value’ (2005, p. 18). The NZ Treasury adopts this default rate 
even though it acknowledges the wide range of estimates provided 
by Diewert and Lawrence (1994) and Bates (2001). 
Similarly, the Australian Government’s Handbook of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis cites Campbell (1997) to suggest an METB of 25 per cent 
(Department of Finance and Administration, 2006, p. 37). 
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Campbell’s (1997) work provides a summary of the analysis in Campbell 
and Bond (1997), which found METB to range from 19–24 per cent. 
Their methodology was to construct a representative agent model 
for each of the 10 gross income deciles and then to simulate for each 
group the labour supply effects of a 1 per cent increase in marginal 
income tax rates. Their main conclusion is that ‘a project proposed 
to be undertaken by the Australian federal government needs to have 
a benefit/cost ratio in the range 1.19–1.24 if it is to receive serious 
consideration’ (Campbell & Bond, 1997, p. 32). Subsequent analysis 
by Campbell and Brown (2003, p. 229) adjusts these values to a range 
of 1.20–1.25.
It is worth noting that this analysis by Campbell and Bond (1997) drew 
upon data from 1988–89, and also from the findings of an earlier study 
by Apps and Savage (1989). This earlier study provided the parameters 
for labour supply elasticities from which the welfare loss from higher 
tax rates were calculated by Campbell and Bond. Apps and Savage used 
income data from 1981–82, and marginal income tax rates for the same 
period. Their analysis is based on a restrictive set of assumptions about 
the structure of households and the way that they allocate resources, 
including income, among their respective members. Specifically, they 
model the effects of tax rates by using data from ‘couple income units 
with a male head aged 25–54 years earning labour income solely from 
wages and salary and working over 624 hours per year’ (1989, p. 341). 
Given these detailed assumptions for the estimates in Campbell and 
Bond (1997) it seems inappropriate that the Commonwealth Treasury 
should uncritically adopt an METB of 25 per cent, well over a decade 
from the data upon which Campbell and Bond base their analysis. 
Moreover, studies for Australia have shown a general decline in the 
METB over time, as income tax rates fall. Campbell and Bond’s (1997) 
decades-old estimate would benefit from updating and re-estimation 
prior to further use.
A7.2 The use of METB estimates in CBAs
Many CBAs simply ignore the issue of METB altogether 
(e.g. Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2011). 
Others (White  et  al., 2012; Abelson & Joyeux 2007) tend to cite 
Campbell and Bond (1997), although White et al. (2012) use a value of 
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10 per cent with no explanation for the difference between that and 
Campbell and Bond’s estimates. Moore et al. (2010, p. 9) simply defer 
to the ‘default deadweight loss recommended by the [New Zealand] 
Treasury’ of 20 per cent. 
Other CBAs may have applied the METB without a proper 
consideration of whether it is relevant or fit for purpose. For example, 
the Independent Cost-benefit Analysis of Broadband and Review of 
Regulation Volume II – The Costs and Benefits of High-Speed Broadband 
(Department of Communications, 2014, p. 42) applied a METB of 0.24 
cents per dollar, which assumes that the full cost of each option is 
financed by labour income tax. The financing arrangements for the 
NBN, however, are through government-issued equity that would be 
repaid through user-charges; not through increases in tax. Bonds may 
generate a deadweight loss if they displace investors’ consumption 
and because of the tax wedge on equity earnings (Campbell & Brown 
2003, ch. 10) but there is no reason to believe that the METB value 
will be the same as that for tax increases. 
A7.3 Issues for consideration 
There are three key issues that are worth noting in arriving at 
a harmonised value for the METB:
• changes in the labour market and how these might affect labour 
supply elasticities
• changes in income tax rates and the distribution of tax collection
• greater awareness of the economic impact of various government 
programs.
One of the arguments for the use of METB in CBA is that higher tax 
rates create a labour supply disincentive, since they act in a way similar 
to a fall in the real wage rate. The labour supply response creates a net 
loss in welfare, and it is the value of this loss that empirical estimates 
of labour supply elasticities attempt to capture. 
The nature of the labour market in Australia and New Zealand has 
changed dramatically since the 1980s. The classic single-earner/
male-breadwinner household is not as common and there has been 
a noticeable shift from full-time to part-time and casual employment, 
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corresponding with a growth in employment for females (see Harding 
et al., 2009 for a detailed breakdown of these changes and implications 
for tax rates). Moreover, the labour supply effects of taxation changes 
vary across groups in the labour market (Creedy, 2003). Indeed for 
some groups, such as working wives, the labour supply curve might 
be backward bending. As Miller (1985) found in an early study for 
Australia, labour supply may increase for this group as the effective 
wage rates goes down. Many of the estimates for the METB listed in 
Table A7.1 avoid this issue by using a single representative household 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model facing a single labour 
supply elasticity and marginal tax rate (see, for example, Cao et al., 
2015, p. 3).
Calculating the METB to be applied to government programs also 
depends on the choice of tax assumed to be used to raise finance. 
For example, KPMG Econtech (2010, p. 5), using a CGE framework, 
provides the estimates in Table A7.2 for the marginal excess burden 
of taxation (see also Ballard et al., 1985, p. 136). Cao et al. (2015, p. 54) 
point out that different results for METB estimates for GST (8 versus 
12 cents per dollar of revenue) may be due to differences in model 
calibration and data updates.
Table A7.2: Marginal excess burdens of Australian taxes 
(cents of consumer welfare per dollar of revenue)
Tax Marginal excess tax burden
Tobacco excise –8
Import duties –3




Alcohol excise/wine equalisation tax 9
fuel taxes 15
Stamp duties other than real property 18
luxury car tax 20
labour income tax 24
Conveyancing stamp duties 34
Motor vehicle registration 37
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Tax Marginal excess tax burden
Motor vehicle stamp duties 38
Corporate income tax 40
Payroll tax 41
Insurance taxes 67
royalties and crude oil excise 70
Gambling taxes 92
Source: kPMG econtech (2010, p. 5)
The sensitivity of the METB to the choice of tax is reinforced by Hayes 
and Porter-Hudak (1987), who show that, even for large excise taxes, 
deadweight loss can be small. Similarly, Diewert and Lawrence (1995) 
have shown, for New Zealand, that the METB only differed by up to 
5 per cent between labour tax and consumption tax rates. Shifts in the 
tax base over time suggest a need to revise assumptions that feed into 
the calculation of METB.
Gabbitas and Eldridge (1998, p. 37) provide a similar range of estimates 
for some Australian state taxes.
Table A7.3: Marginal excess burden of state taxation in the 






Normal strength beer 14
Low alcohol beer 15
Wine 12
Spirits 58
Source: Gabbitas, o. and eldridge, D. 1998, Directions for State Tax Reform, Productivity 
Commission Staff research Paper, AusInfo, Canberra, May
These wide variations in METB have led the Victorian Department of 
Treasury and Finance (2013, p. 51) to adopt a default METB of 1.08, 
on the basis that the government could finance its projects from the 
most efficient state tax source (i.e. land tax).
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Noticeably, the rates in Table A7.3 are lower than those they calculate 
without factoring in externalities that flow from the activities being 
taxed. This reinforces the point made by Boardman et al. (2011) that 
the welfare consequences of higher tax rates depend on the nature 
of the activities upon which these tax rates fall. For example, they 
argue that if taxes are increased on activities that have a large negative 
externality, they actually may be welfare improving.
The calculation of METB, especially when conducted through CGE 
models such as KPMG Econtech (2010), rest on the assumption that 
the economy operates, or at least tends to operate over the long run, 
at the full employment level. If this is not the case, then increases 
in public spending may lead to higher than otherwise output levels, 
which may at least partially generate the tax revenue to fund the 
program. For example, programs being analysed through a CBA may 
roll out during a period of the business cycle when they generate a net 
increase in output and tax revenue. As Freebairn (1995) illustrated, the 
existence of involuntary unemployment affects estimates of the METB. 
A7.4 Conclusion
Estimates of deadweight loss are fraught with assumptions and data 
issues. They are also influenced by the specific type of revenue-raising 
instrument being used and various flow-on effects that may not be 
immediately obvious in a partial equilibrium analysis. 
Conceptually at least, estimates of deadweight losses should be 
conducted on a project-specific basis. The cost of doing so, however, 
would be prohibitive. This factor is probably the reason why studies 
that incorporate the opportunity costs of raising revenue tend to use 
estimates conducted by others as ‘plug-in’ values.
Given the essentially ‘rubbery’ nature of estimates of deadweight 
loss, jurisdictions should consider a more harmonised approach that 
includes the following issues: 
• the extent to which deadweight losses should be included in CBA
• the desirability of agreement on deadweight loss factors for a 
number of the more common revenue-raising instruments 
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